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ABSTRACT
Factory buildings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries loom
large in the urban landscape as symbols of industry, projecting powerful
images of the enterprises they once housed. The factory is a primary
artifact of industrialization and the absence of pertinent scholarship
is startling. Factories provide important evidence about industrial
technology, work, and the relationship between managers and workers.
They also reflect social values and attitudes surrounding
industrialization and the factory as a workplace.
Mass production has been a major theme in the history of technology and
its study, as a force behind both social and technological change, has
revealed important relationships between the economy, technology, and
twentieth century lives. It is in this context that the examination of
the emergence of the modern, rational factory is most illuminating.
Historians of technology have studied many aspects of mass production:
changes in technology and the organization of production, the creators
of the system and their motivations, and the consequences for workers
and society. While this scholarship has addressed the technological and
managerial steps in the hundred year history of the "American system" of
manufacturing that led to mass production it has largely neglected the
development of the modern, rational factory. By overlooking the
emergence of the rationalized factory, scholars of industry and
technology have missed a final and critical step in the ongoing effort
to achieve fast, cheap, and predictable production--the systematic
organization and control of the factory. The rational factory
represented physical plants built to fit new production techniques aimed
at carrying out new ideas about mass production, especially organizing
production to flow easily through the factory. Without the new factory,
it is unlikely that assembly line production would have worked as well
as it did, or as soon as it did.
Industry's Master Machine examines the period of transition from the
turn of the century to the early 1930s and focuses on the Ford Motor
Company and the automobile industry where the modern, rational factory
was born. In 1900 all factories embodied the principles of nineteenth
century industry. By the end of the first decade the shift had begun as
characterized by the factories of the Ford Motor Company built between
1910 and 1920. By 1930 the principles behind the modern factory were
well established in the form of Ford's River Rouge plant.
In addition to the transformation of American industry, changes in
fatory design reflect ideas and attitudes about industry, workers, and
the new urban environment. Inside the factory, engineers were changing
their ideas about what a factory should be and public opinion outside
the factory helped to mold those ideas. In the end, the factory
building proved to be a final and critical step in achieving modern,
rationalized production. Engineers realized that the factory building
could be used as a powerful tool in the quest for efficient production
and control over workers. Industrial engineers considered the factory
building to be the "master machine," "containing and coordinating all
the little machines." The new factories allowed managers and engineers
to achieve their goal of industrial rationality--to run the plant as if
it were a machine itself. They used rational factory planning and
design to confront the increasingly complicated task of organizing and
controlling growing numbers of workers, machines, and materials in one
place.
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Conclusion
Relics of bygone instruments of labour possess the same importance
for the investigation of extinct economic forms of society, as
to fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals.
Karl Marx, Capital, 1867
The factory should be considered the master tool with which the
factory manager is equipped. If it is not properly designed and
constructed for its work the whole manufacturing function will
suffer.
Paul Atkins, Factory Management,1926
Introduction
Factory buildings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries loom
large in the American urban landscape as symbols of industry, projecting
powerful images of the enterprises they once housed. The multi-story
brick structures stand in stark contrast to the generation of low-rise
concrete and steel suburban factories that epitomized the influence of
rational planning and control of modern mass-production industries. The
transition from the large urban factories common at the turn of the
century to a new kind of factory outside the city is an important chapter
in the industrial history of the United States. The shift represents a
significant step in American industry as it embraced the ethos of mass
production. Even a cursory comparison of a nineteenth century textile
mill and a 1920s automobile factory reveals a dramatic shift in thinking
about how factories should be built. What happened during the first two
decades of the twentieth century to so dramatically change the way people
thought about how to build factories? Who was responsible for the shift
to the rational factory? What role did the new factories play in
managerial and technological changes? The answers to these and other
questions will add to our understanding of the transition to twentieth
century mass production and the managerial strategies that accompanied it.
The changes in factory design reflect the transformation that took
place in American industry in the early twentieth century--the onset of
mass production and the introduction of the assembly line--as well as
innovations in power generation and construction technology. Mass
production has been a major theme in the history of technology, and its
study as a force behind both social and technological change has revealed
important relationships between the economy, technology, and twentieth
century lives. It is in this context that the examination of the
emergence of the modern, rational factory is most illuminating.
Historians of technology have studied many components of mass production:
changes in technology and the organization of production, the creators of
the system and their motivations, and the consequences for workers and
society. While this scholarship has addressed the technological and
managerial developments in the hundred year history of the "American
system" of manufacturing that led to mass production it has largely
neglected the development of the modern, rational factory. By overlooking
the emergence of the rationalized factory, scholars of industry and
technology have missed a final and critical step in the ongoing effort to
achieve fast, cheap, and predictable production--the systematic
organization and control of the factory. Alfred Chandler writes that "the
modern factory was as much the specific organizational response to the
needs of a new production technology as the railroad and the telegraph
enterprises were responses to the operational needs of the new
technologies of transportation and communication."2 The rational factory
represented physical plants built to fit new production techniques aimed
at carrying out new ideas about mass production, especially organizing
production to flow easily through the factory. Without the new factory,
it is unlikely that assembly line production would have worked as well as
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it did, or as soon as it did.
The Nineteenth Century Factory
The coming of mechanized mills and factories changed the face of
nineteenth century America. In just over one hundred years, production
shifted from small inconspicuous mills and shops to large industrial
complexes that towered over small towns. Changes in industry's
architectural aspect speak volumes about invisible decisions within the
factory, about expansion and management, and especially about innovations
in technology and production processes.
The nineteenth century industrial landscape was dominated by a
building style that, because of its development in the textile industry,
came to be called the "mill building." Early millwrights designed
textile mills around the needs of the industry and the limitations of
nineteenth century technology. The industry's needs were simple and
straightforward--water power to run the machines, space for the machines,
and lighting for the operatives. But the technologies of power,
construction, and lighting limited the possibilities for meeting the
demands, resulting in long, narrow, multiple storied buildings. In
addition to textiles, the mill building style suited almost every other
industry of the period and became the standard factory building, merely
built large or small according to a company's production volume.
A typical textile mill, after Arkwright's introduction of powered
spinning machines, measured thirty feet in width in order to allow two
rows of spinning machines. In spite of the narrowness they were imposing
buildings; Gary Kulik describes the massive stone and brick mills as
"structures of utilitarian stateliness and arrogant grandeur. Whether
they were seen as palaces of industry or as prison-like workhouses... they
inspired awe."3 (see illustration)
Power transmission technology proved to be the most restrictive
component of nineteenth century mill construction. In order to run one or
more floors of machines, the mill wright had to plan a network of gears
and shafts that carried power from the water wheel to each machine.
Indeed, the transmission of power usually proved more difficult than the
actual generation of power. Power transmission and distribution
requirements, according to Louis Hunter, "virtually compelled the ranking
of machines in rows and segregation of operations by floor." 4 The
restrictions imposed by available shafting, belting, and pulleys, thus
limited mill layout and design. The long, narrow, multiple storied
building was the only practical shape for the early power system.5
The technologies in use in the early nineteenth century continued,
with minor improvements, well into the twentieth century. Increases in
late nineteenth century production came largely from new management
stragegies such as economies of scale, centralization, and insights into
better organization of production. Factory size and centralization along
with distribution of power quickly became the major factor in size of
production output. As Chandler writes, "beyond centralizating their
activities, there was relatively little change in the technology or
organization of production in [the non-heat using industries] ...In these
industries, until well into the twentieth century, the relatively
labor-intensive and simple mechanical technology created few pressures or
opportunities to develop new types of machinery, new forms of factory or
plant design, or new ways of management."6
The textile and related industries operated quite well in the
traditional mill buildings. The mill that emerged from the demands of the
early industry continued to satisfy the needs of the maturing industries.
Similarly, the same style fulfilled the requirements of most of the metal
industries until the end of the nineteenth century.
Twentieth century mass production would grow out of nineteenth century
metal industries. Using what European observers called the "American
system" arms makers introduced interchangeable parts, a crucial element of
mass production.7 Other industries adopted the American system and
continued to innovate their manufacturing system through inventions and
experimentation.8 Surprisingly, even though metal working industries made
important advances in production they continued to house their operations
in traditional mill buildings. It seemed that through the nineteenth
century, and into the twenieth, the standard mill building satisfied the
industry's needs.
The steel industry proved to be the exception within the metal trades
as it, with the guidance of Alexander L. Holley, took steps toward
rational factory planning. Holley designed steel mills around Bessemer's
time and money saving process. Most of Holley's work involved the
conversion of older plants to the Bessemer system. A comparison of the
Edgar Thomson Works (1885), which he designed specifically for the
Bessemer system, with an earlier plant reveals interesting differences.
The early plants were designed without consideration for organization of
operations and flow of production. The Edgar Thomson Works were planned
by Holley for continuous flow production and became the most efficient
steel producer in the nation. Holley described his reasons for the
plant's design:
As the cheap transportation of supplies of products in process of
manufacture, and of products to market, is a feature of first
importance, these works were laid out, not with a view of making
the buildings artistically parallel with the existing roads or
with each other, but of laying down convenient railroads with g
easy curves; the buildings were made to fit the transportation.
Holley's rationale for the design of the Thomson Works anticipated
the arguments of industrial engineers of the twentieth century. His
emphasis on fitting the building to transportation was precisely the
same point made constantly by industrial engineers as they reorganized
and redesigned the plants of other kinds of metal working industries to
fit transportation and production. The auto industry led in planning
the rational factory in the twentieth century.
Builders of nineteenth century processing plants recognized the
importance of factory design earlier than designers of manufacturing
operations. Steel mills, like other continuous process plants (flour,
tobacco, refining, distilling), by the very nature of their work
depended more on flow of production than other manufacturers. Thus, the
physical organization of the plant became a major concern. Physical
organization in the steel plant proved more difficult than other
processing works because of the weight and bulk of materials and because
the several stages of steel production involved very different
activities. By figuring out how to organize the complex operations, the
managers of the steel industry began the steady movement toward modern
production.
The Twentieth Century Factory
Atkins's statement, opening this essay, reflect's the early
twentieth century belief, especially among industrial engineers, that
factory buildings in mass production industries loomed increasingly
important as tools of industry. Though nineteenth century engineers and
factory owners paid attention to the design and construction of
factories and mills, the belief in the factory as a "master machine"
derives from an engineering philosophy that emerged with twentieth
century mass production. When the Ford Motor Company engineers
introduced the moving assembly line in 1913, they created an
overwhelming need for the rational factory--a factory that ran as though
it were a machine itself. The new production system could work only if
it succeeded in gaining greater coordination and control over work and
workers, the kind of control achieved only with a well designed
mechanical system. The rational factory thus coincides with the
development of mass production. In the rational factory every machine
and worker was part of a well-planned (and constantly replanned) system
in which all decisions were made by engineers. Every movement was
charted and every moment of the day accounted for. Workers had no
control over their work; they in fact became merely part of "the master
machine."
The job of planning and designing factories, unusual at the turn of
the century, devolved upon a new group of professionals called
industrial engineers. Breaking away from mechanical and civil
engineering, industrial engineers shared a strong belief in efficiency
and industrial rationalization, and that belief guided them as they
designed and built the new factories. Compared with civil and
mechanical engineering, their work was unspecialized. In general,
industrial engineers' interest lay more with the organization of
production than with any particular engineering problem. But because
many were trained as mechanical engineers they understood industrial
operations well enough to know where factory operations could be made
more efficient. The auto factories were perhaps the most important, and
undoubtedly the most expensive, of all factories because they contained
within one plant, all of the complex operations necessary to make the
most difficult industrial product yet manufactured. The moving line
system, automatic machines, rationalized plant design, and shop layout
made possible levels of production that were undreamed of a few years
earlier. During the second decade of the twentieth century the auto
industry underwent complete transformation from batch to mass
production, with the assembly line being the most obvious of the
widespread changes that fostered large scale production.
More extensive experimentation with factory planning and design
occurred in the auto industry than any other industry in the early
twentieth century. Engineers in other industries had experimented with
production processes, most notably small arms, bicycles, agricultural
implements, and sewing machines. 10  Others tried out novel ways to build
and organize factories such as Oliver Evans and his flour mill and the
famous Chicago packing house from which the Ford Motor Company is
reputed to have borrowed the idea of a moving line. But none of those
industries took on the formidable task of organizing thousands of men
and machines under one roof and coordinating the large quantities of
parts and raw materials entering the factory as well as the thousands of
operations required to produce an automobile. The sheer complexity and
scale of auto making differed from any enterprise that preceded it. The
auto industry was important not only for developing the rational factory
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but also for changing the way almost all engineers thought about
production.
The auto industry gave birth to the rational factory because, unlike
any other industry of its day, auto production required thousands of
separate operations, combining materials processing, production of
parts, and assembly. Chandler observes that
the development of the mass production techniques in the metal
working industries required more time, thought, and effort than
it did in others. And the additional effort required to make
them more profitable and productive meant, in turn, that these
industries became the major seed bed for modern factory
technology and modern factory organization.ll
The auto industry provides the focus for this study because of its
role in the development of the rational factory and because of its
significance in the history of twentieth century technology. The auto
industry was for the twentieth century what firearms, railroads, and
textiles were for the nineteenth--the source of technological and
managerial innovations that spurred the industrial revolution. With the
introduction of the assembly line, the auto companies inspired change in
production methods in most industries, just as the older enterprises set
precedents for production with the introduction of integrated production
systems and interchangeable parts.
Industry's Master Machine examines the period of industrial
transition from the turn of the century to the early 1930s. In 1900 all
factories embodied the principles of nineteenth century industry. By
the end of the first decade the shift to another kind of factory had
begun, as characterized by the factories built by the Ford Motor Company
between 1910 and 1920. By 1930 the principles behind the modern factory
were well established, as evidenced in the form of Ford's River Rouge
plant.
Architecture, like other technological systems both reflects and
influences social relationships, and factories are no exception.
Building design and layout affects movement, surveillance, and
communication--important elements in social organization that ultimately
affect status, power, and control. In their design, factory buildings
contribute to the organization of production on the shop floor, the
degree of communication possible between workers, and between managers
and workers. They are also symbolic as they reveal information to the
rest of the world about the enterprises they house.
Factory buildings limited and supported changes in technology,
management, and the labor process. Engineers realized that factory
buildings could be made an important element in production; that they
could be used as powerful tools in the quest for efficient production
and control over workers. Industrial engineers considered the factory
buildings as the "master machine," "containing and coordinating all the
little machines," that helped them to control every detail of
production. The new factories allowed managers and engineers to achieve
their goal of industrial rationality.
The importance of the rational factory thus lay in its organizing
function, in coordinating the disparate operations of mass production.
In doing so, it helped to create a powerful industrial system. Without
the principles of coordination and flow of movement underlying the
rational factory other individual elements of the system could not have
resulted in the speed of production all entrepreneurs desired.
The rational factory represents engineers' ability to design a
physical plant to fit new production techniques, a demonstration of
engineering innovations that removed nineteenth century constraints on
factory design. Though they remained important, considerations of power
transmission and construction no longer limited factory design to the
mill building; instead, the rational factory could be built to fit the
production process and to control the labor process.
Hamilton Mills, Lowell, Massachusetts, built 1846, showing
typical facade of a nineteenth century textile mill.
(from John Coolidge, Mill and Mansion (New York: Columbia
Press, 1942)
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Chapter One:
Engineering the Factory
The first years of the twentieth century witnessed the beginnings of
dramatic changes in factory planning and design. Behind the changes lay
the new and rapidly growing profession of industrial engineering.
Through their strong belief in systematization and rationalization,
industrial engineers tried to solve complex problems in production and
industrial organization that plagued turn of the century manufacturers.
They changed almost everything about the factory--the design of the
buildings, the layout of machinery, the organization of work, and the
system of management.
The story of the rational, engineered factory, as conceived by
industrial engineers, is a new chapter in the story of mass production.
We know about the rapid changes in technology, about the revolutionary
conception of interchangeable parts, and increasing division of labor 2
but we do not know yet how all of the components of mass production
actually came together in the factory.
Although work like industrial engineering went on throughout the
nineteenth century, the story starts in earnest at the end of the
century, a time when American industry began to outgrow its factories
and management techniques and a new generation of professionally trained
engineers entered the job market. American industry grew in the second
half of the nineteenth century when national and international markets
opened up as a result of new transportation and communication networks.
The new markets encouraged additional manufacturing ventures,
substantially increasing ever-growing competition. Schemes for competing
emerged as important tools for survival in the world of corporate
capitalism. Some manufacturers formed monopolies to control markets,
others sought increased sales through advertising and marketing.3 Some
tried to increase profits by enlarging production, thereby decreasing
unit costs. In this way they could sell their product at a lower price
and, at the same time make a sizable profit. New management techniques
further reduced costs by tightening the chain of command in factories
and intensifying the work process. Daniel Nelson writes that engineers
who took over managerial positions turned to rational management
techniques as they increasingly realized its importance to successful
business. 4 The industrial organization as well as management and
marketing techniques perfected during this period became, and remained,
the foundation of modern manufacturing and business administration.5
Larger profits, a primary goal of manufacturers, required either higher
selling prices or lower production costs. Competition discouraged price
increases, so the capitalist's attention usually focused on lowering
production costs. Costs could be reduced by cutting wages, by doing the
work with fewer workers, by increasing the speed of production, and by
employing economies of scale. These became major goals for industrial
engineers.
The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed
long-lasting changes in the development of the "multifunctional,
multiregional, and multiproduct" manufacturing enterprise. The
expansion led to the reduction of production and distribution costs. 6
Alfred Chandler explains that by increasing both output and number of
functions performed firms could take advantage of "economies of scale
and scope."
The Birth of Management Science
As firms grew larger and more complex, increased managerial
responsibilities outgrew the capacity of older management strategies.
The new scale of production required a different way of managing the
factory, requirements that gave rise to new professionals who gave
management advice and often managed the factory themselves to achieve
economy, efficiency, and control. The new professionals, industrial
engineers, based their work on an engineering idea that promised to
rationalize production and industrial organization in a way that would
solve a multitude of problems. The idea that factory production could
be carefully planned and organized for greater efficiency and
reliability came to be known as systematic management, and later as
scientific management. Engineers argued that the new techniques would
objectively and rationally solve the problems plaguing business,
industry, and society.
Industrial engineering grew out of the management movement at the
turn of the century. The industrial engineers, trained as both managers
and engineers, became the most persistent publicists for the theories of
efficiency. Scientific management guided the new engineers as they
sought economy and control in manufacturing. A leading engineer wrote
that "industrial engineering, of which shop management is an integral
part, implies not merely the making of a given product, but the making
of that product at the lowest cost."8 Through their jobs as factory
planners, industrial engineers reorganized every detail of the factory
to increase productivity and reduce wasted time, energy, and materials;
they introduced new management techniques, rationalized the labor
process, and redesigned the factory. As Calvert writes, the new
engineers left the "engineering of materials and enter[ed] the
engineering of men." This represented a momentous shift from what some
called "pure engineering" to management.9
In the early twentieth century, men who called themselves industrial
engineers were usually educated in traditional engineering
programs--Henry R. Towne, an early proponent of systematic management
and a leader in industrial engineering, studied engineering at
University of Pennsylvania and the Sorbonne and received a doctorate of
Commercial Science from New York University. Charles B. Going, a
lecturer at Columbia University and editor of Engineering Magazine,
received a Masters of Science from Columbia University's School of
Mines. Henry L. Gantt, a protege of F.W. Tayulor, studied graduate
engineering at the Stevens Institute of Technology, and Paul Atkins,
lecturer at University of Chicago and consulting industrial engineer,
graduated from Yale's School of Engineering.
Industrial engineers planned the rational factory to accomodate the
more efficient production and larger output of growing companies. With
greater and more diversified output, the factory could not be run in the
ad hoc ways of nineteenth century industries. The new factories were
larger with more workers and more operations taking place
simultaneously, requiring increased management and record keeping.
Speedy and reliable throughput achieved through new machine layout and
tighter managerial control was, as Chandler explains it, critical to the
success of the new industrial integration. Economies of scale and scope
would work only with reliable throughput.
Planning and directing production emerged as the greatest challenge
industrial engineers faced. It allowed them to use their engineering
knowledge of machinery and production as well as their belief in
scientific management. Industrial engineers boasted that they were the
only people with the proper skills to plan the new rational factory.
F.W. Taylor, though considered the father of scientific management,
was not the first to propose industrial reform based on principles of
efficiency. Manuals published in England in the early nineteenth
century, about which Maxine Berg has written, examined "the connections
between technology and the science of workshop organisation." 10 Before
mid-century Charles Babbage wrote his widely received book On the
Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (1835) and Andrew Ure his
Philosophy of Manufactures. All of these addressed the wide range of
issues important in running a factory for commercial success--from the
technical details of production to the health of "Factory Inmates."
Following from Adam Smith, they sought the best and most efficient
organization of the operations of production.
Early industrialists were as interested in control of the workplace
as their turn of the century successors. Babbage, Ure, and others
recognized that systematic organization of the factory and workshop
increased control over the manufacturing process and increased profits
by improving efficiency. Reorganization and division of labor decreased
the level of skill needed from the worker thereby eliminating the need
for skilled hands, and increasing the manufacturer's control over labor.
Much like Taylor fifty years later, Babbage was interested in the
"deliberate engineering" of the workplace. He experimented with
time-motion studies, looking to the possibility of increasing production
speed. (Berg,185, Babbage,ch 4)
In The Philosophy of Manufacturers (1835), Ure foresaw a factory so
completely automated that the capitalist would obtain complete control
over production.12 Like managers almost a century later, Ure sought to
eliminate the skilled worker from the factory. He believed that "the
more skilled the worker, the more self willed and intractable he became,
the less fit a component of the mechanical system, in which by
occasional irregularities, he may do great damage to the whole." Other
industrialists and observers, whose names are less familiar today, wrote
about similar ideas and practices such as quantities of scale, tool and
machine improvement, division of labor, all of which should lead to the
most important issue--efficient work processes and greater control by
the manufacturer.13
The idea of engineering the perfect factory was also in the air on
the other side of the Atlantic and, by the third quarter of the century,
American industrialists, managers, and engineers were talking and
writing about what modern scholars call "systematic management." During
those decades the science of management was born in manufacturing
enterprises undergoing rapid growth. Owners and managers of
manufacturing companies developed and experimented with new ways of
running their production operations as they grappled with increasing
difficulty in meeting production deadlines and making profits. The
problems arose, in part, from the specialization that came with growth.
The specialization occurred at three levels--product, labor, and
management. Division of labor took on new dimensions, each worker
performing a smaller part of the total production. Specialization of
product became more and more common, to the extent that a company might
only make machine tools and maybe only one type of machine tool. With
increased responsibilities, management duties were also divided and
specialized. With work being handled by many people who possessed only
partial understanding of the over-all operation "parts were being lost,
orders going astray, and other oversights occurring which sapped the
efficiency of the operation."1 4 The consistent theme found in much of
the literature of the period was "eliminate confusion, oversight, and
neglect; coordinate efforts, return firm control to the top people in
the organization; accomplish these things through the use of
standardized procedures in routing managerial work through 'method' or
'system'."15
Systematic management was not a unified movement as scientific
management would be; only in hindsight does it resemble a movement.
Systematic management began in the late 1870s and 1880s with efforts to
eliminate confusion and inefficiency by better organizing production.
When one or two men could no longer oversee everything in the factory,
systematic management was deemed necessary. The new management methods
advised centralized cost accounting, production and inventory control,
reduced foremen's authority, and introduced incentive wages.16
Scientific management, also called Taylorism after its main
proponent, F. W. Taylor, grew out of the systematic management efforts.
Scientific management is often considered to be the beginning of
management science because F.W. Taylor, his colleagues, and proteges
worked hard to popularize their system. But the work of the few
scholars mentioned demonstrates that scientific management represented
merely a continuation of the already growing management movement.
Taylor and scientific management are important, however, because the
management system he proposed in the late 1890s captured the attention
of engineers and industrialists to a much greater extent than the
earlier efforts.
Engineers' interest in business and industry was hardly new at the
turn of the century. As early as 1835, a leading engineer referred to
mechanical engineering as one of the "business professions." The theme
was repeated in 1905 when Henry R. Towne told students that "the dollar
is the final term in almost every equation which arises in the practice
of engineering." "In other words," continued Towne, "the true function
of the engineer is, or should be, not only how physical problems may be
solved, but also how they may be solved most economically."1 7 Engineers
agreed that "whatever else engineering was, it was first of all a
business." Monte Calvert has described the engineers' thinking as the
ideal of the "engineer-entrepreneur." The engineer-entrepreneur was
more interested in profits than engineering excellence. Contrary to the
many common images of early engineers, the correctness of an engineering
design was judged, not by its elegance, but by its ability to make
money.18
Recognizing the concern for profit that runs through their rhetoric
sheds light on engineers' meaning of efficiency. As Towne declared,
"the dollar," not time nor conservation of materials, nor performance,
"is the final term" in engineering practice. This emphasis on economic
efficiency would become more pronounced throughout the twentieth century
as industrial engineers developed their managerial role.
Taylor presented his first important paper to the American Society
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) in 1895. In "A Piece Rate System," he
outlined his proposal to increase worker motivation through the use of
piece rate wages. The use of incentive wages was not new, but Taylor's
proposal differed from previous methods. He proposed a differential rate
system by which he offered two different rates for the same job:
a high price per piece, in case the work is finished in the
shortest possible time and in perfect condition, and a low
price, if it takes longer time to do the job, or if there are
any imperfections
Taylor claimed that under his system workmen had the potential to earn
more than usual for a good day. "This," he asserted, "is directly the
opposite of the ordinary plan of piece-work, in which the wages of the
workmen are reduced when they increase their productivity.19
"A Piece Rate System" and subsequent papers outlining the rest of
Taylor's system created an uproar among the engineers, which led to a
split within the association. The majority of engineers in ASME
who believed themselves to be the entrepreneurial elite within the shop
culture,disapproved of Taylor's system.20 These men did not follow
systematic rules to plan or govern the shop; they were highly skilled
craftsmen who understood the workings of the shop and made decisions
based on their personal knowledge and experience. On the other hand, a
small but growing group propounded management engineering, based on
scientific management, as a replacement for traditional ad hoc decision
making.
The proponents of management engineering, and especially those
closest to Taylor, believed that their system differed from earlier
management techniques. 2 1 A close comparison, however, reveals that they
were surprisingly similar. Systematic management initiated centralized
cost accounting, production and inventory control, reduced foremen's
authority, and introduced an incentive wage. Taylor advocated all four
and added a planning department and time study.2 2 Taylor also advocated
much broader use of his management techniques than earlier engineers
had.
The major points of Taylor's reform were to pay workers based on a
piece rate or incentive wage, increase managers' knowledge of work
process and skill, limit foremen's range of control, develop a
scientific way in which to perform each element of a man's work (time
study), and scientifically select and train workmen, that all work
should be planned by management rather than workers, and workers should
use tools furnished by the company. The program would remove any
control the worker had over his own work. In practical terms, Taylor's
proposal led to the breakdown of jobs into smaller and smaller
operations; with each successive breakdown, the skill and judgment
required by the individual worker diminished. The proposal also changed
the managers' jobs. Managers had previously relied on personal
experience to make decisions. This change removed the personal element
that had characterized the relationship between managers and workers. 2 3
In 1903, Taylor presented a paper entitled "Shop Management" to the
ASME. More complete and sophisticated than his first paper on piece
rates, "Shop Management" was nearly two hundred pages of detail about
managerial techniques, giving practical advice about how to run an
efficient shop. Its instructions included how to set wages depending on
the skill and output of the worker, how to increase labor output and
prevent soldiering (a practice in which workers made tacit agreements
among themselves to limit output, see Aitken and Nelson), and how to
organize work in the shop with the introduction of a planning
department. In the years following the paper, questions of principles
and social significiance arose and Taylor wrote "Principles of
Scientific Management" in 1911 to answer some of those questions. 2 4
In the introduction to Principles, Taylor condemned the waste of
human energy. He decribed the waste as a national crisis, comparing it
to the needless wasting of natural resources. He argued for the
importance of national efficiency, the purpose for which he purportedly
wrote the paper. The way to national efficiency was through system.
"In the past, " he said, "the man has been first; in the future the
system must be first." Taylor's purpose was threefold: to point out
the suffering of the country from the losses due to inefficiency, to
demonstrate that the solution to the crisis lay in systematic management
[his term], and to prove "that the best management is a true science,
resting upon clearly defined laws, rules, and principles." 25 Reform
should begin in the workplace, he suggested, arguing that "system" would
spread from there.
In the twentieth century, scientific management came to "refer to
all efforts to rationalize industry and make it conform to the image of
the machine."2 6 By rationality, Taylor meant the use of precise,
measured amounts of human effort in order to produce the most work. In
order to do this, one must use scientific method to study the job and
the worker. By scientifically and rationally analyzing every movement
of every job, the manager could be assured of the most efficient job
possible.
Responses to the new management principles varied widely. Some
engineers eagerly embraced scientific management, but others disapproved
of its use. Some industrialists readily employed engineers to introduce
scientific management into their factories, others payed little
attention to it. Workers and unions were in almost complete
agreement--they saw the new management techniques as a threat to their
skills and independence.
Workers objected to all or part of Taylor's system, depending on the
industry. The most famous case of resistance to Taylorism was at the
Watertown Arsenal. Workers at the arsenal struck to protest the
introduction of the system which they regarded as "un-American." The
strike was so successful that it resulted in Congress "outlawing time
study and premium payments in all work done on government contract." 27
Even the managers did not universally accept scientific management.
With the new system their jobs would be changed almost as much as the
workers'. David Noble writes that adopting the entire systrem made
management, as well as labor, accountable to the engineers in the
planning department.29 Foremen lost as much autonomy as workers, as
both jobs underwent similar specialization. Under Taylor's system,
foremen would not supervise general activities in the factory; rather
they became functional foremen and watched over only one small part of
production--the work of one foreman being broken down and spread among
eight functional foremen.
Some engineers distrusted Taylor's proposals. Many of the members
of ASME, were unconvinced that the new management system was "a science
worthy of the professional attention of engineers." This skepticism was
reinforced when an ASME committee evaluated Taylor's system on its
scientific merit, and found Taylor's method arbitrary and inexact rather
than scientific. 2 9
Industrial Engineers and the Society of Industrial Engineers
Taylor and early innovators in scientific management all belonged to
ASME. In an 1886 paper Henry R. Towne suggested to members of the
organization that since management techniques had no institutional base,
ASME should form an economic section to "share knowledge, and develop
standard procedures, and forms." 30 The majority of the association's
members rejected the proposal and the engineers behind Towne's proposal
eventually formed their own organization--The Society for the Promotion
of Scientific Management. The Society was renamed the Taylor Society
shortly after Taylor's death. In 1917 the Society of Industrial
Engineers was formed, in close association with the Taylor Society; the
two merged in the 1930s.31
The formation of the Society of Industrial Engineers reflected the
growth of the of industrial engineering profession. A direct outgrowth
of the scientific management movement, industrial engineering, unlike
other kinds of engineering, focused on the organization of production
rather than any particular piece of engineering. Though often trained
as mechanical engineers, industrial engineers' work focused only
secondarily, on the mechanical operations of production. Their primary
pursuit was engineering of the production process rather than the
engineering of machines.
An offshoot of mechanical engineering, industrial engineering shared
a knowledge base with the older group with respect to machining and the
type of work orientation. Like mechanical engineers, early industrial
engineers worked primarily in metal-working shops. The pioneering
efforts in industrial engineering took place in steel plants and machine
shops, origins that helped to shape the profession.3 2
Industrial engineers remained loyal to many of the issues and values
of the mechanical engineer. However, they shifted their primary
attention from the physical capabilities of machines to the organization
of the factory. In fact, they came to view the factory as the most
important machine. Most of the early industrial engineers, such as F.
W. Taylor,Henry Towne, and Frederick A. Halsey, were trained as
mechanical engineers and their broad mechanical knowledge must have
facilitated their efforts to introduce efficiency methods into the
factory. But their concern for larger profits through more efficient
organization of production led industrial engineers to carry the
business orientation further than the mechanical engineer.
In his presidential address to the Society for Industrial
Engineering in 1920, L.W. Wallace talked about the "confusion in the
minds of many as to the real function of the Industrial Engineer."
Discussions during the meeting confirmed Wallace's point. Some argued
that the industrial engineer was primarily a mill builder, confining
himself to "industrial layouts, designs of mill buildings, and
equipment, some appraisal work, and some engineering promotion."3 4
Another engineer, supporting the mill architect definition, suggested
that the role of the mill architect (plus production engineer) remained
primary in 1920 and all other duties should fall within the category of
counsel or advisor of industry.3 5
The majority of engineers agreed with some version of Henry R.
Towne's 1905 description of the industrial engineer as the ideal manager
who combined technical knowledge-with administrative powers "who can
select the right man for the various positions to be filled, who can
inspire them with ambition and the right spirit in their work; who can
coordinate their work so as to produce the best final result; and who,
throughout, can understand and direct the technical operations." 36
These men believed that their job was much broader than that of mill
architect. The industrial engineer studied and implemented industrial
standards, and used them in planning the factory. He considered
problems of reorganization, personnel, equipment, buildings, and all the
features of management and control in industrial or commercial
organization.37 Another engineer emphasized the importance of economy
when he described industrial engineering as "the science and art of
developing means of most economical operation and control of a whole
industry."38
Until the early twentieth century the term industrial engineer was
seldom used. In the late nineteenth century it was an ambiguous term,
which usually referred to mill builders and production engineers, the
inheritors of the early millwright's trade. The millwright, who learned
his trade through apprenticeship and experience, studied the power needs
for individual factories, figured out how large and what kind of power
system to use, and what kind of building to construct around it. 3 9
In the nineteenth century, the men who were sometimes called
industrial engineers built factories and planned some production
details. Later, after Taylor's introduction of scientific management
into ASME the engineers who followed Taylor became known as industrial
engineers. Their jobs were similar to, but broader than, the
mill-wrights' job. Planning the factory took on many new details.
Scientific management created much new work as every element in the
factory became part of the planning problem. The complexity of the job
increased as industry grew and technology developed.
The development of the profession was presaged in 1901 when one
engineer said that:
"the great opportunity for the engineer of the future is in
the direction of management of our manufacturing
industries...as competition grows sharper and greater
economies become necessary, the technically trained man will
become a necessity in the leading positions in all our
industrial works...He must be an engineer of men and capital
as well as of materials and forces of nature."40
Many of the early figures in the profession defined their work in
terms of management and economic efficiency rather than mechanical
technology. Charles Going, in 1911, wrote Principles of Industrial
Engineering in which he described industrial engineering as the
"formulated science of management." "Industrial engineering," he
asserted, "has drawn upon mechanical engineering, upon economics,
sociology, psychology, philosophy, accountancy, to fuse from the older
sciences a distinct body of science of its own."4 1  Similarly, H.L.
Gantt said "the aim of our efficiency is not to produce goods, but to
harvest dollars." And Henry R. Towne explained that "industrial
engineering...implies not merely the making of a given product, but the
making of that product at the lower cost." 4 2
The picture that emerges from the discussions about the practical
definition of the industrial engineer is one of a generalist who planned
the organization of production and the physical layout of shop floor,
monitored the flow of materials, conducted time studies, and more. The
industrial engineer was different from other engineers. Mechanical
engineers designed machinery and-its accoutrements, and constantly
improved them. The electrical engineer designed circuitry, the civil
engineer designed bridges and roads and structural systems for
buildings. Each branch of engineering had its specific orientation, but
the industrial engineer primarily engineered work and capital instead of
the materials.
The industrial engineer was thus the professional who reorganized
work processes, usually following the principles of scientific
management. He believed his work could improve efficiency in many types
of workplaces, industrial and non-industrial, wherever organization of
work was important. Most industrial engineers, however, worked in
industry and the confusion over their professional identity suggests
that they did many jobs within the factory, and that the
responsibilities of different men varied from place to place.
Industrial engineers, unlike other engineers, based their work on a
set of ideas about general processes rather than a specific practices.
This meant that their job more often involved planning rather than
invention. Taylor's scientific management created an ideology of work
and society--that any organization of men, whether for industrial
production or business, or even schools and hospitals, could be
organized in a way to be more orderly and efficient, thereby producing
better results.
Many industrial engineers also said their work grew out of the new
needs of industry to coordinate the many and varied elements of
manufacturing. As Gantt had said, it wasn't that industry needed them
in order to produce goods, but to "harvest dollars." Industrial
engineers were oriented toward efficiency to create profit.
In 1905, an anonymous correspondent to the American Machinist
complained that too few young engineers exhibited the business knowledge
needed to be good engineers. He wrote "that a common fault of technical
graduates was their lack of 'business knowledge and qualification'."43
As scientific management gained influence in business and engineering,
universities created departments to teach students about the new ideas.
By 1913, seventeen schools had established instruction in business
administration, commercial finance, but only three combined business and
engineering or industrial education--MIT, Carnegie Institute of
Technology, and Harvard. Based on demand from industry, Carnegie
created its commercial engineering program in 1910 to combine business
and engineering, and to further the study of scientific management and
production. Harvard established its program
to study the principles underlying the modern organization of
business and of recent applications of system. A brief
introduction outlines the present tendencies of industrial
organization and indicates its forms and problems. This
leads up to a study of the modern factory and of factory
methods of production. The consideration determining the
location of the factory and the type of factory building and
equipment are examined, but especial attention is given to
questions of internal organization.44
In 1913 MIT began classes in its department of Engineering and
Business Administration which aimed to "furnish a broad foundation for
ultimate administration positions in commerce and industry by combining
with a general engineering training, instruction in business methods,
business methods, business economics, and business law."4 5 Before
setting up the new program, MIT conducted a survey of industrialists,
businessmen, and engineers regarding the merits of the proposal.
Thirty-five responded with enhusiasm for the program, among them such
notables as Charles T. Main, T.C. Dupont, E.H. Gary, and presidents and
chairmen of many other companies. In support of the engineering and
business administration program, they also described frustration with
young college educated engineers who worked in business and industry.
The president of Northern Pacific Railroad Company wrote:
it is a fact that we do not get enough men as engineers who
display satisfactory qualities in a business way. They look
at their problems purely from a scientific and engineering
point of view, without enough consideration of the fact that
somebody must provide the money for doing the work, and that
work is not done simply to satisfy engineering pride and
skill, but for the purpose of providing some facility that
will be economical in maintenance and produce a real return
upon the money invested.46
Charles T. Main, a well-known industrial engineer, replied to the
questionnaire that:
In my opinion such a course would be very desirable. If
there is any one thing which is lacking in the graduates of
the Institute, it is a knowledge of ordinary business
affairs. Most of the men are unable to write an ordinary
business letter, to say nothing of important reports or
specifications, and if little knowledge of this sort would be
combined with the engineering coursgj, I think it would make
the graduates better all round men.
Another consulting engineer, Hollis French, said that "there is no
doubt of the difficulty in obtaining the services of a competent
administrative man. We find no difficulty in obtaining good engineers,
but a good administrator, who is at the same time an engineer is a hard
combination to find. 4 8
MIT's course of study included general science, engineering
studies, and business. Within engineering, mechanical engineering
students learned about factory construction and power plant design.
With the new business emphasis, engineers' roles in industry became
more central to factory operations. This was the real beginning of
their influence in industry. As they assumed much of the management,
their philosophy became more and more influential.4 9 As the
rationalizing ideology came to dominate industry each element of the
enterprise underwent reformation. By the first decade of the twentieth
century the factory building became the target. Between 1905 and 1930
dozens of books and articles were written describing "A Better Way to
Build Your New Factory." The principles on which the new assumptions
were based were, of course, "scientific." Buildings became one more
factor to help in making production more rational and efficient.
Industrial engineers believed that they knew the best way to run
industry (or just about any enterprise). Guided by the principles of
scientific management, they set out to engineer the factory, always
working toward their goals of maximum profit and control. "Modern
conditions," wrote one engineer, "brought into organized industry a
demand for systematic coordination of all factors which bear upon it." 50
The engineers wanted to organize the factory in the name of efficiency,
so that the engineer-manager controlled everything. In doing so they
considered every piece of machinery and every movement in the plant.
Their attention to detail would, they believed, improve efficiency and
increase profits.
Profits alone did not drive the engineers to recreate the factory.
As strong as the desire for profits was their belief in the idea that
scientific management, with its foundation in scientific rationality and
uniformity would improve society. The factory could serve as a model
for the efficient society that would emerge at the hands of engineers.
Engineers' work in the factory was not a one time consulting job.
Their new prescriptions for reorganizing methods of production required
a full-time staff of engineers to keep a watchful eye out for problems
and necessary changes. The engineer would direct changes within the
factory and manage ongoing operations. So, the engineers not only
wanted to change the way industry worked, they also wanted to make
themselves indispensible to the new system.
In their role as factory planner and manager they did not limit
themselves to merely the technical side of production. They believed
that their knowledge applied just as well to the organization of men as
it did to the organization of machines. Their job developed into
advising and supervising technical details of production as well as
managing men and directing policy.5 1
The "Engineered" Factory
As engineers analyzed production processes "it became clear that
existing factories were not arranged in a manner suited to [production
operations]." With the knowledge that the new efficient production
system needed a different factory the designing and construction of
industrial plants "assumed the standing of a separate phase of
engineering work." 5 2
Since the early days of manufacturing, Babbage and Ure had talked
about the systematic arrangement and operation of factories. Babbage
was concerned with the organization of work and wrote that he "found the
domestic arrangement, or interior economy of factories was so interwoven
with the more general questions [about the general advantages of
machines and tools] that it was deemed impossible to separate the two
subjects." 5 3 He discussed a "domestic economy"--the organization and
layout of the shop floor--which to him was as important as the machines
themselves.
By the twentieth century the physical components of factory
organization became a major focus for industrial engineers. Through
building design and shop floor layout they addressed a multitude of
problems; redesigning the plant and shop floor was one way to manage the
problem of organizing the many elements of production, human and
technical.
As early as 1903 an editor of the Engineering Record pointed out the
importance of the "mill architect" by describing the old means of
building factories:
It was formerly held by most manufacturers that they knew
what they needed in the way of machinery, that the local
millwright was competent to put in their power plant and a
local builder to design and erect their mills...The local
mason's buildings answered their purpose, although the floors
sometimes sagged and the shafting was more often out of
alignment, owing to the deflections of the structural
framing.
As graduates of technical schools assumed positions in manufacturing
enterprises, they changed the methods of plant design, bringing, this
editor suggested, "skill and experience gained in bridge design...to the
structural planning of the buildings."54 The new mills were better
illuminated, more comfortable to work in, resulting in a demand for the
mill architect.
At that time it was unclear out of which engineering tradition the
mill architect would come. The editor called mill architecture "one of
the most interesting branches of civil engineering" while others were
already using the term industrial engineer. The confusion developed
because factory planning had no formal course.
Setting up a manufacturing operation had become too specialized for
most owners and their staff to do alone. Industrial engineers,
"especially trained in the planning and building of shops and
factories,"55 advised on site selection; size and design of building;
heating, ventilation, and lighting systems; shop floor layout; type of
production organization, and routing schemes for work flow; materials
handling systems; and just about anything else that had to do with
managing production in the factory. The object of the advice was always
a plan which would allow low cost production.
The industrial engineers based most of their advice on assumptions
that developed directly out of scientific management, assumptions about
production, workers, their role in society, and the nature of industrial
society. Production was the engineers' life-blood. They believed it
should be standardized in order to be efficient and efficiency was the
only way to create profits. Industrial engineers believed themselves to
be saviors of industry.
Many industrial engineers diverged, however, from Taylor's
scientific management in their emphasis on appropriate building design.
Taylor believed that a good organization plan was more important than a
building; that capitalists should spend their money on setting up the
organization rather than building more factories. In Shop Management,
he maintained,
Almost all of the directors of manufacturing companies
appreciate the economy of a thoroughly modern, up-to-date,
and efficient plant, and are willing to pay for it. Very few
of them, however, realize that the best organization,
whatever its costs may be, is in many cases even more
important than the plant.. .There is no question that when the
work to be done is at all complicated, a good organization
with a poor plant will give better results than the best
plant with a poor organization.56
To many industrial engineers, planning factory buildings and floor
layout provided the means by which to organize efficient production. The
factory building thus came to be considered part of industrial
technology, not merely a passive structure. Designing new factory
buildings became a major part of the industrial engineer's career. They
called the building itself the "master machine," the "master tool," and
"the big machine containing and coordinating all the little machines."57
The engineers did not, however, believe that plant design was as perfect
as machine design; the shortcoming was due more to lack of attention
than any inherent problem. Addressing that lack of attention in the
profession, one engineer argued that engineers' "vision must be
broadened to embrace the idea of the plant as a working unit--a machine
whose operation is a primary requisite to economical production."5 8 As
the master machine, the factory building was carefully measured,
planned, and designed. Like other technologies, engineers believed that
"the plant building by its design and arrangement function[ed] to make
production easier or more difficult." 5 9
The engineers argued that the factory building's vital role in
production required a professionally trained engineer to design it. They
based their argument on the belief that when planning a factory it was
necessary to have knowledge of both the production process and business
policies and management.60
By 1910, factory architecture took on a new significance. As
industries grew, large factory buildings became the major expense in
setting up a manufacturing operation, adding to the importance of good
planning and design. In 1912 Henry Tyrrell, an engineer known for his
role in the introduction of reinforced concrete, wrote Engineering of
Shops and Factories in which he described the changing nature of
factories and explained the importance of the industrial engineeer.
"Those who were formerly content to carry on manufacturing in shops of
the old type," he began, "have long since discovered that the buildings
themselves can be made one of the largest factors in economic
production." He further observed that:
the planning and arrangement of plants was formerly done by
their owners or manager, who made little or no provision for
their extention or development, and who considered that
business success depended wholly on good management. It was
then the belief that the buildings were of little importance,
but it is now well known that they can and should be arranged
and designed to facilitate production the greatest
extent.61
Industrial engineers advised on building type and size, construction
method, production flow, and even "the labor problem." Charles Day,
author of Industrial Plants... , described his work as "the latest
manner of arranging and planning industrial plants." He claimed that
industrial engineering was "based on a logical scientific method of
analysis which recognized not only all physical means available, but
those more subtle factors having to do with the human element--men and
women upon whom all industrial undertakings depend." 6 2
These and other works addressed every detail of running a factory,
from getting the raw materials into the plant to motivating workers.
For each detail there were suggestions for a physical plan that would
improve efficiency. One engineer summed up the general problems of poor
factory planning:
Many factories have modern equipment and efficient methods
but an unbalanced distribution of floor space, with some
departments badly congested and others misplaced. Some
industries located in multi-story buildings are handicapped
by a lack of flexibility, which might have been avoided if
space had been available for single-story construction, or
for a combination of single-and multiple-story. Some
building widths or the spacing of columns are not well suited
to the machinery size or spacing and prevent an ideal
arrangement from being adopted. In some instances headroom
is not sufficient for overhead handling by traveling cranes
or trolley hoists.63
The old factories were inadequate for many reasons. One of the most
common complaints was that their design did not allow adequate
expansion. Many engineers, in their prescriptions for new factories
emphasized the necessity for anticipating expansion. "A well designed
factory," said one engineer "should be as flexible and adaptable to
enlargement as the unit system of filing cabinets." 6 4 Plants should,
they believed, have the potential of being enlarged without unbalancing
the layout.
Arrangement of factory interior space influenced production
efficiency in several ways. One of the most important was the impact on
materials handlingthe movement of all parts, raw materials, and
in-process production through the factory. "The design of the
building," said one engineer, "should allow work to go forward as though
the building did not exist at all." 6 5 The proper arrangement would
reduce transportation to a minimum.6 6 In poorly planned factories the
right materials were not where they should be when they should be.
Excessive movement meant that more workers were employed to do the
moving and less production was completed because of insufficient
supplies at the appropriate stations. Materials handling, the engineers
argued, was one of the most wasteful parts of production and proper
arrangement of departments could eliminate unnecessary movement. By the
1910s they proposed a variety of technical solutions to materials
handling such as craneways, gravity slides, elevators, and assembly
lines, all of which will be more fully described in following chapters.
Careful arrangement could also improve management of workers, one of
the most troublesome problems for the engineers. The well designed
building should "facilitate the economic management of labor," wrote
Tyrrell.6 7 Engineers assumed that workers did not want to work and that
through work slow-downs and other tactics they would produce as little
as possible. Controlling labor presented a constant problem for the
engineers; "it means," wrote one engineer, that "many a manufacturer is
today facing the necessity of abandoning a plant which produces
excellent goods, simply because of excessive labor costs." 68
Not surprisingly the relationship between workers and engineers
developed into an antagonistic one. Engineers dehumanized workers;
rather than working with them, engineers wanted to control them as they
did other variables in the factory. In an article about efficiency, one
engineer wrote "I shall ignore the human element entirely as it actually
exists in the shop and describe the people handling the operations as
people who, whatever they may be outside the factory, are while in the
factory simply animate machines,...(trained] to do their work with all
the precision of the most marvelous engineer..."69
To assure the highest productivity possible from workers, some
engineers stressed the importance of good visibility in the shop so that
all workers remained in view at all times. In Planning a New Plant,
Noyes advised that one man supervis no more than 300 feet of the shop
floor.7 0  Others exhorted owners to build factories with open spaced and
no hidden corners in which workers could hide as they shirked their
duties. To that end many typical building shapes that took the form of
L's, E's, and H's should be avoided. This meant that the ideal factory
would be a rectangular shaped single-story building, with as few columns
as possible. In multiple story buildings reinforced concrete
construction was preferred over mill construction because concrete
buildings required fewer columns--the contained three bays rather than
the four common in mill construction. Concern with visibility and
control of workers' movement around the factory also led to arguments
against unnecessary walking or elevator riding by workers, further
supporting the single-story argument. Hugo Diemer wrote that "avoidance
of unproductive travel demands a minimum of passage ways," and that any
necessary passages
should be under the close supervision of watchmen who must
note all wandering clerks and workmen, and who must be so
informed as to the employees and their duties, that they may
be able to observe and report illegitimate or aimless
wandering.71
Proper arrangement was also important for the peaceful coexistence
of workers, suggested some. One engineer advised that "in certain
localities it is not feasible to have union and non-union men working
side-by-side in the same shop unless their work falls under widely
separate heads... at these times union men refuse to work when non-union
men are engaged in their midst."72 "Union and non-union men must
sometimes be housed in different buildings."73 Charles Day gave the
most specific advice when he cautioned manufacturers to segregate the
foundry workers, often the most militant group of workers, from
employees of other departments "in order to gain adequate control of the
labor situation." He described measures taken by the Wagner Electric
Company in St. Louis, Missouri:
The employees of all departments other than the foundry enter
the plant through the service building "L," where they dress
for their work before going to their departments. Separate
service facilities and entrance and exit are provided for the
foundry operatives.74
Agreement on factory size and shape and number of floors was far
from universal. Engineers engaged in much discussion , for example, on
the optimum number of stories for a factory. Some argued for
single-story plants and others for multiple stories; sometimes the same
arguments were made for both. "Where the business is likely to grow,"
wrote one builder, "the disadvantage of a single-story building is that
the organization becomes spread over so great an area that it cannot be
properly supervised." The multi-story plant, he continued, "lends itself
more readily to the expansion of business and unquestionable it
simplifies the general supervision of work."7 5 Others were convinced
that workers were best supervised in single-story buildings because they
could be kept in sight by the manager. Some insisted that materials
handling would be easier and faster in one floor, others said that it
was more efficient in a multi-floor factory, that "in general it is
easier to walk up a flight of stairs than to walk several hundred feet
through departments." Finally, proper ventilation was difficult in the
single story building and workers objected to "the closed-in effect." 7 6
The multiple story advocates apparently won out in the early decades of
the century, for there were far few single-story factories built before
World War II. Typical one-story plants included foundries, railroad car
works, steel mills, machine shops, and forge shops. Producers of
machine tools, arms, clothing, shoes, and automobiles almost always
located in multi-story plants.7 7
The shop floor layout, which consisted of machine placement and
process arrangement in each specific area, and the arrangement of
departments, also attracted the attention of the engineers. In
discussing shop floor layout, they talked about speed of operations and
best use of workers' time and energy. Proper location of departments
bore directly on predictability of production flow and on ease in
supervision of workers, their location, wrote Diemer, "will have a
decided influence on the cost of production."78
Other concerns were not as technical, such as worker motivation and
productivity. Worker motivation, considered by some as one of the most
important factors in high output could be improved by making the factory
more comfortable. Wrote one engineer,
poor air and insufficient light and warmth inevitably result
in poor work as regards quantity and quality, even though the
workers may be picked for their cheerful and sunny
dispositions. Agreeable and healthful surroundings will tend
more than anything else to make workers contented; and
discontent in a factory organization at the present day is
sure to lead to trouble. 7 9
Even the best factory layout and design depended on two fundamental
conditions--location of the factory and sound construction. Good
location meant a good labor market, that is, penty of workers willing to
work for low wages (best location would differ depending on type of
manufacturing). Ease and expense of transportation depended on
appropriate location, and all of this ultimately affected manufacturing
costs and profits.
Sound construction was an obvious concern to manufacturers. Not
only was it a good investment, but certain types of construction
eliminated problems in the factory. The introduction of reinforced
concrete in factory construction'in the first decade of the twentieth
century revolutionized factory construction. It had many advantages
over the earlier wood and masonry mill construction. Concrete almost
eliminated vibration which, in multiple story factories, cost money
through wasted energy. Vibration also caused significant discomfort for
workers and damaged machines over time as well as causing machines and
shafting to need constant realignment. Reinforced concrete buildings
were stronger than wooden ones allowing heavy machinery to be safely
installed on upper floors. Concrete was also fireproof, greatly
reducing insurance premiums, and many manufacturers trusted it so
readily that they cancelled their fire insurance. The "daylight"
factory was also a function of concrete construction. A concrete
factory did not depend on exterior walls for support, allowing for small
exterior columns which then left large areas free for windows. Later
chapters will discuss daylight factories in more depth.
Architects as Factory Designers
Engineers were not the only ones interested in designing factories.
By about 1920 architects began working with, and sometimes competing
with, engineers for factory design jobs. The term "industrial
architect" began to apply to architects as well as engineers.
Architects and engineers joined together to build factories. Architects
also began to learn about structural engineering and production
processes, sometimes helping to plan the plant layout as well as the
building design. In doing so, they encroached on the engineers'
territory, inciting a barrage of criticism from engineers.
Though some architects designed factories in the nineteenth century,
they were a small minority. Most nineteenth century architects designed
houses, civic, and commercial buildings which brought steadier work and
greater recognition. The other side of the issue is that architects
trained in the nineteenth century beaux arts tradition knew little or
nothing about the requirements of a manufacturing building. They could
merely copy construction of other factories and then decorate the
building, which some did. In 1909 the editor of the Architectural
Record disparaged the fact that the architect had played such an
insignificant role in developing manufacturing plants. He said that he
had trouble finding a few factories influenced by architects. The
reason, he explained was the American factory building had always been
considered the subject of the engineer.8 0
As the factory became the symbol of twentieth century progress,
architects' interest in its design increased. Factories were still not
great public buildings like train stations, libraries, schools, and
churches, but they became more important as they grew to physically
dominate any area in which they were built and became the centerpiece of
wealth and power in the society. Eventually they became as important
and costly as those other great buildings. The factory emerged as the
symbol of much that was changing in the United States. Like the train
station had once signified a community's wealth and importance, the
factory came to mean jobs and growth. For some it meant great wealth
too. Many industrialists wanted their factory to be attractive,
believing that it would provide good advertising and aid community
relations.
In 1923 the editor of Architectural Forum wrote that "the great
outstanding promise that industrial buildings hold for the profession is
the opportunity of creating a style of architecture that will truly
interpret modern conditions.. .the simple requirements of industrial
buildings should suggest appropriate forms that may eventually lead the
way to the long sought American style."8 1
His quote illustrates the different motivations of the architects
and engineers. Engineers, whose professional concerns were with
production and efficiency, sought to build a rationalized efficient
factory. Architects whose interests were style and aesthetics saw the
factory as the opportunity to develop an "American style" of
architecture. They believed that industrial buildings offered greater
freedom and range of expression than other types of building because
modern factories had no prototype. The scale of industrial buildings
was also new, an element of the design process in which architects must
have taken great pleasure.
The style theme runs through much of the architects' writings.
Industrial architecture relied on functional form rather than historic
style or ritual, leading one architect to point out that industrial
buildings escaped the "useless application of historical detail to
contemporary structures," and in so doing the buildings "served to
develop the contemporary concept of architecture."82 Industrial
architecture eliminated non-essentials; it swept clean the habits and
preconceived ideas about architecture. 8 3 The utilitarian nature of
industrial buildings meant that "the design must grow out of what is
essential to the objects of the plant." Consequently, a proper
architecture for a factory building is "simply making beautiful and
attractive what has to be there anyhow for utilitarian purposs."84
This discussion went even further as they debated whether Gothic or
Renaissance traditions were better suited for industrial buildings.
Renaissance was deemed less favorable because "it often demands the use
of projecting cornices, which when applied to some types of industrial
buildings involve more expense than the Gothic." 85
Architects considered factories to be the only original modern
architectural form, a fact which some accepted with a note of
bemusement. Wrote one editor, we must "consider the somewhat
paradoxical possibility of an important contribution to the development
of American architecture through the medium of designing industrial
buildings."8 6 One notes the surprise in his writing that "industrial
buildings" could contribute to architectural style!
Finally, architects argued that making the factory attractive,
architecturally, would cost the manufacturer less than five percent of
the total cost of the building. Borrowing from the rhetoric of social
engineering and proponents of welfare capitalism, they claimed that the
advantages of an attractive building would easily pay for the five
percent. The advantages of an attractive factory, the architects
argued, were better employee morale leading to less absenteeism. They
added that the attractive factory was good advertising for the company
and good for relations with the local community. Furthermore, by hiring
an architect rather than a contractor, the manufacturer would probably
save money in the long run.87
Interest in the factory as an architectural form grew during the
twentieth century as Walter Gropius and the Bauhaus movement used the
American factory as the inspiration for a new architectural style.
Reyner Banham has demonstrated the important influence of American
industrial buildings--factories and grain elevators--on the work of both
Gropius and Corbusier by looking at their designs, their publications,
and their notebooks. In Gropius's notebooks, Banham found extensive
sketches and notes of his tour of the United States. What Gropius saw
on his tour clearly influenced his later work. His attention to the
factory influenced other architects in the early years of the century
and perhaps accounted for American architects' growing interest in
factories* 88
For many years the architects played only a minor role in factory
construction; if he had participated at all in designing the building
his role was secondary to the engineer. Architects complained that
heads of industry had used all resources except architecture in building
large industrial plants. Admitting that a purely architectural interest
would be with the exterior treatment of the building, a number of
articles pressed upon architects the importance of understanding the
internal plan. By the 1920s the situation began to change. Architects
who designed factories were sounding more like engineers. They talked
about flow diagrams and plant layout. Recognizing, like engineers, that
"the production line is the real backbone of the plan," thus, "the
architect must keep it always in mind."8 9  From the plan, they
maintained, the "architect receives the key to exterior design." The
architect argued that his "natural faculties" for securing logical and
convenient arrangement of parts" were the best a manufacturer could
find. 90
This shift toward production organization, probably more than
architects' earlier role in "decorating" the exterior, brought on
engineers' wrath. One engineer wrote that:
the design of factories has little relation to general
architecture. To handle the task requires a thorough
knowledge of the production processes, an understanding of
factory management and production control, including an
appreciation of the reaction of workers to the equipment and
facilities. These subjects are foreign to the training of
the typical architect.91
Many critical articles appeared in engineering journals. Engineers
accused architects of overstepping their bounds and engaging in work for
which they were not educated. In a biting presidential address to the
Brooklyn Engineer's Club in 1905, Richard S. Buck expressed the tension
between architects and engineers which engineers viewed as aesthetics
versus economy and efficiency.
While a certain modest observance of fundamental facts must
be maintained, this is deemed by architects a bar sinister on
architectural escutcheon. It is on these rainbow-hued
conceptions, those lofty flights of fancy which have
expression in beautifully rendered drawings from which all
inharmonious accuracy is carefully eliminated that the
architects lavish their devotion.92
Some of the early twentieth century industrial buildings designed by
architects probably deserved the engineers' sarcasm. They were flights
of fancy, which must have repulsed engineers--sewage works designed as
Victorian residences and foundries looking like classical and Victorian
civic buildings. Buck further stated that the principle of engineering
(and industrial structures depended primarily on engineering) "is not to
tickle the fancy and please the eye."
Though industrial engineers believed that factory design belonged in
their professional territory, they realized that architects were
historically the designers and supervisors of building construction.
Some engineers realized that their role in any kind of building
construction was very recent. Their young profession became useful to
the building trades primarily with the advent of a new era of technology
and new demands on buildings. In this light it seems that engineers'
criticism of architects who designed industrial buildings might have
been territorial competition. Engineers perhaps feared that architects
would assume their historic perogative and take over the designing of
the factory building. Therefore they made an effort to make it clear
that factory buildings were very different than other kinds of
architecture.
Engineers sometimes sought alliances with architects and
architectural firms, but then found themselves often subordinated to the
architect. When engineers joined with architects it usually meant
becoming part of an architectural firm instead of architects joining an
engineering firm; they were consultants to architects more often than
consultants to industry. Though the engineer in an architectural firm
performed many of the same jobs as the industrial engineer, one
primarily solved technical problems in construction and the other solved
basic manufacturing problems.
A number of firms made up of architects and engineers specialized in
industrial building construction, notably Albert Kahn, Associates of
Detroit; the Turner Company of New York City; and the Austin company of
Cleveland, Ohio. Firms of this type came under some criticism from
engineers who believed that such large consulting firms had trouble
"securing really good men" because good men preferred to be independent.
Furthermore, they argued, a company of this type was primarily a
business organization and the business brach of the company might
encourage poor engineering in order to lower costs.
The difference between an architectural perspective and an
engineering one is important. Architects' first concern was the
building. They considered manufacturing processes important only
insofar as they had to in order to design an appropriate building.
Engineers directed their attention first to the manufacturing process
and designing the factory building became a means to the end of
efficient production.
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Chapter Two
Factory Welfare Designs
Within the last few years another aspect has been added to the
purpose of the manufacturing industry, namely, that it is an
instrument of social service.
In 1905, the Ludlow Manufacturing Association in Massachusetts,
built an employee clubhose which included a theater, gymnasium and dance
hall, poolroom, bowling alley, card and smoking rooms, baths and
swimming pool, and locker rooms. Later, in 1911 John H. Patterson, owner
of the National Cash Register Company, built baseball diamonds, tennis
courts, a dance area, and a golf course for his employees in Dayton,
Ohio. Four years later he installed a children's wading pool near the
factory.2
These improvements represent examples of the welfare capitalism
movement in which, between about 1900 and 1930, factory owners and
managers made significant changes in factory environments as part of a
new management philosophy that, some scholars believe, came close to
revolutionizing worker-management relations. Welfare capitalism, also
called "industrial betterment" or "factory welfare work," referred to
"any service provided for the comfort or improvement of employees which
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was neither a necessity of the industry nor required by law."3 This
included a number of services: improved health and safety in the
factory, housing, educational programs, pension, health insurance, job
security, and workmen's councils. Industrialists and engineers used
welfare work in order to increase productivity, improve control over
workers, and reduce conflict with labor. Welfare work was expected to
help achieve these goals with worker cooperation rather than the
technological and engineering innovations of scientific management.
Welfare work grew from a belief that gained popularity in the early
twentieth century--as tools of production, workers would work better if
they were kept healthy and happy. Employers realized that it payed "to
improve and perfect their animate machines." 4 Welfare work was to the
worker what oil was to the machine. "It seems to me," Washington
Gladden, a minister and social reformer, wrote in 1893 "that the social
side of the machinery needs lubrication as well as the physical side.
The very complicated mechanism of organized labor must be frequently and
carefully oiled... Doubtless it costs something to keep the machinery
properly lubricated; it costs time and thought and patience, and some
money; but would it not pay?" 5
William Tolman, a former New York City relief worker and the
"father" of social engineering put it like this:
Setting aside any consideration of altruism or philanthropy, it
is good business to provide the best light, pure air and water,
the essentials of health for factory and workshop. That there
is a response is evident when the increased production is shown
at the end of the month."6
By the end of the nineteenth century new ideas about industrial society
swept the country, social reform philosophy met with the engineering
ideology of efficiency to create the progressive movement and welfare
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capitalism.
In the early twentieth century engineers involved themselves in
social and political reform in ways that they had never done before.
Their new interests resulted, in part, from a change in valu'es that
came with a shift in professional orientation from early engineers'
ideas about manipulating the physical world to the values more in tune
with the business world.
Engineers' influence went far beyond business and industry. They got
involved in city planning, sanitary reforms, good government movement,
educational reforms, and public control of utilities. 8 Some used their
influence to encourage engineering type expertise in political
decision-making. Most combined their reform and business interests by
encouraging urban reforms that would be attractive to industry.9 The
relationship between engineers and society proved to be an important
one--engineers moved away from purely technical interests into social
realms and much of society caught a fascination with efficiency that
endures to the present.
Their growing confidence to move beyond their traditional work
came, in part, from the widespread acceptance of one of their major
doctrines, scientific management. Many engineers, especially Taylorites,
believed that "the ultimate significance of scientific management was
moral," and that scientific management should be the model by which to
run society. 1 0 Many reforms of the period reflected engineers'
participation, creating what Samuel Haber called "the efficiency craze."
Haber indicates that the craze began in 1910, and for the most part,
disappeared with America's entry into World War I. 11 According to
Haber, "through its various forms, efficiency provided something to
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almost everyone's taste." At its peak in 1914, an efficiency exposition
at the Grand Central Palace in New York City featuring an address by
F.W. Taylor attracted 69,000 people. 12
Progressive Reform
Ideas of efficiency had a profound impact on many social realms, the
most obvious being business and industry. But efficiency also became a
guiding principle for the Progressive Movement and related philanthropic
activity where its effects are perhaps less well known. In Efficiency
and Relief published in 1906, Edward T. Devine wrote about philanthropy
and "its special province [in the] increase of efficiency." In his
treatise, Devine coined a new term, 'social economy," to identify the
new kind of social work that worked toward "efficiency" in society.13
Even earlier, in the nineteenth century, social reformers like
Washington Gladden and Josiah Strong talked about efficiency. Gladden
in Tools and the Man wanted to change employers' attitudes in the
interest of both workers and management. He proposed greater
cooperation, even profit sharing, concluding that the creation of humane
relationships within industry would result in greater efficiency. He,
like industrial engineers two or three decades later , recognized that
technology accounted for only part of industrial productivity and that
the "the human machine" must be respected. On a slightly different
theme, Josiah Strong, working with William Tolman, promoted industrial
efficiency as a way toward a better society.14
Progressive reformers employed ideas of efficiency in their diverse
social programs. Settlement houses taught neighborhood residents how to
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work better; visiting programs taught immigrant women how to be
efficient homemakers; political reforms sought more efficient
governments through non-partison politics; tenement house reformers
believed that better housing would make better workers. 1 5
At the turn of the century ambivalent mood characterized the
country's attitude toward industry. Material life improved each day, it
seemed, but more and more people began to notice the social cost of
American industry. Muckrakers wrote about factory conditions and lives
of factory workers in books like The Jungle and The Octopus.16 These
writings came at the end of the "Gilded Age" when industrialists and
businessmen accumulated great fortunes. Reformers, as members of the
middle class, sought to ameliorate at least some of the injustices to
the working class by encouraging industrialists to use part of their
great wealth to make the lives of their workers a little safer,
healthier, and happier.
Most scholars date welfare capitalism from about 1890 through the
1920s, the same years that progressive reformers tried to impose social
and political changes throughout the country. That the dates of these
two movements correspond is probably not coincidental though scholars of
welfare capitalism have ignored, or even denied, the relationship
between the two movements.
Some reforms of the progressive period directly addressed factory
conditions. Factory reform became a pressing social issue at the turn
of the century, with some states passing factory reform legislation as
early as the 1880s. During this period factory inspectors made
unannounced visits (though their arrival was often expected) to examine
health and safety in the factory and to insure against abuses of child
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labor laws. The factory inspections provided additional fuel for
poignant accounts of factory life. 17
In addition to health and safety regulations, factory reform
included legal limitations on length of the working day, restriction of
children's and women's labor, and worker compensation. The reforms
exerted a significant influence on the factory's environment and created
minimum standards for working conditions.18
Progressivism was more than a group of social reforms, it was a set
of ideas dominated by a belief in science and experts, in
rationalization and bureaucratization. Robert Wiebe has written that
"the heart of progressivism was the ambition of the middle class to
fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means."19 Progressives tried
to make sense out of the disorder that grew up alongside of industrial
capitalism and urbanization. Reformers looked at some of the grossest
social injustices like housing and labor laws and at what they saw as
corruption in government and business. The ideas and values that formed
the base of the progressive movement also lay behind welfare capitalism.
Welfare Capitalism in Action
Factory welfare work existed long before professional managers began
to think about it. Welfare capitalism, initiated by industrialists in
the nineteenth century, was a broadly based movement whose ideological
roots can be traced to the paternalism of early American industrial
communities. Welfare capitalism, as an integrated system, began with
"model company towns" such as Pullman and LeClaire in Illinois. 20
These towns were built by industrialists who believed that the proper
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social and physical environment would encourage the kind of personal and
moral development that made for loyal, hardworking employees. Their
attempts met varying degress of success, with Pullman where workers
staged their 1894 strike of such magnitude that it shook the nation,
being the most famous failure.
Even though not always successful, company town experiements led the
way to further development of welfare capitalism's ideology--provision
of security, education, wholesome entertainment, and physical comfort to
achieve peace in the workplace.
During the last years of the century, workers worried their
employers in a number of ways. They slowed down production through
deliberate attempts to control the pace of work. Another factor, labor
turnover increased by the turn of the century as more factories were
rationalized and workers sought work places in which they could maintain
more control over their own work. Turnover was expensive for a company.
No matter how "unskilled" a job might be, it took several weeks for a
worker to be fully integrated into the operation. Studies of the period
estimated that hiring and training a new employee cost as much as
$500. In the 1910s, turnover was so high that large plants had to hire
twice the number of employees needed during the year to maintain their
work force. Worst of all, said one executive of the auto industry,
"turnover breeds inefficiency and inefficiency breeds turnover."2 1
There were other problems. Unionism, always frightening to
industrialists, grew in the late nineteenth century and reached a peak
just after World War I. Between 1875 and 1900 over 20,000 strikes
plagued American industry. Most threatening were the mass strikes,
notably the railroad strike of 1896. The goal of mass unionism was to
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mediate changes in work process as well as unhealthy working conditions,
low wages, and long hours. Through welfare capitalism, industrialists
responded by improving working conditions but rarely changed jobs,
wages, or hours.22
Finally, many companies suffered from a bad public image. Modern
industry was supposed to mean progress and prosperity. But many
factories were exposed as unsafe, unhealthy, and inhumane workplaces.
The two images did not fit. The bad image hurt public relations. It
also threatened industry with widespread social reform in the form of
laws that would impose specific regulations. Capitalists preferred to
make changes themselves rather than risk potentially harsh laws. The
most striking example is that of workmen's compensation laws which,
contrary to convensional wisdom, were supported by businessmen who
feared an acceleration of employer liability laws which meant
potentially unbounded reibursement to employees for job related injuries
and death. 23
Companies responded individually to low worker motivation, high
turnover, unionism, and bad public image by offerring their workers
benefits designed to make their lives more pleasant. Physical
conditions inside the factory were improved, such as lighting, heating,
ventilation, and sanitary facilities. Additional amenities in the
factory might include dining rooms, libraries, clinics, commissaries,
and locker rooms. Even more interesting were the programs that affected
workers' lives outside the factory--company housing, education, and
recreational programs. Some companies also offered profit sharing,
insurance, and pension funds. 2 4
In addition to stimulating worker motivation and loyalty, employers
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talked about improving the character of their employees. Workers were
almost always referred to as persons with dull minds, low morals, and
questionable character; they were assumed to lazy, drunken, unreliable,
and prone to lying; they were depicted as full of lust, uncontrollable
passion, and violence. Running through the literature of welfare work
(and other reform literature) was the theme of moral uplift and
improvement of the lower classes. Absenteeism and low productivity came
in part, employers believed, from the inferior culture of immigrants and
the lower classes. Thus, educated workers would be better workers.2 5
One writer went so far as to argue that it was the industrialist's
responsibility to improve workers' character for the good of the
society. He wrote:
Not from the churches, not from the universities or colleges not
from the common schools, but from the hands of the great captains
of industry who are recognizing and providing for an all-round
development, the character of the plain people is being moulded
and shaped along lines of civic and social usefulness. Never
before in the history of the world has the employer had such
colossal opportunities for guiding and uplifting the thousands of
men and women who spend at least one-third of each working day in
his employ. If employers realized that they hold within their
grasp the possibilities of industrial contentment, social
stability and communal welfare, they would plan and scheme how to
improve the conditions of their employes [sic] with the same zeal
as they n2g devote to promoting the efficiency of their
business.
In 1914, George M. Price outlined four different motivations behind
"employer's welfare work"--philanthropy, fear of unionism and radical
political movements, efficiency (because it pays), and industrial
justice (to begin to reduce hardships endured by workers due to low
wages). Some businessmen claimed humanitarian motives; that their form
of welfare capitalism was pure altruism. They insisted that no economic
advantage resulted, that profit never figured into their plans to
improve the lives of their workers. 27
Others claimed that welfare work was simply good business, denying
the slightest suggestion of altruism. To make this point, one person
explained: "When I keep a horse and find him a clean stable I am not
doing anything philanthropic for my horse., 28
A National Civic Federation survey in 1914 found 2,500 companies
with welfare programs in operation. The Federation, by establishing a
department for advising on welfare work, one of the only departments
from which union representatives were excluded, legitimated welfare work
for many businessmen.29
Industrialists devised a variety of welfare programs which can be
divided into three categories: basic health and safety, personal
security and social services.
Health and safety programs were sometimes voluntarily introduced by
the factory owner, but most states required minimum safety precautions.
Early in the century owners and managers denied the existence of
hazardous conditions in the factory, insisting that workers caused most
accidents themselves through careless negligence. Though designed to
ameliorate hazardous conditions, most factory inspections were shams. 3 0
Before workmen's compensation legislation, which began in 1911,
employers escaped their obligation to compensate workers for accidents
in the factory. Once faced with the threat of paying large sums for
severed limbs or death, employers instituted serious safety programs.
In the long run companies found safety programs cheaper than
compensating workers and their families. Safety programs consisted of a
variety of efforts, from simple campaigns like posting safety slogans
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around the factory to more costly measures such as the installation of
safety guards on machines. 31
Personal security programs included pensions, health insurance,
profit sharing, and guarantees of job security. Many companies also
built worker housing. Housing was a mixed blessing for workers. While
usually less expensive for the worker than other housing, company
housing meant that the company possessed yet another hold over workers;
if the worker changed jobs or struck he faced immediate eviction.
The welfare programs most relevant to factory planning and design
were social programs that often included new facilities right inside the
factory. These facilities attempted to give workers a message that the
company cared about their welfare.
One of the most frequent additions was the workers' dining room.
Formerly, workers carried their lunches or bought them from sandwich
carts brought onto the shop floor and ate at their machines or outside
on the factory grounds. Bars and cafes sprung up nearby many factories,
providing another option for meals. Many of the bars offered free food
along with drinks. (see illustration)
Industrialists built dining rooms for several reasons. Factory
inspectors pointed out the health hazards inherent in the practice of
eating on the shop floor near the dirt (and often chemicals) of
production. The usual absence of washing facilities exacerbated the
problem. Managers did not like workers to leave the factory for lunch,
especially to patronize the neighboring bar. Not only were workers
often late in returning from outside lunch trips but their performance
was usually impaired from lunch-time imbibing. The bars and cafes
created another, less obvious problem for management--they served as
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gathering places for union organizing. Welfare secretaries also
convinced management that employees could work better with a healthy,
hot lunch provided in a peaceful, wholesome atmosphere where workers
could experience a real break from work. The effort and expense in
providing dining facilities varied widely. At the Iron Clad Factory in
Brooklyn the "dining room [was] the most important feature," a large
room with many windows, each holding a flower box, and a ceiling covered
with grape vines, the dining hall held small tables arranged like a
restaurant or hotel. Waiters in white uniforms served workers. On a
more modest level the Waltham Watch Company of Waltham, Massachusetts,
gave workers the use of a plain room with small tables. The company
supplied a counter "for the sale of simple forms of food" and provided
facilities for heating food and coffee. 3 2
Most companies that supplied lunch rooms also offered some form of
subsidized lunch. The Pierce-Arrow Company furnished a hot lunch for
fifteen cents, National Cash Register employees paid fifteen cents for a
hot lunch in "Welfare Hall," the Plymouth Cordage Company sold a
"substantial dinner" for ten to twelve cents, and the Natural Food
Company of Niagara Falls gave their employees a free lunch.3 3
Much like dining rooms, sitting rooms, smoking rooms, and libraries
were built to provide workers with quiet retreats to refresh and educate
themselves during their breaks and after working hours. Sitting rooms,
or rest rooms offerred women, and sometimes men, a haven from the busy
factory. Some companies like the Shredded Wheat Company, National
Biscuit, and National Cash Register "required" their workers to take a
ten to fifteen minute break each afternoon. Amenities like sitting
rooms (as well as classes in sewing, cooking, and homemaking) often
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characterized welfare programs for women. Many companies assumed that
women would marry and leave factory work which meant that they did not
need long term welfare programs like pensions and health insurance.
Factories employing women tended to improve the physical environment of
the factory to a greater extent than factories employing men. Men, they
believed, were more interested in personal security--pensions, profit
sharing, housing, and job security.34 Some of the most interesting
physical changes under welfare programs were recreational facilities.
Guided by their beliefs that workers possessed weak character, many
industrialists devised recreational programs to influence their
employees' behavior outside of the workplace. Businessmen feared that
leisure threatened work values, that workers would not use their
increased amount of leisure time in wholesome, healthy pursuits. The
programs were intended to counter the influence of "unhealthy"
commercial leisure like dance halls, saloons, pool halls, and amusement
parks, which were thought to be "injurious to industrial morality."
Company recreation would increase efficiency by keeping the worker
healthy and, perhaps more importantly, it would build "character" and
create a team spirit among workers as it instilled loyalty in the
company.35 Good recreation, like other welfare work, was considered to
be maintenance for one of the most important machines in the
factory--the worker.
Industrialists sometimes went to great expense in order to make
company recreation attractive and convenient for workers. Several
companies built swimming pools inside their factory. Others built
bowling alleys and installed pool tables in a club room. Some built
elaborate club houses for employees' use. Still others added
auditoriums and ballrooms to the factory. Less striking were ball
fields and picnic areas on the factory grounds. 3 6
Less frequent than some of the other additions were classrooms in
the factory. Companies set up training programs for boys and young men,
clases in English, Americanization, cooking, sewing, and music. Many
companies also installed commissarries, and clinics for employees'
convenience.37
Industrial Engineering and Welfare Capitalism
Industrial engineers played an important role in welfare capitalism;
in many ways they legitimated it. Engineers took what might have been
viewed as an idealistic, humanitarian idea and turned it into a
practical tool to increase production. "There are two reasons for
employers giving workers good air, good light, proper temperature, safe
and comfortable working conditions, good lunch facilities, and
encouraging athletic and recreational facilities," wrote industrial
engineer Hugo Diemer.
The first is that better health and better attitude...help to
produce the largest possible output at the lowest possible
cost...The second reason is based on the idea that industry and
society are interdependent, and that industry and business have
certain obligations to society in the way of helping to develop
and maintain a healthy and intelligent citizenship with proper
American standards and ideals. It will be noted that neither of
these reasons involves anything in the way of philanthropy or
paternalism.38
Thus argued Diemer, and others, that welfare work was good business.
Diemer meant that welfare work was no longer philanthropy, but part of
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the economic and managerial practices in industry, that, as one author
wrote "production is far more a matter of efficient men than improved
machinery...that capital can prosper only as long as it secures the
good-will of its workers by providing better advantages for them."
Industrial engineers' involvement with welfare work is worth looking
at, not because their contribution was especially unique, but because
they employed welfare capitalism in order to balance their efforts to
rationalize the factory. In their use of welfare work, the engineers,
influenced by progressivism and factory reform, employed a kind of
environmentalism in their factory planning. They directed their work at
a special set of problems--worker productivity. Though old problems,
they took on new meaning in the rational factory. The problems were
social, not mechanical; about workers not machines.
After the factory had been reorganized, new machines installed, and
work arranged according to time study, industrial engineers began to
realize that productivity still was not as high as they wanted it to be.
They had been concentrating only on the technical details of production
and overlooked the human element. In their planning, they forgot that
production depended on human will as well as technology. Engineers
could design the ideal technical production system, but if workers did
not want it to be productive, it would not be. As work became
increasingly rationalized, workers' individual output was expected to
grow. But as their jobs changed, allowing them less control over how
they performed their task, workers refused to speed up their work to the
extent believed possible by engineers. There was no way around it;
without motivated workers no amount of planning would attain the desired
rates of production. This dilemma led to the combining of scientific
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management and factory welfare work.
As discussed in chapter two, predictability became an important part
of the new industrial system--the ability to keep contracts; faithful
delivery of promised goods became a critical link in the expanding
industrial system. Worker cooperation affected predictability just as
it did productivity. Washington Gladden, even as early as 1894,
realized this connection when he wrote:
[with good relations] he [the employer] can make his contracts
with confidence; he will feel well assured that he will not be
interrupted by threats of a strike when the tide of business turns
toward prosperity.40
The writing of industrial engineers illustrates their efforts to
combine scientific management and welfare work. By 1910, books on
factory planning and design appeared with chapters or sections extolling
the effectiveness of "welfare features" in the factory.4 1 These new
sections proposed a combination of managerial strategies--the concurrent
use of scientific management and welfare work. Engineers recognized the
importance of the "human side" of the factory. Some writers explained
in detail how and why welfare practices contributed to productivity.
Others treated industrial betterment in a perfunctory fashion,
suggesting that they grudgingly accepted the necessity of the new
elements of factory planning. Generally, writings of industrial
engineers' reveal that their purpose in using welfare work was to
produce efficient workers, "treat the operative as one of the factors of
production whose efficiency should be raised to the highest pitch..." 4 2
Social Engineering
In 1901 William Tolman introduced his idea of social engineering in
an article entitled "The Social Engineer, A New Factor in Industrial
Engineering." 4 3 Social engineering grew out of welfare capitalism and
industrial engineering. The new movement reflected the growing interest
in social reform and the strong influence of engineering as a profession
and an ideology.
Because of its high visibility and perceived role in society,
engineering became so popular that its ideology influenced many
professions. The term "engineering" was used increasingly even for
non-technical jobs. One such use, "social engineering," appeared just
after the turn of the century and became a force in welfare capitalism.
Like other parts of the engineering movement, social engineering was
affected by scientific management. The social engineers' goals, like
those of industrial engineers, were profits and efficiency. The social
engineer's job, however, merely supplemented other engineering work.
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His, or her (and they were often women) main function was to improve
working environments in order to assist the "efficiency work" of the
industrial engineer. Social engineers believed that workers, like
machines, had to be taken care of. Caring for workers, they realized,
would improve production by improving worker morale and loyalty to the
company.
William Tolman, the "father of social engineering," along with
Reverrend Josiah Strong, a minister of the social gospel, established
The American Institute of Social Service in 1902 for the purpose of
"social and industrial betterment." The Institute gathered information
on employer welfare work from around the world to disseminate to
American industry.4 5 Tolman wrote his Social Engineering under the
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auspices of the Institute. In it he described the need for, and
function of, the new professional--the social engineer.
Tolman wrote about the desire for "industrial peace and contentment"
and its importance to the efficiency of a firm. This peace would come,
he argued, when the industrialist established a connection between
himself, his staff, and "the rank and file of his industrial army." The
social engineer would provide this contact because the "industrial army"
had grown too large for the employer to do it himself.4 6
The Institute, based in New York City, encouraged industry to use
its services in the interests of workers, society, and the industry.
Some of the largest firms in the country appear on the lists of the
Institute's clients--Prudential Insurance, General Electric, McCormick
Harvester, Sherwin-Williams, H.J. Heinz, and National Cash Register.47
According to Tolman, the social engineer could ease the curious
concern of many employers that improved workplace conditions might raise
workers' suspicion about the empoyer's motivations. Though unstated, he
referred to workers who had begun to question the motives behind factory
welfare work, arguing that welfare features were implemented to draw
attention from low wages and long hours. If an employer paid fair wages
for reasonable hours they would have no trouble with workers' loyalty,
argued the critics. The social engineer would serve as a point of
contact between the owner, the administration, and the work forge.
Obviously, social engineers were not real engineers; social
engineers manipulated people rather than the physical environment. They
advised industrialists on welfare features in factories. They talked
about efficiency promotion (that is, getting workers to accept
"efficiency work"), hygiene, safety, security, benefit asociations,
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housing, pensions, employee thrift, education, recreation, and community
betterment. 48
The social engineer's work was not altruistic. He concerned himself
with improving the factory's working environment only to the point where
it would be profitable. As with everything in industry, environmental
improvements were judged, in the end, by the degree to which they
enhanced profits. Tolman wrote that there was "little room for
sentiment; the ordinary employer demands a cash equivalent for each
dollar paid out." 4 9  Improving the factory environment for profit seems
a more convincing explanation for the social engineer's existence than
the mediating role advanced by Tolman.
Worker Response
Not everyone responded favorably to welfare capitalism. Unions and
individual workers believd that motives behind welfare capitalism were
greed and power, not altruism and social justice.
Understandably, unions criticized welfare programs. Authors of
welfare proposals made no secret of their intentions to keep unions out
of the factory. Managers hoped that industrial peace and stability
would follow the introduction of welfare programs. For many workers,
welfare capitalism meant that a major issue in the labor
movement--working conditions--ceased to be a problem. Consequently,
union membership declined and organizing efforts met with little
success. Unions called fewer strikes and those called were less intense
between 1918 and 1930, the peak years of welfare capitalism.
Labor leaders argued that welfare practices lulled workers into
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inactivity. They believed that welfare programs replaced hour and wage
reform.50  Welfare programs gave employers more control over workers
than they would have had with higher wages. With better wages workers
did whatever they wanted with their money. With welfare programs
employers determined how money was spent. Consequently, "the welfare of
the workers is constantly becoming more and more dependent upon the
good-will, success and prosperity of the particular industry in which
they are engaged." 51
Welfare work had profound implications for the workers' community.
If the factory's programs succeeded in appealing to workers, the
community would become dependent on factory-supplied recreation and
social services. Dependence would grow as other sources of recreation
and services disappeared through disuse. Some workers foresaw the
potential dangers in allowing the factory to provide their socializing
as well as their employment and they opposed each new addition in the
factory's welfare work. At the 1928 convention of the Amalgated
Clothing Workers of America one worker proclaimed that :
Welfare is a deadening anesthetic. It is Delilah's method of
robbing Samson of his power...It puts the employer's collar on the
worker... It chains him to the factory not only as a producer of
goods but also in every other respect. Even his recreation is
handed to him at the factory, in the factory atmospherre, and with
his employer's label. Under the welfare system the worker is a
"factory hand" even while singing and dancing.52
Some workers clearly rejected welfare efforts. In one case rather
than use a library the company built, workers collected their own
library fund. Workers often refused to take advantage of subsidized
meals; when asked why he did not buy the two cent coffee, one worker
replied that he was "afraid that if he took two cents' worth of coffee
he would be expected to do seventeen cents' worth of work for it. 5 3
Although many workers opposed the practices of welfare capitalism,
it did work for a while. Two of the main goals of welfare work were
met--turnover declined and union organizing abated. Organized labor
seemed to have had little influence in curtailing welfare work. The
success welfare capitalism enjoyed in the 1920s, however, finally came
to an end during the Depression of the 1930s. But its demise did not
result from trade union criticism. It ended for the same reason it was
so successful--it depended on a sound industrial economy. It worked in
the twenties because there was plenty of money and low unemployment. It
collapsed in the thirties because of scarce money and high unemployment.
Bureaucratization of Paternalism
To some, welfare capitalism seems little more than age-old
paternalism used by an increasingly sophisticated industrial system. As
one industrial engineer, described the system:
Recognition of planning and control of production as an essential
feature of industry became widespread in the United States about
1910. The application of research methods to the factory, to the
markets, and to merchandising was a natural sequence. The ulimate
result was the correlation of planned control in all the major
divisions of industry, namely, finance, production, distribution,
and personnel.54
The system is the same one described in chapter two, a system that
took shape as industry grew in order to take advantage of economies of
scale and scope. Organization and management of production was
systematized and rationalized in the effort to gain control over
increasingly complex elements of production. Control, industrialists
hoped, would improve efficiency and predictability of work in the
factory. Industrial engineers reorganized factory layout and work flow
in a way that should have created the desired increase in productivity.
The changes did lead to improvements in productivity but not as great as
engineers and owners hoped for.
By the early 1900s capitalists realized that they needed a system to
manage the workforce just as they had a system to manage the technical
side of production. Turnover, threats of strikes, and workers'
noncooperation seemed to be the final hurdle to achieving a smooth, and
more importantly, reliable flow of production--thus, welfare capitalism
became part of a broad based strategy with which industrialists
addressed "the labor problem." Welfare capitalism, especially in the
1920s, was an effort to stabilize the working class; to stop (or at
least curtail) the radicalization of workers.
Welfare capitalism was a new form of paternalism and it became a
serious component of the production system. As part of the system,
paternalism, under the name of welfare work or industrial betterment,
became bureaucratized. Like so many other reforms related to the
progressive movement, welfare work came under the supervision of
experts, newly trained experts in social engineering. Social engineers,
or welfare secretaries, formalized the relationship between the worker
and the company, a necessity born of the increasing size of the
workforce. With thousands of workers, owners and managers could not
practice the old style of paternalism under which they claimed to
maintain personal contact with employees.
By the 1920s specialization of professionals in the factory was as
visible as the specialization of production operations. Social
engineers assumed principal responsibility for welfare work as
industrial engineers deferred their role in that part of factory
planning. Harrington Emerson, a spokesman for industrial engineers
since the earliest days of the profession said in 1922:
When I was much younger I thought that the function of the
industrial engineer was to spread himself all over the map. He
was concerned with the health of the operators, with their
education, their morals and their happiness--all that was part of
the function of the industrial engineer. As I went along I
discovered it was none of his business whatsoever; that he was
there to secure industrial competence...Happiness, of course, is a
great thing for the human race, but it is not the business, as I
see it, of the industrial engineer to take up the subject of
happiness.55
Social engineers were reformers who brought the attitudes of the
social reformer into the factory. They wanted to change certain
elements of factory life without altering the basic structure of
industry and to teach workers to adjust to the factory situation. Like
other reformers, social engineers stressed education, socialization, and
environmental improvements. Unlike other reformers, they worked in a
small, well-defined world with a captive population. To improve
relationships between workers and management social engineers
regularized contact with workers. Sometimes contact was personal,
sometimes institutional (such as in company dining rooms). The point
was to remind workers that their best interest was always the company's
concern.
Many scholars fail to see welfare capitalism as more than a
collection of welfare activities. 5 6  They have examined welfare
capitalism by exposing specific practices as manipulative devices to
deceive and control workers. Their arguments are persuasive so far as
they go, but they overlook the underlying system of which welfare
capitalism was only a part. Only by looking at the industrial system in
larger context can we see how welfare capitalism moved ideas of
paternalism out of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.
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From Tolman, Social Engineering.
Swimming pool for employees of the Standard Sanitary Mfg. Company,
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Chapter Three
New Methods, New Factories:
The Ford Motor Company's Highland Park Plant
In 1910 Henry Ford moved manufacturing operations to a new plant
just outside of Detroit. The Highland Park plant represented the
beginning of a new era in the design of automobile factories, an era
when new assumptions about production dictated important changes in the
planning and design of factories. The new plant signaled a significant
step in the development of the rational factory, a factory planned to
work as predictably and obediently as a machine. Such a factory would
not need to depend on welfare programs but would rely on industrial
engineering practice.
Instrumental in the development of the rational factory, the auto
industry combined more different kinds of operations on a larger scale
than any other industry. Though others experimented with new building
forms, auto companies provided the most exacting industrial environment.
The demands of the auto industry for the perfect factory went far beyond
earlier requirements for a strong, solid structure to hold machinery.
The new industry required a factory strong enough to hold machines that
seemed to grow heavier each year, but engineers also wanted the building
design and layout to aid in production flow and in the management of
workers.
Engineers changed the way they designed factories in the early
twentieth century because the factory, like other industrial technology,
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had to be made more productive. Careful management of men, materials,
and speed of production became the crucible that determined whether a
company would survive in a tough business climate. The new factory
buildings had to aid in that management. In the Visible Hand, Alfred
Chandler includes plant design as one of the tools used by growing
industrial enterprises to increase speed and volume of production and,
most importantly, to assure a steady flow of production. The following
chapters examine that development at the Ford Motor Company.
The Ford Motor Company experimented with factory design and layout
more explicitly than most companies. Ford seemed more willing than many
industrialists to abandon an old building and build a new one when
either production volume outgrew the original structure or when
engineers' thinking about production advanced beyond its capabilities.
By looking at the buildings of the Ford Motor Company one is able to
discern the stages in the development of mass production and the
changing role of the factory building. Such an examination helps to
clarify and underscore the revolutionary changes in factory design and
organization during the early years of the twentieth century.
The Early Automobile Factories
The design of early twentieth century factories evolved from two
nineteenth century styles: large mill-type buildings and smaller shops
which housed a variety of enterprises such as wagon and machine shops,
firearms manufacturers, and perhaps blacksmiths. Preceding the auto
industry in the early attempts at large scale production, textile
manufacturers, and later, bicycle, sewing machine, agricultural
equipment, and firearms makers, all used mill type construction. Mill
construction, characterized by long, narrow, multi-story buildings, was
used most widely in the textile industry but came to be the standard
building type for all large scale production operations barring any
special requirements for heavy or special equipment or unique working
environments.
The small shops varied in appearance and function. They housed
operations too small to warrant a mill building as well as those that
would not easily conform to work in the multi-story building. Most
machine shops, for example, depended on single-story buildings because
the weight of machine tools and forges was too great for upper stories.
Machinists also required good light which was best provided by saw-tooth
roofs on one-story buildings. For the most part, the small shops in any
city could fulfill their requirements.
The early auto industry, as small companies made up of skilled
machinists, was located in small shops throughout the Northeast and
Midwest. Turn of the century auto makers produced only a few cars each
day. The first automobiles were built one at a time by the skilled
workers by fitting together components purchased from other shops. In
1904, the Michigan Bureau of Labor reported:
In general a large part of the modern factory for the manufacture
of automobiles does not differ materially from that which will be
found in any well-equipped machine shop adapted to produce
"parts" in large quantities; but there are some points of
divergence which differentiate these plants from those of others,
and the most important is the inspection of materials.2
The auto industry was established in Detroit during the final years
of the nineteenth century. Ransom Olds, the man behind one of the first
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successful auto companies in the United States, began production of the
Oldsmobile in 1899. Olds was the first to bring the automobile into
quantity production and the first to build a factory "designed and laid
out for the manufacture of the motor car."3 During its early years the
Ford Motor Company was merely one of many struggling auto companies in
the Detroit area. The Bureau of Labor Statistics report chose to
acknowledge only three auto companies--Olds Motor Works, Buick, and
Packard--implying that he Ford Motor Company was not a contender for an
important place in Michigan's industrial community.
Henry Ford's first factory on Mack Avenue in Detroit fit the
Bureau's description--a relatively small, inconspicuous building. In
1903 one of Ford's first investors wrote:
The building is a dandy. I went all through it today. It is
large, light, and airy, about 250 feet long by 50 feet wide,
fitted up with machinery necessary to assembling the parts, and
all ready for business.4
Ford entered into an agreement with the contractor, A. Strelow, who
owned the Mack Avenue property--Strelow would build a factory to Ford's
specifications and Ford would rent the building for at least three
years. Later, in September of the same year, the corporation met and
decided to increase the size of the building. A committee reported
that:
A. Strelow made the proposition that he would put a second story
on the present site 72 feet wide by 172 feet long for the sum of
$5,000. The Company to advance the money for so doing. The
Company also to pay the additional insurance necessary and the
increased taxes thereon. If the Company shall occupy the building
for a period of two years from date hereof, he to pay back to the
Company the sum of $2,000... He also agrees to erect a tramway to
the east of the building on his own ground and to make no charge
for the ground, but the Company to pay for the cost of erecting.5
Work in the shop looked very different than it would in the Highland
Park plant less than ten years later. In the Mack Avenue plant Ford
first employed "ten or a dozen boys and a foreman."6  Machinists worked
at the pace and in the manner of their choosing. Management was
minimal, with the owner and foreman also being skilled machinists rather
than school educated engineers or managers, creating more of a collegial
relationship than a hierarchy. The shop floor was divided into small
working groups, each assembling a single car at a time. The design of
factories changed little during the first few years of the century while
production remained stable and made few demands on the factory building.
As demand for autos grew, pressures mounted for increased speed and
volume of production, placing heightened awareness on the development of
appropriate plant design. Ford, like other auto makers, moved operations
from the small shop to larger buildings of the mill type. The production
process remained essentially the same, the only change being that the
number of workers increased. In 1904 the Ford Motor Company moved to a
building on Piquette Avenue in Detroit. Henry Ford and John Dodge, an
early partner in the company, oversaw "letting of contracts and
construction of buildings from beginning to end." 7 Ford's personal
attention to plant construction reveals the extent of his involvement
in the company. In the early years he participated in designing,
engineering, and supervising, overseeing every detail of management and
production. After the Piquette Avenue plant, Ford never again directly
participated in the details of factory planning.
The plant on Piquette Avenue was built in the style of mid to late
nineteenth century textile mills, a long narrow building measuring 402
feet by 56 feet with three floors. The building resembled hundreds of
other small manufactures of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, having nothing that would identify it as an auto factory. It
was one of the last of its type, the unspecialized auto factory. The
Ford Motor Company could produce automobiles in the Piquette plant
because the process by which they were made differed little from the way
any other heavy goods such as carriages, wagons, or machinery were
built. They were made the way cars had always been made, built one at a
time by workers in small groups, filing and fitting parts.
Surviving drawings of the plant layout provide an interesting look
at the organization of early auto production, organization that could
easily be changed if models or production methods changed. Nothing in
this small factory was heavy or unmoveable.(illust)
The earliest auto companies were in the business of design and
assembly. This meant that they produced few or no parts themselves, but
instead bought everything from small manufacturers.8 Ford was one of
the first to establish a major in-house manufacturing operation. In
1905 he set up the Ford Manufacturing Company to produce engines and
rear axles. 9 When transportation by horse cart between the
manufacturing plant on Bellevue Avenue and the assembly plant on
Piquette Avenue, a distance of about four miles, proved to be too slow,
the company purchased additional buildings next to the existing plant on
Piquette Avenue in order to move engine production closer to assembly
operations.1 0 But even with the expansion Ford was constrained by lack
of space to try out his ideas. Then, in 1908 the company built the
first Model T, which enjoyed immediate success. In 1909 the Ford Motor
Company produced 10,000 cars, twice the output of 1908. This created a
strain on space at the Piquette Avenue plant even without the newly
added manufacturing operations.11
Not all auto companies built factories as small as Ford's. The
three companies already noted, Olds, Buick, and Packard, had built major
factories before Ford built Highland Park, and all three factories
received attention for their modern design.
Olds built two factories plus several additions between 1899 and
1903, each one built for the purpose of increasing production volume.
The company's first factory, built in 1899, had 125,000 square feet and
a capacity of eighteen finished cars per day. In 1901 Olds built a
second plant, and in 1902 added to it, increasing production capacity to
fifty cars per day. By 1903 additions increased floor space to 570,000
for the two plants.12
The illustrations of the Olds and Buick plants show complexes much
like those of the textile industry. Both plants consisted of standard
mill buildings placed in hollow rectangular configurations and both have
additional low rise, monitor roofed buildings (best seen in the lower
part of the Olds illustration) which were probably used as machine shops
because of the excellent light allowed by the special type of roof.
The Flint, Michigan Buick plant, in 1911, boasted the largest auto
factory in the world. The plant preceded Ford efforts to manufacture as
many parts as possible and to process some necessary materials. Within
one plant were ignition works, body works, spring works, hub and cap
works, wheel works, gray iron foundry, and brass, bronze, and aluminum
foundries.1 3 Construction on the Packard plant, began in 1903 following
the design of Albert Kahn, the young architect who would become famous
for his industrial buildings. From 1903 to 1905 Kahn designed and
oversaw construction of nine buildings for Packard, all of standard mill
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construction and organized much like other factory complexes. With the
tenth building in 1905, Albert and his brother Julius, an engineer,
began their experiment with concrete.1 4 Packard Number Ten attracted
considerable attention from the industrial community. To Detroit
industrialists the building represented a significant advance in factory
construction. Three important changes resulted from the use of
reinforced concrete. It greatly reduced floor vibration from the new,
larger, and heavier machines and made multiple-storied structures more
practical for heavy manufacturing. Second, it required fewer interior
columns than older mill construction and opened up space on the shop
floor. Lastly, the strength of reinforced concrete meant that most of
the exterior wall area could be used for windows, opening up the
interior of multi-story buildings to natural light for the first time.
In his use of reinforced concrete in the new factories, Kahn played a
role in the revolution in industrial building. "By introducing
reinforced concrete in the factory," historian Hawkins Ferry notes,
"almost overnight, Kahn eliminated the deficiencies in mill
construction. 15
When Henry Ford decided that his company needed a new factory, the
inventor turned to the architect who, like himself, seemed to be the
most inventive.
The Crystal Palace
With business booming, Ford built his third plant in 1909. The new
plant in suburban Highland Park marked a transition from an older to a
more modern form of industrial structure. It looked much like the
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multi-story mill-structure but contained important innovations in
construction technology and in the arrangement of space. Its designers
took into account changes in attitudes about workers and work processes
which prevailed in an era of technical and organizational innovation.
It also created a stir in architectural circles because of the unusual
amount of glass used to enclose the building. The "window walls"
inspired observers to call the building the Crystal Palace, a reference
to the London's famous glass hall built by Joseph Paxton for the Great
Exhibition in 1851.
Industrialists and engineers considered the Highland Park plant
special for reasons other than its reinforced concrete and acres of
glass. It housed the first experiments with the moving assembly line
and Ford's particular style of mass production. The company's
innovations in technology, management, and marketing, not to mention its
eccentric president, constantly drew public attention to the Highland
Park plant.
The auto industry's growth exceeded all expectations. As Alfred
Chandler has noted, "by 1923 an industry that had barely existed in 1900
ranked first in the value of its product, the cost of its materials, the
value added to manufacture, and wages paid." It is not surprising that
such an industry developed innovative factory buildings before other
industries. In the world's most dynamic and fastest growing industry,
automotive pioneers were forced to look beyond traditional methods of
production and beyond traditional means of housing those operations.16
The story of the Model T is perhaps the most spectacular of the auto
industry. From the beginning, its sales outstripped all competitors
and the small firm found the demand impossible to fill. The "T",
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introduced in 1908, became the single most popular model ever produced
in the United States. With the automobile still a new phenomenon and a
large part of the population highly skeptical about its utility, the
Model T helped to persuade people that the motor car was a good idea.
It was strong, durable, easy to drive, and easy to fix and so successful
that for eighteen years it was the only car Ford made. During that time
it became the object of much affection in the country, with songs and
stories written about it. The T's fame assured Henry Ford's and it made
him one of the richest men in the world.
Much of the T's success came from its low price which ranged from
$850 in 1908 to $290 in 1926, with a low of $260 in 1924.17 Ford is
noted for his foresight in pushing for the design of a light car that
could be produced inexpensively, as well as his insight into lowering
production costs. Historians have given Ford credit for the idea of the
cheap car when they should have praised him, instead, for his genius in
implementing someone else's idea. The idea for the cheap car for the
masses came not from Henry Ford, but from Ransom Olds. A report of the
state of Michigan in 1904 described the Olds Motor Works as the
preeminent auto company, its success due, in part, from a change in
philosophy that a modern reader might mistake for Henry Ford's.
They [Olds] thought in order to make a success of the business it
would be necessary to throw away all of the patterns and commence
anew and devote their whole energy to one style and finish. They
also decided to make a machine light enough and to sell at a low
figure so that the general public could buy them instead of only
a few. With this in view they started out to make a mobile to
weigh five hundred pounds and to sell at $500.00, but when the
machine was finally completed it weighed gix hundred pounds and
could not be sold for less than $650.00.
This description was written as Ford struggled with the newly formed
Ford Motor Company, just two years after the failure of his first
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industrial effort, the Detroit Automobile Company. The report which
also included Buick and Packard, compeletely ignored Ford Motor Company
as a company worth investigating.
Ford's move to Highland Park meant more than additional space for
manufacturing operations. It also signified the beginning of major
changes in technology, production processes, management strategies, and
labor relations. For Ford himself, the move meant that he was less
involved in factory life than he had been earlier. His office, now
located in the separate administration building, removed him from the
mainstream of the factory and its day-to-day operations. Complex
management tasks required more than the casual style used at the
Piquette plant. The separation of administration, both physically and
occupationally, from production marked the beginning of a new era in
management at Ford Motor Company.
Highland Park was designed around a set of assumptions about how to
produce an automobile, assumptions that would change dramatically over
the next few years. Before operations left Piquette Avenue, Ford
engineers gradually changed from group assembly, a method by which crews
of workers built one complete car, to rudimentary line production
methods in the assembly rooms. They first experimented with the
sequential flow of different manufacturing operations. In 1906 they
worked out the first sequentially-arranged machine operations to produce
parts for the Model N. This meant that rather than placing similar
machines together, machines were placed in the order of oeprations
thereby reducing time and labor costs of transporting partially
completed operations between machines. The company experimented with
operations flow and in 1906 the first sequence of operations was worked
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out for the Model N. This meant that rather than placing all similar
machines together, machines were placed in an order of operations
thereby reducing time and labor costs of transporting partially
completed operations between machines. "Before that," noted one of the
company's engineers, "we had all lathes in one place, all drill presses
in another and then we moved the materials around from place to place.
We then worked out the idea of sequence to avoid carrying the material
from one machine to another." 19 After those initial experiments plant
layout and materials handling became the most important tasks of factory
managers and engineers. The two activities emerged as the primary
determinants for building design and would become major deteriminants
for success. Casual layout in the early shops worked because production
was slow, its volume low, and skill, rather than efficiency ruled the
shop. But as engineers improved machines and increased speed, plant
layout became increasingly important. In the company's first decade,
Ford engineers constantly rethought layout as they tried new methods to
increase production speed. Shop-floor layout merged with new
construction as a crucial factor in the firm's success. The job of
coordinating and planning organization of production and the
responsibilities of building design and construction fell to the plant
layout department.18
A.M. Wibel, one of the layout engineers, described the department as
planning and integrating "the overall picture of production and
materials handling." Movements necessary for producing a car had to be
mapped out before installing all of the machinery and equipment. The
constantly changing production quotas complicated the job as machines
were added. M.L. Weismyer, who moved to the layout department in 1918,
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described his job as "cutting out little templates and laying them out
on a floor plan, juggling them around to get the most efficient layout,
and then making a drawing of that and selling it to the
superintendant." 20
Highland Park was built in two sections, the "old shop"--buildings
built before 1914--and the "new shop"--buildings built during and after
1914. The old shop housed production facilities before the
introduction of the moving assembly line and the intense Ford concern
about the continuous flow of all work through the factory. The new shop
consisted of buildings planned specifically to line production methods
after 1914. To be sure, the old shop contained the first stages of
assembly line production, though it was designed on the basis of
pre-assembly line technical knowledge. In the old shop, the initial
manufacturing methods more closely resembled the traditional methods in
the Piquette Avenue plant. The various departments had many individual
stations where one man might build a steering column, a radiator, an
engine, or a transmission. But once experiments with the assembly line
began, Ford's engineers discovered the deficiencies of the old shop. 2 1
The design of the old shop and new shop rested on a set of
assumptions closely linked to technology, management, and the labor
process--assumptions that set it apart from earlier and later plants.
As Ford and his engineers gained experience in manufacturing and as they
set their goals on larger, faster, and cheaper production of the Model T
they, like other managers and engineers, sought predictability and
accountability in the plant operations. To that end, the company's
factory buildings were designed to facilitate efforts to order and
control production as well as workers--efforts that resulted in the
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system that came to be known as Fordism.
Fordism constituted both a business strategy and a method of mass
production. It concentrated on a single style of one product. Produced
at high volume, the Ford cars could be sold at a low price and still
provide a margin of profit. To manufacture the low cost automobiles
Ford established a minute division of labor using highly specialized
machines which required a minimum of skill to operate. Eventually, the
work would be connected by a moving assembly line which automatically
set the time allowed for any operation.
Speed, efficiency, and control, the ruling principles of Fordism,
demanded both organizational and physical changes in the company and the
factories. Fordism resembled the broader scientific management
movement, though important distinctions existed. As David Hounshell has
pointed out, a fundamental issue in Fordism was the mechanization of as
many operations as possible. Mechanization reduced level of skill
required of most workers and increased managerial control over
production.22
Standardization was central to achieving the goals of
Fordism--production of a single model, inexpensive but good, in large
quantities with a small margin of profit. Its success depended on
speedy, efficient production, and careful control of production and
workers.
For Ford, though, control was more than a way to maintain high
production standards, it was also a personal obsession. Ford had the
final word on all decisions made in his works. Indeed, he opposed
unions because they would dilute his control. He wanted to shape
workers' lives both in the factory and outside; he wanted workers with
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no previous factory experience so that he could teach them to work his
way. His famous sociological department investigated workers in their
homes to ensure that they were living up to his expectations of what
constituted "good American values." If not, they had to reform or find
another job. 23 His desire for control is also apparent in his struggle
with stockholder. When stockholders of the Ford Motor Company angered
Ford in a legal battle over dividends (stockholders argued that profits
should be distributed through dividends rather than reinvested in the
company), Ford bought them out, guaranteeing his autonomy and control. 2 4
When Ford moved production to Highland Park in January, 1910, all or
part of nine buildings were complete. 2 5 (see diagram of plant layout)
Building A, the main factory building was four stories high, 860 feet
long, and 75 feet wide. In order to leave open as much space as
possible on the shop floor, four utility towers were erected on the
outside of the building. These towers contained the elevators, stairs,
and toilets.2 6  Based on the standard mill construction, Building A,
and the other four story buildings, looked like other factories, except
for the extra large windows.
Adjoining the first building was a single-story machine shop,
Building B, with a saw-tooth roof. The saw-tooth roof added to Highland
Park's abundant light. It covered the single-story buidings that were
erected between the four-story structures. An English invention, the
saw-tooth roof took its name from the jagged profile which resembled the
tooth edge of a saw. The vertical side of the saw-tooth contained glass
and faced North. The saw-tooth roof provided evenly distributed, well
diffused light without sharp shadows or contrasts. The diffused light
was preferred for the precise and delicate work of machinists.2 7
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The rest of the complex into which the company moved included the
first two stories of the administration building, Building 0, to which
two additional floors were added later, a small part of the first power
house, and half of the heat treatment building. The main four-story
building held assembly operations, stock rooms, tool cribs, painting,
and other light operations. The single-story saw-tooth roofed building
housed the huge Ford machine shop. The number of machines and their
tight arrangement made their installation anywhere but a ground floor
impractical. According to an engineering appraisal years later, the
construction of the main factory building was inadequate for heavy
manufacturing because of capacity of only about fifty pounds per square
foot, a load limit suitable only for assembly and storage. After 1910,
Model T production expanded so rapidly that, according to two of the
plant's engineers, the company added new buildings as fast as it could;
one building was barely finished before another was started. The period
of hectic growth compounded the normal problems of rational planning for
the layout and arrangement of work processes. 28
The attention plant engineers gave to the production processes
yields important insights about the factory as machine. The most
significant difference between Highland Park and other plants was the
placement of buildings, reflecting new ideas about production. In 1910
these ideas were just beginning to form into a mature system. Ford and
his engineers realized early on that materials handling, or the movement
of parts and sub-assemblies, to and between operations would be one of
the most significant elements of fast, efficient production fundamental
to the flow and organization Ford sought. Engineers everywhere agreed
that the "old-fashioned high cost of manufacturing was because of the
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way things were lugged around the shop."29 Consequently, in designing
Highland Park, materials handling served as a major directive.
The most novel feature of the plant, the organization of the
buildings, emphasized the movement of materials. Except for two
processing facilities (heat treat and foundry) the power house, and the
administration building, the buildings of the old shop shared common
walls, essentially making the plant one large integrated building. (see
diagram) This contiguity meant that, as the model T was built, parts
and sub-assemblies travelled shorter distances, a factor which meant
faster flow of materials and considerable saving time and labor. Few
factories before or after Highland Park were built in such a tight
formation. Most large factories before the 1920s were built in hollow
squares, or in H, L, or I configurations. These shapes allowed natural
light to enter the workshops of the multiple-story buildings. Instead
of leaving the usual space between buildings, the Ford Motor Company
covered those spaces with glass and utilized them as work space.
The building arrangement thus eliminated costly and time consuming
travel between buildings. In 1910, horses and wagons commonly supplied
transportation within industrial complexes. (illust) Except for the few
factories equipped with narrow gauge railroad tracks, most companies
used teams of horses pulling trucks or wagons for the movement of
materials between buildings. The expense of the horse-drawn method;
which included wages of the teamster and his helper, cost of feed,
repairs and renewals to harness, wagons, shoeing, veterinary services,
depreciation of wagons and trucks; came to approximately $1,850 each
year for each team. More important than the cost were the limitations
imposed by the method of transportation. In addition to the awkwardness
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of the large draft animals on the plant grounds, only eight to ten loads
(with a two ton limit) per horse team could be expected to be moved in
one day.3 0  As late as 1920 the Ford Motor Company used teams of draft
horses for hauling materials at construction sites. 3 1
After moving into the old shop Ford and his engineers intensified
efforts to increase production by making it more efficient. By 1913,
they had developed new ideas about how to manage production, and how a
factory should work. The most important of these were first and
foremost, production flow; then specialized machines (creating a fine
division of labor); standardization of product and process; and
minimization of materials handling. These ideas about how to run the
factory, though thought through by 1913, were not completely realized in
plant operations. Production flow and materials handling continued to
be problematic. Standardization of the production process, largely
accomplished by dividing labor and installing single-purpose,
specialized machines, proved satisfactory. But the goal of control over
production and workers would not be possible without automatic flow of
materials through the plant.
Flow and speed of production became the most important element in
the Ford Motor Company's manufacturing operation. Every facet of
production, including factory design, was subordinant to production
flow. As one of the Ford engineers said:
It was arranged so that raw materials would go into one end of
the building and the finished product come out the other...The
railroad tracks came in at one end of the building, the bodies
were taken up to the top floor, the painting operations and other
operations taking place, and they were then brought down from
floor to floor into assembly. The plant was designed to bring
out the finished car in Manchester Street. The C craneway and
the F craneway were built with this same idea in mind.32
1l1
Machines were designed to speed flow. Ford engineers, collaborating
with machine shops, designed and built specialized or single purpose
machines to perform only one operation and to carry on the operation
continuously. Ford employees in the tool department designed the
fixtures and gauges that transformed general purpose machines into
specialized ones. The special fixtures made insertion of a part into
the tool nearly automatic, the worker had to make no adjustments at all
to the machine.
The labor process was divided to produce cars faster. A good
description of Ford's division of labor is the following 1913 account of
the early flywheel magneto assembly, the first moving assembly:
Originally, one workman assembled the whole flywheel magneto
and turned out about 40 in a 9-hour day. It was a delicate job,
had to be done by an experienced man, the work was not very
uniform and it was costly. In the Spring of 1913 a moving
assembly line with 29 men was put into operation. The entire job
was divided into 29 operations and it was found that with these
29 men, 1188 flywheel magnetos for every 9-hour day were
produced, making a saving of 7 minutes time on each
assembly... This moving assembly line is a good example of the
Ford system of process assembly, which has behind it a few
fundamental principles, such as: Keep the work at least waist
high, so a man doesn't have to stoop over; Make the job simple,
break it up into as many small operations as possible and have
each man do only one, two, or at the most three operations;
Arrange so the work will come to each man so that he shall not
have to take more than one step either way, either to secure his
work or release it; Keep the line moving as fast as possible,
consistent with good work.33
Single purpose machines, the moving assembly line, and other
"improved" processes changed the ratio of workers to operations and
required more care in the allocation of space. In some cases, like the
magneto assembly, workers were added as processes were divided into many
small operations and many workers were required to perform each simple
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operation over and over. In other cases, workers were eliminated by a
new process or machine that provided one worker with the means to do the
work of many. According to a 1924 Bureau of Labor Statistics report,
spot welding, for example, allowed one welder to do the work of eight
riveters; the multiple drill press increased one man's productivity by
eight to twelve times; the vertical turret lathe meant that one worker
could produce sixty flywheels per day instead of the twenty-five
previously machined on a regular lathe. Similar reductions in time and
labor resulted from other specialized machines designed by Ford
engineers and mechanics to perform specific jobs such as turning and
milling crankshafts, die-casting pistons, and presses for body
fabrication.34
The introduction of these machines proved to be important for
several reasons. The reduction of man hours needed to complete an
operation meant an increase in speed and volume of production. The
higher productivity of new machines also meant that a given volume of
production required less floor space. Manufacturers could produce the
same amount with fewer men or keep the same number of men and produce
more. In either case production costs decreased. Most companies chose
to increase production volume allowing them to take advantage of
economies of scale, with additional cost reductions.
The Ford Motor Company adopted new machines as fast as, or faster
than other auto makers. As the number of machines on the shop floor
grew production increased yearly. The specialized machines greatly
improved individual worker productivity.
Production Rates 35
1909-10 14,000 1912-13 168,000 1915-16 534,000
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1910-11 35,000 1913-14 248,000 1916-17 785,000
1911-12 78,000 1914-15 308,000 1917-18 707,000
Average man-hours per car built for each available year 36
1912 1,260 1915 533 1921 322
1913 966 1919 425 1922 273
1914 617 1920 396 1923 228
When additional machines with greater capacity were added to the
newly available floor space they created a serious traffic problem.
Always a problem, materials handling became a major deterrent to rapid
and smooth flowthrough.
Materials Handling and Shop Floor Layout
New layout schemes went hand-in-hand with innovations in materials
handling to make the factory into a place of orderliness and
predictability. To avoid the chaos of hundreds of laborers delivering
parts and materials by hand trucks, engineers began to rationalize
materials handling based more on their own experience than theories of
management. Improvements in materials flow, whether through more
efficient arrangement of machines, assembly lines, or mechanized
handling, developed incrementally. Better machine layout increased
production speed as well as eliminating previously available floor space
that had been used for temporary storage. That required parts to be
delivered more frequently and predictably. With each step, slight
improvements were made, eventually leading to the moving assembly line
and mechanized handling.
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As the layout department figured out the best arrangements for
machines and departments, materials handling stood out as the next
hurdle to the kind of production flow they desired. So fundamental to
smooth production, the demand for improved materials handling increased
with increased volume and speed of production. Rapidly being recognized
as one of the most important functions in the factory, materials
handling also ranked as one of the most troublesome. Materials, parts,
and partially or totally completed assemblies were constantly on the
move in the Ford shop. Materials and parts travelled from railroad cars
to loading dock, from loading dock to separate department, and then to
the various work stations. Assemblies in progress continuously moved
from one work station to another. Completed assemblies had to travel to
the final assembly area. All of these movements had to be timed and
coordinated so that materials reached the appropriate place when needed,
but not so early as to cause a backup of supplies on the shop floor. By
1912 Ford engineers had mapped out all movements of parts and
sub-assemblies, correlating the movement with plant layout. (37)
Highland Park's old shop contained few mechanical or automatic
handling devices. In 1912, the old shop had two cranes which moved
materials as well as heavy equipment through the machine shop, and a
monorail that formed a small railway system. One craneway ran
lengthwise between the first and second machine shops, the second ran
perpendicular to the first and the back of the second machine shop for
unloading and moving materials into the building. (see plan) The
monorail moved along tracks placed around the entire first floor and
could deliver goods to areas beyond the craneways.
The craneway formed the main distributing artery in the plant. In
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general, pieces purchased from outside as well as those manufactured by
the company were "unloaded directly into the craneway by means of the
crane." Materials were then loaded either into bins or directly onto
the floor for "temporary storage pending delivery to the machine
shop."3 8 Materials and parts destined for storage rather than
machining, travelled by elevator to the upper floors of the four-story
buildings, and then down by elevator to the first floor assembly area
when needed.39
This system, in practice in 1912, had several problems, the most
important being the large volume of parts and materials moved by hand,
that is to say by men pushing hand trucks. The company employed 800 to
1000 "truckmen, pushers, and shovers" to move materials from the
craneway or monorail to work stations or to storage areas, from storage
areas to work stations, and between work stations. 40 (illustration)
Oscar Bornholt, one of the Ford engineers, wrote in 1913 that "trucking
in the machine shop is always looked upon as an unnecessary
expense...and all its labor is non-productive."41 Likewise, after
examining the old shop in early 1914, the industrial journalists Horace
Arnold and Faye Faurote reported that "handling of materials and work in
progress of finishing is now the principal problem of motor car cost
reduction."4 2 Most importantly, the truckers frustrated Henry Ford.
In addition to the slowness of the handling system, it was
impossible to assure reliability of having supplies available when
needed.. If workers ran out of parts or materials, their idle time
added up to a significant loss of money and delayed output. To keep the
system in order "to straighten out tangles of all description in the
handling of materials, to trace lost items which range from the smallest
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part to finished cars, and to ferret out opportunities for improving
conditions," reported Abell, "a force of clerks is detailed." Employed
in the department of the shop superintendent, the clerks had "no regular
routine and are available for whatever contingency may arise at any
time."43
One Ford Motor Company policy exacerbated handling
problems--purchases of all materials were, without exception, restricted
to carload lots, "the subsequent distribution of this material through
the manufacturing processes becomes a handling problem of unusual
magnitude."44 The plant must have been a-buzz with truckers working
constantly to have parts and materials at the right place at the right
time. In an early effort to simplify the transportation and inventory
of incoming parts, the company, by 1913, insisted that suppliers pack
all small parts in boxes or cartons which could be piled on the floor.
All bins, previously repositories for all parts and materials were
eliminated. Even parts manufactured by the company were loaded into
cartons or trays that held only a specified number. The standardized
boxes made inventorying supplies much faster, a necessary improvement
given the constantly increasing volume of production. Abell wrote in
1913 that "by reason of the change, the cost of handling stock materials
is now slightly less than the expense involved in handling half the
quantity of stock a year ago." 4 5
Ford's engineers sought ways to eliminate both manual and mechanical
transportation around the factory; by reorganizing shop floor layout and
placing machines closer together, they shortened the lines of travel.
In a 1913 interview one of the layout engineers described the importance
of the right layout:
117
every time we would get a change of production, it would require
a complete re-layout of the plant. There was a constant shifting
of departments and God help you if you had a particular job like
those Bullard multimatics and you ran out of room... before you
had enough machines to do the particular job.46
Oscar Bornholt provided a detailed example of changes that both
facilitated production speed and minimized handling. In describing the
cylinder department he explained that the "cylinders are trucked from
the foundry to the border of the aisle, down which are located the
machines which perform the operation." The cylinders, being light, were
carried by the operators from the end of the aisle to their machines
while the machines automatically made cuts on the positioned cylinders.
The, "the cylinders move to each successive machine until they land in
the assembly department which borders the cylinder department."
Bornholt proceeded to explain the savings of the system, "in placing the
machines according to operations it is necessary only to truck the
cylinders to the first operations and after the last." He further
explained that "if the cylinders were to be machined in departments
consisting of like machines (the old method), it would be necessary to
truck to and from each department ...It would be conservative to estimate
that the cylinder would have to be trucked about twelve times."4 7
Bornholt's description is one of the best surviving accounts of the
Ford Motor Company's rational for changing machine layout. No verbal
description is needed to see similar changes in assembly; one can see
from the following photographs how dramatic were the changes in assembly
from 1913 to 1914--before the introduction of the moving assembly line.
By 1914, machines were closer together than was usual "so that there
is but barely room for the workman to make his usual movement." 48 With
workers closer together and production going faster, more parts and.
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materials passed through the factory. But with the new tight
arrangement less room existed for materials on the shop floor. In order
to open up floor space, Ford's engineers conceived of the idea of moving
the unfinished components by elevated slides, troughs, and conveyors.
Gravity slides made of inclined sheet iron were built next to the work
stations. After completing an operation the worker dropped the
component onto the slide "so inclined as to carry the piece by gravity
to within easy reach of the next man." This saved the work of the
pusher who, in the earlier scheme, moved a box of partly finished pieces
by hand cart to the next station as well. The gravity slides also helped
to speed the process. Ford engineers found that the gravity slides,
chain conveyors, and the assembly line not only helped reduce labor
costs, but also "cleaned up" the floor, "making more room for tools and
workmen where it was thought the limit of close placing of production
agencies had been reached."49
Henry Ford himself pushed shop floor crowding one step further. His
idea, reported by the plant's construction engineer William Pioch, was
to get the machines as close together as possible to save floor
space.50 Another observer, journalist Fred Colvin, remarked about the
orderly delivery of parts in the crowded factory, "the delivery is timed
so as to avoid undue accumulation of stock around the delivery stands,
and to always have materials on hand."51 He was impressed with the
quantity of materials used in the shop, noting that "work is piled on
every hand beside the machines, leaving only a comfortable passageway
for the men." He quickly added that the piles turned over regularly
since so many pieces must be completed every day to keep up the
supply. 52
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New technology not only increased production but also enabled
semi-skilled workers to take the place of skilled workers. The new
speed of operations made the potential for rapid production enormous.
Labor spent in moving materials was unproductive. As late as 1934, a
National Bureau of Economic Research study found that forty percent of
the auto industry's labor saving changes came from handling materials. 5 3
The study reported that "one marked tendency in the modern movement for
greater industrial efficiency is the effort to reduce handling through
the arrangement of equipment and processes to provide straight lineflow.
The serialization of processes and machines reduces inter-process
handling to a minimum."54
One of the layout engineers described his job as cutting out little
templates and layout them out on a floor plan until he got the most
efficient layout. A superintendent went to him, for example, and said
We've got to re-layout this crankshaft job. We've got fifty new
machines coming. We've got to arrange the department in order to
get these machines in, and while we're doing it we can save some
labor by putting in some conveyors. In order to make rssm for
this equipment we've got to re-layout this department."
He described the process of layout as a matter of sticking the machine
tools as close together as you could to conserve space to get as many in
as possible. The theory pretty well was that the closer together they
are and still have room to work, the cheaper it is, because they don't
have so far to move the stock."5 6
With each expansion, the plant layout department had to reorganize
machinery. Small departments underwent regular change due to the
introduction of new parts or new machines or new methods for
manufacturing. The layout department did not determine the types of
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machines to be used but rather, decided how to arrange the machines
after they had been chosen by production engineers for the most
efficient operation. Layout engineers also estimated the number of
pieces that would be produced by each machine and the number of machines
needed.57
Not all buildings at Highland Park boasted the practicality of the
shop floors. Both the power house and administration building were
showplaces built at considerable expense. Ford apparently took great
pride in the power house, wanting it visible and insisting that it be
kept spotless. He believed that the public was as fascinated with the
huge generators as he was, and had the building walled in plate glass.
He also believed that it would be a great advertisement. More than
glass made the power house a showcase, however. It contained the finest
fittings available, including brass and copper fixtures, chains and
rosettes, wrought iron railings with mahogany handrails, " and all
workmanship to be first-class in every particular."58 Atop the power
house hung the huge FORD sign between the five stacks. William Vernor,
the mechanical engineer for the power house, explained years later that
only two stacks were needed but Henry Ford wanted the sign and insisted
it be hung from the power house stacks.5 9
Like the power house, the administration building became the plant's
public face as well as Henry Ford's office. The high-ceilinged lobby
led to a broad winding staircase which would take a visitor to the
offices. The marble staircase, carved ceiling, and luxurious furnishings
of the lobby created a sharp contrast to the factory buildings behind. 6 1
Though some claimed the two Ford buildings to be unusual in their
elegance, other companies made similar efforts to attract attention to
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their plant. Earlier factories also boasted "the handsomest engine room
in the country," and many plants displayed administration buildings of
fine architecture.61
The Daylight Factory
Highland Park has been almost universally praised by American
architectural and industrial historians as the first "daylight" factory.
Though recently Reyner Banham in A Concrete Atlantis has shown that
several "daylight factories" in Buffalo, New York predate Highland Park.
Those familiar with nineteenth and twentieth century industry acclaim
the "daylight" factory as a revolution in improving working conditions
by opening up the dark interiors of mill buildings. But why were the
large windows deemed so important when, by the time of their
introduction in 1910, electricity could have provided lighting adequate
for industrial production? The large windows did not always provide
increased ventilation as often touted. In many factories, only a few
panes in any section actually opened. The large areas of windows were
expensive to replace when broken. They also had to be kept clean if
their benefits were to be enjoyed and keeping them clean was no small
task.
One answer lies in the industrial welfare movement. Threatened by
unionism and high labor turnover, industries adopted measures to pacify
as well as attract and keep good quality workers.6 2 Problems with labor
turnover were especially acute in Detroit. Auto companies competed for
skilled workers as workers frequently changed jobs; in 1913 the Ford
Motor Company had a turnover rate of 370%.63 One way to keep good
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workers was to build attractive factories. Factory beautification was
part of the industrial welfare movement's focus on improving worker
morale through social and environmental improvements such as libraries,
classes, gardens and better factories.
Some of the interest in the daylight factory, no doubt, came from
ideas inherited from the larger social reform movements of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Reformers heralded the
importance of abundant sunlight and ventilation for their purifying
effects. The long-standing belief in sunlight's purification qualities
persisted even when turn of the century scientists found more effective
measures to improve the health conditions of the lower classes. 6 4
Though the widespread popularity of the "daylight" factory was
probably a result of the industrial welfare movement, its introduction
to the United States was more likely a product of architectural and
technological innovation. Daylight factories became possible only with
the introduction of new construction technology--reinforced concrete.
Highland Park may have been the first American factory to use the
kind of steel window frames that allowed maximum window space, but it
was not the first attempt to open up the factory to sunlight. A number
of reinforced concrete factories had been built before Highland Park.
Undoubtedly many daylight factories exist that have escaped the
historian's attention, such as the reinforced concrete machine shop
built at McKeesport, Pennsylvania in 1904 by Robert Cummings, a
structural engineer. Concerned about light in the plant, Cummings
designed the factory with abundant windows, which, except for larger
frames of wood, admit as much light as Highland Park's windows.(illust)
Cummings' concern for adequate lighting for the workers is well
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illustrated in correspondence with the firm, though the company's lack
of interest is inconsistent with the general mood regarding sunlit
factories.
Firm to Cummings, June 21, 1905
We do not see our way clear to follow your suggestion in regard
to white washing this building, as the light would be entirely
too strong for the workmen.
Cummings to Firm, June 26, 1905
My suggestion as to whitewashing the interior of your building
was based on the supposition that too much light for the
mechanics could not be obtained.65
Cummings' building easily could have escaped the Kahns' attention,
but similar German factories could not have. German immigrants, Albert
and Julius frequently returned to Germany and other European countries
where well-lit factories could be found before Highland Park was built
in 1910.66 One presumes that one or both of the Kahn brothers visited
some of those factories. Surviving Kahn records are scanty so it is
impossible to know if the Kahns introduced window walls in the spirit of
architectural style or if they realized that opening up the factory to
sunlight was important to the industry.
Though Albert has typically been credited for designing and building
Highland Park, Julius clearly played an influential role. But in spite
of the acclaim they have received, they are probably responsible only
for designing the building shell. Though only vague references remain
it is highly likely that Ford's engineers designed the layout of the
factory buildings and turned the basic plans over to the Kahns to
enclose.
When Kahn worked on the Highland Park plant, industry was not yet a
desired client for American architects. Kahn's interest in industrial
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buildings was probably a combination of serendipity and the influence of
the noted German architect Peter Behrens. Though Kahn does not mention
Behrens specifically, Kahn's papers contain numerous letters indicating
that both Albert and Julius made regular trips to Europe during which
they examined new architecture. Behrens work, especially noteworthy
both because it had the attention of the art world and that it had an
unusual client, industry, could not have escaped the brothers. Behrens,
famous for his work as artistic advisor for Germany's AEG67 wrote about
architecture's importance to industry long before his counterparts in
other industrial countries. Behrens' work with AEG began in 1907 when
he began an extraordinary career as industrial designer, architect, and
writer. With remarkable foresight, he wrote essays about industry,
society, and architecture which were widely read in Europe.68 Behrens
believed that through good design he could alleviate some of the
devastation wrought by industry. He also believed that industrial
efficiency grew out of good design.69 Though Albert Kahn was
undoubtedly influenced by Behrens, the imagination and idealism of
Behrens is hard to find in Kahn's work or in his writings. Working for
the pragmatic American industry Kahn sought to aid in increasing
production efficiency, though only scant evidence exists to document his
concern for matching factory buildings with the production process. In
1931 he wrote that "the development of the automobile has indeed taught
us the importance of simplification which is equally important in
architecture." 70  Other than this statement, however, the record remains
silent about Kahn's theories of industrial architecture.
Kahn's first factory commission came from Henry B. Joy whose house
Kahn had designed. Impressed with the architect's work Joy hired Kahn
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to build the new Packard Motor Car factories. In his own words, Kahn
undertook the job "with practically no experience in factory building."
He admitted that Julius, his brother the structural engineer, played a
very important role in the eventual success of the Packard plant. 7 1
George Thompson, one of Ford's engineers, later described Kahn's
special character that enabled him to work so well with industry.
Mr. Kahn was a wonderful architect but he didn't know anything
about [the industry]. He was extremely quick in grasping his
client's needs. He would be sitting there sketching almost as
fast as anybody could talk as to what it was to be, and would be
back the next morning with sketches.72
Evidently, Kahn's speed was an earmark that appealed to Ford!
Impact of New Building Technology and Electricity
Developments external to the auto industry made the new factories
possible. The most important was reinforced concrete construction
coupled with improvements in structural steel, both introduced in
industrial buildings in the late nineteenth century. Reinforced, or
structural concrete, is the placement of steel rods in concrete columns
or slabs to strengthen the structure. Concrete alone cannot carry the
weight that reinforced concrete can. Because of its strength,
reinforced concrete buildings could be supported on its internal columns
thus relieving the outside walls from bearing the building's weight.
The concrete opened the way for changes that ultimately transformed the
factory.
By the time engineers designed the Highland Park plant, assumptions
had changed about how to build a factory. In 1904 one standard existed
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for large factories--wood or brick mill type construction. By 1909,
when actual work began on the plant's buildings, new construction
technology had expanded the possibilities. The most important new
construction technology was reinforced concrete and in years to come, it
would revolutionize building design and construction.
The Kahns gained recognition by using reinforced concrete to build
the four story factory buildings at Highland Park. Hawkins Ferry notes
that the introduction of reinforced concrete in the factory, almost
overnight, eliminated the deficiencies of mill construction.7 3
Reinforced concrete accomplished three improvements in factory design.
It greatly reduced floor vibration from machines, making multiple
stories more feasible. Reinforced concrete required fewer interior
columns than older mill construction, opening up space on the shop
floor. Lastly, the strength of the concrete meant that the window walls
could be used in multi-story factories. 7 4
Builders and engineers perfected reinforced concrete construction
about the same time industry began to expand through changing
technology, management, and production processes. Without the potential
to build new factories, industry's growth might have been curtailed.
The new concrete factories were especially important for the growing
automobile industry with its increasingly heavier machines and expanding
size of operations.
Wood or masonry buildings of the nineteenth century were necessarily
built with load bearing walls such as those in the following report of a
typical textile mill. The Durfee Mill in Massachusetts, built in 1875
by mill engineer Frank P. Sheldon, consisted of a five story building
with a sharp roof, 376 feet six inches by 72 feet with walls of stone.
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The first story contained walls two feet six inches to three feet wide.
The second story walls were two feet six inches to two feet eight inches
wide, and so on until fifth story of one foot ten inches in width. The
windows measured four feet five inches wide with heights decreasing from
eight feet four inches on floors one, two, and three to seven feet four
inches on the fifth floor. 7 5
The advantage of the internal load bearing columns made external
walls into little more than shells to enclose space. This opened up
numerous possibilities for new building styles. The first major change
came with enlarged windows like those in the Highland Park buildings.
These early open factories began the era of the daylight factories.
The new material allowed for a vast variety of sizes and shapes in
buildings. New dimensions, however, did not appear during the early
years of concrete construction. Other constraints created by power
sources and distribution, by materials handling, and by lighting
persisted to keep the size and shape of factory buildings within the
mill tradition.
Power distribution by belting from a central source proved the
strongest determinant of building dimensions. Until electric,
individually driven machines became possible (and popular) the textile
mill remained the most practical model for any facility requiring
widespread distribution of power. Even without the real limitations one
must assume that builders and factory owners would continue to build in
the familiar style for a short time.76
In addition to providing added strength, concrete almost eliminated
fires. Pre-concrete factory owners lived in constant fear of fire that
could wipe out their entire factory as well as the neighborhood, and
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maybe the whole city. Previous changes in factory construction had all
been attempts to decrease fire danger. Slow-burn mill construction,
whose name reveals the hopes of its inventor, replaced early, lighter,
and easily burned construction styles. Mill owners built flat roofs
instead of pitched in order to eliminate the hazard of fires starting in
the dead space of roof rafters. Concrete proved to be so fireproof that
many companies stopped paying for fire insurance. Its success is well
illustrated in insurance rates.
Insurance Rates per $100 of Value 7 7
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Reinforced concrete differed from earlier construction in many ways.
It was stronger, often less expensive, and it used different technology
and techniques. Reinforcing bars constituted the major new technology.
The bars or rods improved plain concrete because, in Carl Condit's
concise explanation,
concrete by itself can work only in compression, it will quickly
fail if it is used for members subject to high bending forces,
such as beams and floor slabs. It is reinforced with iron or
steel bars, however, the elastic metal will take the tensile and
shearing stress and the rigid concrete will sustain the
compressive forces."78
At the turn of the century many engineers and builders patented
their own designs for reinforcing rods--round rods, square rods, rods
twisted in dozens of different ways, looped rods and hooked rods. One
of the important discoveries was that simple imbedment of metal did not
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improve the strength of concrete. In writing about this problem one
engineer recounted his experience; when he asked why plain square iron
rods were placed below the surface of a sidewalk, the worker answered
"it is said to be good for concrete." The engineer, Robert A. Cummings,
wrote and lectured about his own discoveries, as well as those of
others, with reinforced concrete construction. He explained over and
over again that the only way to strengthen concrete was to suspend the
rods in the middle of the concrete mass, a difficult task.79
The earliest concrete buildings of the late nineteenth century were
monolithic construction, meaning that floors, walls and roof were poured
into forms assembled using plain, unreinforced, concrete. Problems
arose first because the unreinforced concrete had to be used in massive
amounts to assure its strength. Only relatively small buildings could
be constructed with the monolithic technique because the concrete had to
be poured in complete units. Half a column, or half a floor, could not
be poured one day and half the next because wet concrete does not adhere
well to dry. Early concrete had to be used with great care to avoid
disasters that befell many buildings. 80
Concrete buildings were made by pouring the wet concrete into forms
constructed by skilled carpenters. When the concrete dried after a few
days, the forms were torn down and discarded. The forms which created
the outline of the entire building proved the most expensive and time
consuming element of concrete construction. "Forty to sixty percent of
the cost of concrete work is right there in the forms, so that if you
eliminate the forms you are getting a more economical form of
construction." 81
Albert Kahn explained that reinforced concrete "had been in use for
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some time abroad where labor costs were lower, but adopted here (U.S.)
only hesitantly because of its greater cost and the danger connected
with its use."8 2 By the early 1900s concrete builders developed a new
technique that reduced both cost and construction time. The new method,
slab construction, used unskilled laborers to pour slabs of
approximately four by six feet. The laborers built the simple forms and
poured the concrete on the ground. (see photo) The slabs were then
assembled much like bricks. The slab method reduced cost because it
used inexpensive labor and reused forms. It was also faster because
forms did not have to be constructed and torn down, while many slabs
could be poured in advance, ready for use when needed. Concrete
construction, and especially the slab method led to larger buildings and
changed the nature of construction work.
Most of Highland Park's buildings were concrete slab construction
with concrete covered steel girder beams, with a brick facing. 8 3 The
concrete held reinforcing rods designed by Albert Kahn's brother and
partner Julius.84 An engineering survey written many years later
reported structural weaknesses in the original buildings. Though the
survey did not give reasons for the weaknesses it did explain that the
building could hold no more than fifty pounds per square foot. 8 5
Electrification
Factory electrification meant two things--electric lighting and
electric motors. Electric lighting, installed before electric power,
improved visibility and safety. It also raised productivity in some
factories that chose to run production twenty four hours.
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Though lighting was important, electricity's major impact lay in the
new possibilities for shop floor layout; it eliminated the necessity to
arrange the shop floor according to the position of the main shaft. The
new flexibility allowed engineers to experiment with shop floor layout.
In water or steam driven factories power distribution required a'
cumbersome system of gears and belts to deliver energy from the central
source to individual machines. The water wheel or steam engine, located
in the basement, turned a vertical shaft which extended upward through
each floor. On each floor a line shaft connected to the main shaft.
The line shaft was attached to the ceiling and extended the length of
the floor, it turned as the main shaft turned. Belts and gears attached
to the line shaft powered individual machines. 8 6 Machines had to be
placed parallel to the shafting and the shaft turned constantly.
This system contained many problems. The multiple transmissions
meant lost energy. The shop floor layout was restricted to parallel
placement of machines. One part of the factory could not be used
without everything being engaged; if one machine was on, they were all
on. The belts from line shaft to machine often broke, injuring nearby
workmen, the belts interfered with movement through the factory, limited
light, and needed constant maintenance.
The first factories to install electricity simply replaced steam as
a power source. This changed nothing about the way the plant worked.
Power transmission to machines and machine placement remained
essentially unchanged, electricity simply replaced the steam engine as a
central power source. By the end of the nineteenth century, however,
some engineers advocated group drive to replace central power sources.
Industries which required intermittent use of machinery would profit by
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installing electric motors to drive small groups of machines. Belting
and shafting still transferred power from the motor to the machines but
one group of machines could be operated without engaging the entire
factory. Group drive allowed changes in the shop floor layout because
the line shaft no longer dictated placement.
The most important change came with unit drive machinery--one
electric motor attached or built into one machine. Unit drive allowed
independent operations of machines using no belts and no shafting. It
increased range of machine speed, efficiency of power use, and
flexibility in machine control. 8 7
Even with the innovations, many industries continued to use steam,
or even water power for many years. Industries like textile used a
steady amount of power throughout the day, and the power load remained
constant through the work week. This meant that the older power sources
remained sufficient. These companies thus put off the expensive
conversion to electricity for a number of years.88
In the 1880s and 1890s engineers and industrialists debated
electrification's potential affects on industry. Some argued that
electricity would result in savings in energy and capital. Others
believed that while electricity had many advantages, it would not result
in a significant cost reduction. Most establishments spend no more than
three percent of their operating costs on energy production.89
The real advantages in electrifying the factory were not cost
savings. Electricity made all the difference for the industrial
engineer. Unit drive, and even group drive, systems allowed him new
freedom to reorganize production. Without the constraining shafts to
dictate machine placement; the engineer moved away from the parallel
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rows to experiment with other arrangements. New arrangements improved
production flow and increased efficiency and floor space. The new
system allowed the actual organization of production to be rationalized
to keep up with modern ideas about management and production. All of
this helped the industrialist move toward his constant goal of increased
production, which in many cases rose by twenty or thirty percent.90
Other improvements in the factory resulted from electrification.
Some industrialists hailed the improved appearance of the shop floor and
claimed improved morale. Removal of the cumbersome belting resulted in
better light and cleaner factories. The new power system reduced fire
risk due to the elimination of the openings in floors through which
shafting passed. Of economic significance was the freedom to expand
production (and buildings) as needed. The old system made expansion
difficult because building size was limited according to the power
system. Expansion had to be planned for in the original construction or
a new power system had to be installed. The new system opened vast
possibilities for the industrial engineer.
For all the revolutionary innovations that took place within it,
Highland Park remained fundamentally an old style factory. When Ford
moved production to Highland Park he sought space large enough to hold
his rapidly expanding operations. Once established in the new factory
the company's engineers set to work to make production as fast and cheap
as possible. In the end they found that efficient production
necessitated careful planning of the factory building. Through their
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efforts to streamline production Ford's men developed new expectations
for factory buildings.
Highland Park's old shop proved to be neither an old style plant
like the Piquette plant, nor a modern rational factory. It was an
intermediate experiment. When Ford's engineers originally thought about
building the factory they had only the old style of production to direct
them, and the old production methods were not very demanding.
Innovations in production increasingly required that the factory
building be planned around production. Older factories had been planned
according to the power source, new factories had to be built with
attention to the production process.
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Piquette Avenue plant of the Ford Motor Company, 1909. From the FMC Archives.
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The Packard plant designed by Albert Kahn, 1903.
Albert Kahn Associates.
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Highland Park's Old Shop, original building (1910)
(Ford Motor Company Archives)
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General Plan of the Works of the Ford Motor Company, 1912
(taken from O.J. Abell, "Making the Ford Motor Car," Iron Age,
vol. 89, June 6, 1912, p. 1385) 142
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Piston assembly using early gravity slide. From FMC Archives.
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Horse-drawn truck transferring Model T bodies at Highland Park's Old Shop.
From FMC Archives.
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Dashboard assembly, Highland Park 1913. FMC Archives.
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Dashboard assembly line, 1914. FMC Archives.
Shop Transportation. Hand-Truckers Moving Filled Component Receptacles
From Arnold and Faurote, Ford Methods and Ford Shops.
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Piston Gravity Slide from Four Drilling Machines to Piston, Pin, and Connectinj
Rod Assemblers
From Arnold and Faurote, Ford Methods and Ford Shops.
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Taylor-Wilson Manufacturing Company Machine Shop, McKeesport, Pennsylvania.
Robert Cummings, 1904-05. Cummings Collection Photo Albums, Mechanical and
Collection, Smithsonian Institution.
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Slab concrete production, construction site of Harbison-Walker Refractory, 1909.
Built by Robert Cummings. Cummings Collection Photo Albums, Mechanical and Civil Engineering,
Smithsonian Institution. 150
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Chapter Four
The Rational Factory: Highland Park's New Shop from 1914 to 1919
Between 1910 and 1913 production at the Ford Motor Company grew from
fewer than 2,000 Model T's a month to over 15,000.1 In the face of the
dramatic rise in production volume, Ford began to think about another
building campaign. The company needed the new buildings to house
expanding operations, but more interestingly, Ford layout engineers saw
the new buildings as an opportunity to further rationalize the factory.
The early Highland Park buildings had been innovative for 1910 style
production, that is, production based primarily on static assembly. By
1913 innovations had outmoded both the early production style and the
buildings designed for it. The new buildings would be designed
specifically to house the recently introduced moving assembly line. By
their design, the buildings would aid in the rapid movement of materials
around the factory, an indispensable feature of assembly line
production.
In 1913 Ford engineers, along with architect Albert Kahn, began work
on plans for a new section of the plant. To distinguish between the new
and old buildings, Ford personnel began to call them the "new shop" and
the "old shop." The decision to expand the buildings evolved around the
need for more manufacturing space and the realization that the design of
the new buildings could be instrumental in advancing the newly
introduced assembly line system. In order to produce enough cars to
keep up with ever-growing consumer demand for the popular Model T, the
new Highland Park structures needed abundant floor space, and mechanical
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transportation inside the factory walls. In 1913 the company boasted an
annual production of 200,000 Model T's, yet even that volume failed to
satisfy demand. More than just the simple addition of manufacturing
space, the engineers intended the new shop, by virtue of its design, to
aid in the organization and control of production; with 14,000 workers
in the factory, producing so many cars, organization of production and
the movement of materials became more important than ever.
Technological and economic priorities guided design of the new shop.
With the design and construction of each new building, transportation
became more and more important--movement of materials into the plant,
movement of parts being assembled, transportation of finished parts to
their destinations, motion of men as they assembled parts, and movement
of men through the plant. This emphasis contrasted with the schemes of
the companies described in chapter three, which sought increased
production through improved worker motivation achieved by welfare
capitalism. The Ford Motor Company thus made a strong statement about
its attitudes toward workers as well as about social movements. In
building the new shop, Ford and his engineers continued to disregard
most trends and forge their own.
Much like the move into the Piquette Avenue plant, and then into the
old shop at Highland Park, the move to the new shop was preceded by
important changes and growth in production. Each component of Fordism
had been put into operation by 1913, albeit some were in rudimentary
states. The new components helped to direct plans for the new shop. The
engineers must have known that their system, though not yet fully
developed would lead them to new successes in production. The new shop
provided them with an opportunity to experiment with building a factory
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around production. The words "experimental" or "exploratory" best
describe the Highland Park plant. The Ford engineers did not know what
the best plan for production would be but they planned the new shop
according to their 1913 priorities. In 1913 they judged materials
handling, including the moving assembly line, to be the next major step
in advancing production.
The introduction of the moving assembly line in 1913 presaged the
auto industry's future, for with it came the realization that almost all
movement through the factory could be mechanized and thus closely
controlled by management. Mechanized materials handling provided the
final piece of Fordism that created the potential for an entirely new
system of production. In the new system, workers merged with the
machinery as assembly and machining operations were completely
routinized. Workers had no choice but to perform their jobs with a
prescribed set of movments. The new technology also allowed the foreman
to control the speed of production simply by controlling the speed of
the line. Finally, unskilled laborers no longer moved all materials
around the factory because mechanical handling could do much of the work
faster and with greater predictability.
The moving line was the final step in Fordism and the innovation
became the foundation of the complex materials handling system that
vastly improved speed and reliability of production output. The
assembly line led to such a major change in production that the Ford
layout department engineered a new factory to better suit it.
The engineers who had designed the old shop worked from 1910
assumptions about production when skilled mechanics performed their work
at individual stations and small groups completed final assembly. In
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planning the old shop, the primary concerns were sufficient space, good
light, and convenience of moving materials, in that order. During the
three years after the old shop was built, the company's innovations in
production outgrew the older facility.
Space, a constant concern to the company, continued to be important
for the growing enterprise, but movement soon became the overwhelming
priority in designing the new shop. By 1913 the old shop had become too
crowded to handle additional production and Ford's engineers realized
that they needed a different factory building if they wanted to continue
with their experiments to increase speed and volume of production as
they lowered its cost. They knew that "one thing that had a good deal
to do with the old-fashioned high cost of manufacture was the aimless
way in which things were lugged around the shop."2 When the engineers
began planning new factory buildings they focused on materials handling,
and especially on housing the assembly line. Improved materials
handling, they believed, would make production faster and more
efficient. It would also eliminate many unskilled laborers--the
pushers, shovers, and draggers--who had always been the major agents of
materials transportation.
Not surprisingly, complaints about the old shop helped to shape the
plans for the new shop additions. The shop managers expressed
dissatisfaction with the plant organization, as one manager related to
Arnold and Faurote: "There was not floor space enough; machine tools and
factory departments were not placed as the management knew they should
be, and...truckers, pushers, and draggers engaged in needless handlings
of materials and work in progress."3 As usual, the complaints
emphasized transportation, the "all important factor which influenced
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the length of the manufacturing cycle."4  Henry Ford viewed
transportation as a key to better management of production. As he aptly
expressed in his often quoted statement:
if transportation were perfect and an even flow of materials
could be assured, it would not be necessary to carry any stock
whatsoever. The carloads of raw materials would arrive on
schedule and in the planned ogder and amounts and go from the
railway cars into production.
Ford's engineers learned a great deal from the old shop. It was not
only too small for growing production, but also proved inadequate for
the new type of production. When the company built the old shop
inefficient transportation created only minor problems, in 1910 manual
handling was appropriate for the speed and type of production in the
Ford shop. But by 1913 the configuration of the old shop and its
limitations for shop floor layout had become problematic to the shop
general manager.
In planning the new shop, Ford engineers, especially Edward Gray,
worked more closely with architects than they had in designing the old
shop. William Knudsen, the head of the assembly department, indicated
that the new buildings had been more carefully planned and "all
mechanical equipment arranged for in the contract." This was done, he
added,
in hope of showing a decrease in the cost of our building. On
the first buildings none of this was included in the contract and
continual changes, necessitating cutting, and removal of 6walls,
in some instances ran the cost way beyond the estimates.
In 1914, two buildings were completed, marking the beginning of
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Highland Park's new shop. In 1916, another six-story building was
constructed. The buildings were 62 feet wide, 842 feet long, and six
stories high, built parallel to each other and joined by a six story
craneway of the same length. The most striking features of the new shop
were the giant six-story glass-roofed craneways each built between two
six-story factory buildings. The craneways became the heart of the new
transportation system and did much to solve the materials handling
problems. Railroad tracks, laid in the craneways, allowed the supply
train to pull right into the factory. Two five-ton cranes moved along
the length of the craneway lifting materials from the floor of the
craneway and placing them on one of almost two hundred cantilevered
platforms from which pushers and shovers transported materials to work
stations by hand-truck. Compared to the layout of the old shop, the new
shop layout looked very modern and efficient with its long glass-walled
buildings joined by the giant craneways. (see diagram and illust. of
craneway)
Constructed of reinforced concrete with brick facing, new shop
buildings resembled those of the old shop. By 1914, though, the
engineering of reinforced concrete had been greatly improved. Some
structural weaknesses had been found in the older buildings, but the new
buildings would prove to be among the sturdiest of factories. Although
the new buildings maintained the traditional mill building proportions,
the technological and managerial innovations inside belied that
traditional appearance. Along with the installation of the crane
system, M.L. Wiesmyer and the other layout engineers reorganized the
sequence of production operations in order to make the best use of the
new cranes.
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Surprisingly, the foundry occupied the top floor; rough stores and
machine operations demanding most light occupied the other top floors.
Work in progress descended "in natural course of operations, until it
reached final assembly on the ground floor."7 By placing the machine
shop on the top floor the engineers took a bold step. The machine shop
in the old shop, as in other factories, was located in a single-story
building to provide good lighting and a solid floor that could withstand
the machines' vibration. Placement of the machine shop on the top floor
was possible only because of stronger construction and because the crane
was able to lift heavy materials easily and conveniently to the sixth
floor. The arrangement of the departments aptly reflected the Ford
Motor Company's philosophy of rationalization. The reordering of
production flow through the factory was supposed to eliminate as much
handling of materials as possible, making production more automatic.
Organization of production flow, became the major variable remaining to
be perfected in mass production.
Though the opening of the new shop received less fanfare than the
old shop, its completion held far more significance for the company and
the industry. The new shop inaugurated the era of the rational
factory--a factory planned as though it could be run just like a
machine. In the rational factory engineers had to coordinate all
activities and movement in the factory so that each meshed with the next
like cogs in a huge machine. The new Ford system demanded close
supervision of every worker and of every operation. Speed of production
of each part had to be maintained for the entire system to work. And in
order for that speed to be feasible, delivery of parts and raw materials
on time was absolutely necessary. There were many different kinds of
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transportation to think about--railroad freight cars, outgoing
shipments, transportation within the factory limits, and even moving the
work force in and out of the plant between shifts. The efficient
movement of men and materials absorbed the attention of industrial
engineers in all factories, but Ford's engineers faced an unprecedented
challenge. They had to do more than coordinate the usual stream of
parts and materials through the factory. The increased speed and volume
of production meant the management of greater quantities of materials.
Most important, the moving line system required a degree of precision
never before achieved in materials handling. The story of Highland
Park's new shop is one of engineers searching for a way to have
everything in the factory in the right place at the right time.
The challenge led Ford engineers to invent new methods of factory
transportation and discover unique ways of using old methods. At
Highland Park, their most impressive new materials handling technology
was the building design itself--the building arrangement and the
addition of the craneways dramatically reduced materials handling needs.
Rather than viewing the building as an obstruction to smoothly flowing
production, Ford's engineers conceived of it as part of the industrial
machine. Without the new building arrangement, the new production
system could have been only partially successful. For production speed
depended on fast and reliable delivery of materials. The new shop made
speed and reliability far more probable than it had been in the old
shop.
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Fordism in the New Shop
The production system around which the new shop was organized had
three basic elements: manufacture of a single, standard model; the
division and simplification of work through automatic, specialized
machines; and a mechanized materials handling system. The absence of
any one of these three elements would have limited the company's
success. Each had been introduced individually between 1908 and 1914
and each had achieved its own success. But in the new shop the three
principles gained new importance as they were integrated to provide the
foundation of a carefully thought out system of production.8
The importance of the new shop lay especially in the attention paid
to materials handling. Any company could have decided to produce only
one model or introduce specialized machines. But the new handling
methods played the critical role in completing Ford's system of
producing large numbers of Model T's at low cost. Few companies before
Ford could boast the forethought of building the factory according to
such a complex and detailed production process.
The single model, the T, lay behind Ford's initial success, the
first of his long trail of successes. Its simple, durable design
appealed to thousands of Americans and thus created overwhelming demand.
The principle of holding product design constant had its greatest impact
on production in the new shop. The single model, produced year after
year with only minor changes, opened the way for quantity production.
In later years three of Ford's major engineers agreed that
standardization increased production, "we would not have had a shop big
enough [for] our production if we had followed the old methods
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[producing several models]." 9 The production of the single model also
facilitated the development of the rational factory. According to one
writer, it "influenced machine selections, work and task organization,
and the integration of the entire plant."10
Not surprisingly much of the innovation in the Ford plants has been
attributed to the company's decision to produce a single model.
Industrial journalist H.F. Porter, wrote that the production of a single
model allowed managers and engineers to devote their complete attention
to the machines, materials and work routines; the Model T's "unlimited
run" resulted in a "free hand in the selecting and developing machinery,
special tools, dies, and men." "Nothing," Porter continued, "is quite so
demoralizing to the smooth commercial operation of a factory as
incessant changes in design. Even small changes at the beginning of
the season occasion much confusion for weeks or months; meanwhile,
production is curtailed and costs go skyward."1l Fay Faurote, in 1926,
stated that the success of Ford's economies in production could be
"attributed to quantity production which, in turn, could be attributed
to the fact that only a single model was manufactured." 12
After the decision to build only one model, came experimentation
with, and introduction of, the automatic specialized machines. Intense
mechanization in the Ford shops became crucial to the success of
Fordism. Its importance stemmed from the fact that individual machines
were equipped with highly specialized fixtures and jigs that allowed the
worker to insert the part to be worked on without making adjustments.
Some machines were standard, general purpose machines fitted with
special jigs by Ford men. Others, like the multiple screw driving
machine, were specially designed by Ford engineers and manufactured by
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machine tool companies. The screw driving machine allowed the worker to
throw the screws "at random into the pans of hoppers at the top of the
magazines." The machine placed and installed the screws, leaving the
worker nothing to do but turn the handle to move the work through the
machine. While the worker operated the machine, his helper removed the
previous piece from the rack where it fell when completed. 1 3
Like the standard model, specialized machines had been introduced
before the company moved into the new shop. But because the new shop
was planned for specialized machines, their effectiveness proved far
greater than before. Moreover, the increased speed and efficiency of
handling provided conditions in which the machines could work to their
full capacity. As O.J. Abell described movement in the machine shop in
1915: "So far as possible the piece is kept from touching the floor or
from accumulating in receptables during a series of consecutive
operations in any department. The system had advanced far beyond
methods in the old shop.1 4
Economic use of the machines depended on the scale of the factory.
One of Ford's engineers explained that most of the machines could not be
used by small manufacturers because they were available only if
purchased in quantity. What is more, some of the machines were so
expensive that few companies could afford them.1 5 Another engineer
explained that specialized and high speed machines played an important
part in the development of Ford's system but that in order to build the
special machines "you've got to have mass production or it will break
you; it's so expensive."1 6
In the early days of mass production, most auto manufacturers did
not have large enough output to warrant using the machines that Ford
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used. However, the boom in demand for automobiles in the 1910s gave
other companies the means with which to employ some of Ford's economies
of scale. By the mid 1920s descriptions of other companies sounded much
like those of the Ford Motor Company. In a 1926 Wall Street Journal
article, for example, the Hudson Company was described as turning out
more engines per hour than Ford. The company had completely adopted
Ford's practice of investing in expensive machines that "saved one
minute per gear" resulting in large yearly savings. Hudson also adopted
Ford's materials handling methods, moving materials quickly to avoid
keeping a stock room.7
Perhaps the single most dramatic innovation, the moving line changed
priorities in the factory such that timing and coordination of all
movement became the single most important management task.
Consequently, layout and materials handling loomed more important in the
new shop than they had been in almost any factory. Layout and handling
both addressed the same problem--how to reduce the amount of time and
labor spent in moving materials around the factory. Time was, in the
end, the problem to overcome and Henry Ford seemed to be obsessed with
it. Workers were constantly prodded to use time well, as a typical
reminder in The Ford Man, the company paper, read:
Time is the Most Valuable Thing in the World
Shorten the time required to perform an operation. To save one
minute in each hour worked means a saving of 1.6% in the wage
bill. True efficiency means making every Minute count.18
With every decision, the engineers intended to reduce the time
required to produce a car. By 1913 much had already been achieved. As
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Arnold and Faurote wrote "it is of record that in the old Piquette
Avenue days, previous to the time when any attempts at Ford shops
systematization were made and chaos reigned supreme, the first
systematizer found that Ford [engine] travelled no less than 4,000 feet
in course of finishing, a distance now reduced to about 334."19 This
was achieved even before the moving line system had been perfected.
The engineers first changed the position of machines on the shop
floor. They were concerned, in the words of one structural engineer,
with the "laying out of the work." Cummings told the society of
engineers that layout, so central to the new theories of production, was
the most important part of the engineers' work--"to give the greatest
economy with the least expenditure of effort." 20
According to a 1917 article in Automobile Topics, automobile output
had been doubled in many plants by rearranging the shop floor and
providing an adequate supply of materials "properly timed in their
arrival at the machines."21 But as the Ford Motor Company learned, such
rearrangement and timing was no simple task. Nothing short of building
the new shop could achieve the desired results in materials handling.
Plant rearrangement and mechanization of materials handling dominated
the design strategy of the new shop. The company considered those two
improvements so important that they guided the planning and design not
only of the new shop, but also Ford's next factory, the River Rouge
plant.
As important as layout was, it was constrained by the line shafts
that distributed mechanical power throughout the plant. Few machines
ran on individual motors even as late as 1918. Usually medium sized
electric engines provided power for a bank of machines and the
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troublesome shafting and belting transferred the power to the individual
machines. The shafts and belts not only made layout difficult but also
created safety problems and generally interfered with movement through
the shop floor. In the words of a plant engineer "you had to lay your
departments out to utilize the line shaft overhead that drives the
machine."2
Even though restricted by the use of shafting and belting, layout
did much to improve materials transportation through the factory.
Continuing the method used in the old shop, engineers placed machines in
the new shop as close together as possible to keep necessary
transportation between machines to a minimum. But the timing demands of
the moving line required more than good plant layout. Mechanized
materials handling, the major technological innovation in the new shop,
helped to meet the timing needs and represented a major contribution to
the development of the rational factory. Materials handling became the
key to assuring that mass production would work. The old manual methods
of moving parts, materials, and assemblies in process, created so many
bottle-necks that the moving line would not have been able to live up to
its capabilities.
Most of the handling in the old shop had been manual. That is,
laborers moved parts, raw materials, and assemblies in process around
the factory; assemblers, as well as other production workers, often had
to carry their work from the last worker's station to their own. Manual
handling created several problems for mass production. Most important,
it was slow and unpredictable. Because it depended on human beings,
instead of machines, the movement was not as easy to control as the
later mechanized system. It was inefficient because it used so many men
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whose tasks conceivably could be eliminated. With the moving line, the
well-timed and predictable delivery of materials and parts was
essential. The assembly lines moved at a certain pace and without a
supply of parts the line could not go on. In the new shop most handling
was mechanized though some manual handling remained.
In the new shop the cranes were planned as a primary handling
source. Railroad cars pulled right into the craneway which,
conveniently located between the two factory buildings, allowed the
cranes to lift goods from the ground to loading platforms for both
buildings. So many platforms jutting out into the craneway from the
sides of the buildings that no work station was very far from the
materials. This method greatly reduced the amount of slow and
troublesome carrying of materials around the factory. However, much of
the remaining horizontal transportation--the movement across factory
floors as contrasted to vertical movement from one floor to
another--still depended on the pushers and shovers to deliver parts and
materials to the appropriate work stations but the manual handling
merely supplemented the mechanical. During the planning of the new
shop, some experts had predicted that manual handling would become
almost obsolete with its completion. Though that prediction proved
wrong, manual handling was nonetheless greatly reduced.2 3
In addition to the cranes, the new shop made full use of gravity
slides, conveyors, and rollways. Conflicting reports about the origin
of these moving devices leaves several questions unanswered. It is
difficult to date the introduction of gravity slides. David Hounshell
argues that neither gravity slides nor conveyors existed in the Ford
Motor Company operations before the first experiments with the assembly
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line in 1913. He bases his argument, in which he disagrees with much
previous writing, on an important set of articles written in 1913. The
articles, written by Fred Colvin, a knowledgeable industrial journalist,
contain no mention of conveyors or gravity slides, though they cover
nearly every other important feature of the plant. Hounshell discredits
other accounts that are largely based on oral histories done in the
1950s. There is however, another set of interviews from 1926 that were
part of an extensive research project known as the Additional Tax Case.
The probable accuracy of these interviews is much greater than the 1950
oral histories. Scattered through the 1926 interviews are indications
that conveyors and gravity slides did exist before 1913. It is possible
that some experimentation with slides and conveyors took place before
1913. But Hounshell is undoubtedly justified in his position that if
they were in widespread use in 1913 Colvin would have described them.2 4
Nevertheless, the date of introduction is less important here than
the use to which slides and conveyors were put in the new shop. The
slides, troughs, and conveyors were the technologies that provided the
base on which the new system of materials handling was built. The
introduction of each new technology meant less manual handling and more
automatic delivery.
Slides, conveyors, and rollways were built in many ways for
different jobs. They varied in shape, length, width, and function. A
slide might carry a finished piece just a few feet to the inspector or
it might be twenty feet long and hold the work of several men. Some
slides carried work from one man to another; some moved work to the next
work area, sometimes even to the next floor. Conveyor belts brought
work to the worker and took it away. (illustrations)
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Ford engineers eagerly employed conveyors and moving overhead lines
to move parts and materials as they made every effort to rationalize
materials handling. The Ford Motor Company's position in the early
debate about conveyors was clear. Ford engineers stood strongly behind
the position that "conveyors should be installed wherever they will
displace enough hand labor to pay for the investment."25 Ford
engineers clearly believed that they met that criterion. The in-house
publication Ford Industries reported that "the day the first big
conveyor went into operation seventy men were released by the
transportation department for other work." 26 Other companies, less
convinced of the utility of conveyors, argued that "in many cases
material can be conveyed in crates or boxes on trucks and elevators with
great economy." "In general, the critics argued, "the efficiency of
conveyors is apt to be overstated."27 The critics were proven wrong as
company after company adopted conveyors, and production in most
enterprises underwent transformation similar to that in the Ford Motor
Company.
Moving conveyor belts constituted an important part of the company's
new plan to rationalize production. In 1914 when the new shop was
finished Ford engineers knew that the moving conveyor would become one
of the most important time saving tools in the factory. Several years
later, a company spokesman wrote that:
conveyors on which assembly or other work is done are carefully
timed to insure an even output and thus act as a governor on the
rate of production. The rate of speed at which they move is the
result of a careful time study of each operation which determines
the rate at which any piece of work should be done without
crowding men or machines beyond their efficient capacity. To
have them move too slowly is sheer waste.
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Correct timing conserves the energy of the men by holding them at
a uniform pace without allowing them to exceed it. It results in
a better and more uniform quality of workmanship and also enables
the company to determine with accuracy the number of hours of
labor that go into each car and every part. This permits the
factory to figure its production requirements months in advance
and to regulate the flow of raw materials through the plant 128
such a manner that there is neither a shortage nor a surplus.
Not all auto companies, however, immediately adopted the moving
assembly line. In 1916, three years after Ford announced successful
experiments with the moving assembly line and after production rates in
many companies had soared with the widespread use of the moving line, at
least two prominent companies continued to use group assembly. The
companies, Cadillac and Chalmers, continued with the old methods perhaps
because they competed only on quality of product rather than price.
They too, however, eventually turned to the moving line.
Even with all of the mechanical handling devices, much manual
handling remained. At the new shop, pushers and shovers continued to
deliver parts and materials to the individual stations employing the
standard loading boxes described in chapter four. Boxes of parts were
placed along the lines for both easy access by the worker and easy view
of the foreman who had to ensure a constant supply of parts.
Like other changes in the Ford factories, mechanization of handling
would speed up delivery of materials, in addition to exerting new
control over work. Mechanization of handling differed from
mechanization of other jobs. When engineers mechanized the jobs of
skilled machinists they created an entirely new job that an unskilled
person with no experience could perform. The job became standardized
and very controllable. Mechanizing handling eliminated many jobs, but
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the remaining transport jobs were unchanged. Those jobs continued to be
difficult to standardize and control to the extent that the company
viewed desirable. Though materials handling was an unskilled job, its
mechanization and standardization became important to the success of
Fordism.
Though considered one of the first of the rational factories,
Highland Park's new shop operated under the constraints of two related
and obvious holdovers from earlier factory plans--the six-story
buildings rather than a single-story building and the use of group
driven machines instead of individual motor drives.
Why did Ford's engineers build a six-story building at a time when
many engineers and industrial architects advocated single-story
buildings for low building costs and production efficiency? In 1914,
mechanized materials handling was still in its infancy; with conveyors
in the early stages of innovation their potential was still uncertain.
It was safer, therefore, to expect any one conveyor to move materials
and assemblies a few hundred feet at most. If the Highland Park plant
had been spread out on one floor the building would have extended
thousands of feet in each direction. Early conveyors did not have the
capacity to cover such distances. At the same time, elevators and
craneways were designed for vertical movement, they were fast,
efficient, and reliable. Thus, the six-story building was perfect for
mechanized handling as it existed in 1914.
It seems that Ford's plant engineers continued to think about power
and power transmission in an uncharacteristically old-fashioned way. At
a time when many companies were moving to individual drive machines that
eliminated shafts and belting, the Ford Motor Company continued to use
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the group drive principle that perpetuated the use of shafts and
belting. This adherence to obsolete ideas about power might help to
explain the continued use of the six-story building design. In earlier
periods when a factory ran off water or steam power, a tall, narrow
building was best for efficient mechanical power distribution.
Work in the Rational Factory
Rationalization changed almost everything in the factory. Work in
Highland Park no longer resembled any other experience in a worker's
life. Once the beginning bell rang, work took on an unnatural
regularity. The assembly line required absolute conformity and workers
essentially became like one of the machines. The worker made no
decisions and was discouraged from thinking about how to do his job.
Company hiring policy continued to favor workers with no previous
exerience. Ford and his engineers seemed to believe that the perfect
worker would be as obedient as the machines.
In writing about efforts to introduce Taylorism in Watertown Arsenal
in 1908, Hugh Aitken described rationalized production as consisting
of more than merely technological innovations. The factory represented
an organization with established hierarchies, patterns of behavior, and
systems of control, and introducing Taylorism in Watertown Arsenal
necessitated widespread changes in the old patterns; "there in microcosm
were all the stresses of an industrial society exposed to constant
revolution in technology and organization."29 Aitken's observation is
as pertinent to the transformation of the auto industry with the coming
of Fordism as it was to the arsenal a few years earlier. However,
175
unlike the arsenal where worker opposition to Taylorism resulted in the
congressional ban of time study from companies holding Army contracts,
Ford workers had no channels for complaint and had little choice but to
cooperate with the new methods or find another job.30
The advances made in rationalizing production in Ford's new shop had
significant consequences for workers in the factory. Many of the
changes began in the old shop and progressed quickly in the new shop.
The most obvious and startling change in the entire factory was speed.
Not only the speed of the assembly line, but the speed of every moving
person or object in the plant. When workers moved from one place to
another, they were instructed to move fast. Laborers who moved parts
were ordered to go faster. And every worker on a sub-assembly line
worked as fast as the line dictated. The Ford factory combined
scientific management with a finely tuned machine. Not only were
workers expected to produce at a certain rate in order to earn a day's
wages, they had no choice but to work at the pace dictated by the
machine.
All of these changes in the factory did more than solve the
engineering problems of materials handling, they also had a substantial
and significant influence on the workers. Each new factory building
increasingly embodied modern ideas about production and the concomittant
concerns with management procedures and control of workers. Through a
new concern about plant layout, the closer placement and specialization
of machines meant that the men had little discretionary time. Earlier,
when they assembled automobiles at their own benches, workers controlled
their own speed and could linger over a particular operation. In the
modern factory, the new layout eliminated the last vestiges of autonomy
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and independence in their work. As one worker in Ford's Chicago plant
described his work:
Along with [the assembly line] was the other bad treatment and
the fear psychoses which was developed. I worked, for example,
about 40 to 50 feet from a water fountain and during the summer
you would work 8:00 to noon and 12:30 to 4:30 and never be able
to get over this 40 to 50 feet to get a drink of water. If you
did the assembly line would move so fast you would be behind and
it would be impossible to catch up. I have seen people go to the
washroom and get fired when they came back because their job was
behind.31
Individual workers complained about the speed, and unions (though
there was no strong union in the industry in the 1910s) defended the
rights of workers to control their own work. The protest over speed
arose from several quarters. The most straightforward was the harsh
effect of the production speed on workers' health. A nervous condition
dubbed "Forditis" was attributed to the constant pressure to keep up
with the pace of the line. 3 2 Workers' wives even complained to the
company that their husbands were overworked and physically exhausted
after a day's labor.
Speed of the line was connected with other changes in the actual
work performed in the plant. Rationalizing the new shop required
fundamental changes in the role of workers in the plant. "Workers by
millions in mills and factories are being shaped to meet the demands of
these rigid machines," wrote Charles Reitell.3 2 Jobs that had once
required the skills of an experienced mechanic could now be performed by
any one of the new "specialists." Specialists were machine tenders who
knew how to perform one operation on a machine with a specialized jig.
The jobs required no previous experience and a new worker could
typically learn the job in less than one day. According to a 1917
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survey, by the that year over fifty-five percent of Ford's workforce
were specialists. Assemblers, a second semi-skilled position, made up
most of the balance of the productive work force. Stephen Meyer has
described the two deskilled jobs as the "foundations of the automobile
industry," representative of "the new type of worker in industry."5 1
The new jobs demanded no mental activity from the worker. In fact,
the less thinking workers did the better Ford liked it. Instead, the
new work required manual dexterity, alertness, watchfulness, rhythmic
and monotonous activies, coupled with a lessening of much of the older
physical requirements35 rather than a knowledge of machines and the
experience of earlier workers. Agility and quickness in handling parts,
both large and small, became the definition of skill.3 6 The shift away
from skilled jobs, of course, led to the decline in numbers of skilled
workers in the factory. Though some of the skilled workers remained in
capacities such as designing machines and fixtures, most left and some
accepted demotion to specialist. The new skill requirements, or lack
thereof, also led to a preference for younger workers. Young men could
perform the new operations better than old ones. In the earlier factory
young men had to serve years as apprentices and older men were valued
for their experience. The rational factory reversed the situation. For
the most part, jobs in the rationalized auto factory had been
transformed from skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled to the technical
jobs (design, planning, scheduling, and routing), the supervisors
(clerks, inspectors, foremen), and machine tenders. The automatic
machinery and mechanized handling equipment leveled wages by eliminating
the highest and lowest paid workers.
Rationalization also affected the make-up of the work force. As
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skilled workers left the company unskilled immigrants usually replaced
them. One supervisor later recalled having men of fourteen different
nationalities in one department.37 Turnover became one of the company's
most significant problems. In the rational factory labor turnover
increased rapidly. (As noted earlier turnover reached almost 400 percent
at Ford in 1913) The inventions that allowed inexperienced workers to
build cars also allowed them to change jobs as often as they liked.3 8
Though turnover created disruption, the company never worried about
finding enough workers to operate the machines. David Montgomery has
suggested that the jobless became "an indispensable part of rationalized
industry,"39 thus keeping an ever-ready supply of workers outside the
factory gates.
In the rational factory, Ford's engineers eroded the control once
held by skilled workers by virtue of their knowledge and experience.
Ford simplified each job so that any man off the street could replace
the skilled man. With a large labor pool at the company's door few
single workers risked opposing the system. In such a factory, close
supervision was absolutely essential for work to proceed as expected,
for workers had no personal incentive to get work done. The factory was
now filled with workers without a tradition of craftsmanship. They
worked for money only.
Workers tried to assert some personal control in the rational
factory in two ways. Borrowing from earlier days, they continued with
soldiering practices to slow down production. This became more and more
difficult as it became easier to identify the source of slow-downs.
Slow-downs had to be planned and executed more carefully than ever
before.
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More important was the second method--unionization. Early efforts
to organize the auto industry met with repeated difficulties. Disputes
over jurisdiction characterized much of the early history. Growing from
similar problems in the carriage industry, individual craft unions (e.g.
painters, carpenters, etc. ) competed with the Carriage Workers who
represented all workers in the industry.
These fights intensified in the young auto industry in the battles
between the AFL and CIO. But even when jurisdictional agreements were
settled the UAW faced trouble with the character of the rational
factory. The rational factory contained an ironic twist in the
relationship between the union and the company. On one hand it was
easy for a small group of workers to stop the flow of production through
much of the plant because of the interconnectedness of each process. On
the other hand, the very large plants of unskilled and semi-skilled
workers were hard to organize: the workers had no craft tradition to
tie them together and communication between departments proved
difficult.
As production was rationalized the need grew for careful supervision
of workers and for the final checking of pieces. "In the new Ford
plant," writes Stephen Meyer, "the foreman's duties were more
circumscribed and he had assistant foremen, sub-foremen (straw bosses),
clerks, inspectors, and others to assist him."40 The new system
required the keeping of vastly increased records, resulting in the
employment of many clerks.
As productive work was made more tedious, close supervision became
necessary to assure any quality control. In one way the foreman's job
became easier. The new jobs meant that workers had no reason to wander
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around the shop floor. Because the jobs allowed no worker judgement the
foreman could "easily detect 'work' activities not necessary to the
business at hand."41 Likewise foremen from other departments could
monitor movement through the factory because he would know whether or
not a worker had reason to be in a particular place.
The new management system resulted in a reduction in the foreman's
power. Like the guidelines of Taylorism, the individual foreman in the
Ford factory could not hire or fire workers, nor could he assign work.
These functions were moved to the planning department to be performed by
someone with a broad view of the entire factory. Departments were no
longer the province of the foreman. Much of his job--decision making
about to get production out--was usurped by engineers in the planning
department. Thus, he lost status as he lost power to make decisions and
became just another worker. His job was reduced to enforcing speed and
quality of production.42
Rationalization instilled in managers the confidence that a certain
number of cars could be produced every day. The moving assembly line
gave the production department the capability "to say how many cars it
can build in a given time, for it knows how fast the conveyor chain
moves, and how many chassis can be put on the track."43 It also
measured labor effort measurable.
Construction at Highland Park continued through the 1930s as
operations were added and production expanded. It seemed that the Ford
Motor Company had an insatiable need for space. Only a year after the
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company moved into the new shop one report read that "some of the
buildings are now overcrowded and will, in the course of another year,
need additions, mostly on account of the heavy increase of service
work." 4
Highland Park's new shop provides a good example of the changes
taking place in factory design and construction. Twentieth century mass
production methods presented a new set of problems for the manufacturer,
the architect, and the engineer. Greater volumes of production required
larger spaces than ever before, new machines were heavier and, when in
operation, set up a steady vibration which could prove hazardous to the
building and to the worker. Perhaps most important was the increasing
dedication to the modern production ideal--to produce large quantities
quickly.
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1Highland Park's New Shop seen from rear of building. From
FMC Archives.
The New Shop's craneway. From FMC Archives
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Model T body on slide in craneway area in the New Shop. FMC Archives. 185
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Overhead conveyors in the New Shop. From FMC Archives.
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Chapter Five
Experiment in Industrial Control: Ford's River Rouge Plant
from 1919 to 1935
The experienced observer [sees each Rouge operation as] part of a
huge machine--he sees each unit as a carefully designed gear
which meshes with other gears and operates in synchronism with
them, the whole forming one huge, perfectly-timed, smoothly
operating industrial machine of almost unbelievable efficiency.1
Ford and his engineers believed that the River Rouge plant would be
the perfect industrial machine. It would, they believed, overcome the
limitations of the Highland Park plant, particularly the latter's
inconvenient transportation facilities and lack of space for expansion.
Highland Park, though as modern and efficient as any factory of the day,
simply could not satisfy Ford's plans for expansion. The auto industry
had grown at a phenomenal pace and technological change created new
possibilities for fast, high volume production. The industry, and
especially Ford, was responsible for introducing mass production and the
assembly line, dramatically changing the way work was done in the
factory. Ford's River Rouge plant would reflect the industry's
unprecedented growth and change.
The Rouge River is connected to Lake Michigan by the Detroit River.
In 1915 when Henry Ford bought the site, undeveloped land lay on either
side of th river much of which had been farm land. The Dearborn area by
1920, however, began to experience the suburbanization process.
Suburbs--both anglo-American and immigrant--surrounded the plant site;
the proximity of a potential work force enhanced the desirability of the
site for Ford.
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Though the basic Ford manufacturing idea of bringing the work to the
man and machine was developed at Highland Park, the plant depended on an
insecure foundation--that iron and steel must come in from outside.
Because of its inland location the plant was inland it depended solely
on rail transportation which slowed down delivery of the materials.
Residential and commercial activities had built up during the 1920s,
thus surrounding the Ford plant, limiting available land for expansion.2
Consequently, the company had little choice but to relocate in order to
carry out planned expansion.
Not long after Highland Park's new shop construction began in 1914,
the Ford Motor Company purchased more than 600 acres (shortly thereafter
increased to over 1000) on the Rouge River. Henry Ford had personally
bought several thousand acres a few years earlier. He sold it to the
company in 1916. Ford envisioned a new kind of factory on the banks of
the Rouge. It would not only be a large suburban factory, its buildings
and their arrangement would also be unlike other factories. When
completed, even the casual observer could see that the River Rouge plant
was different, because of its size and many diveerse operations it
looked more like an industrial city than a factory. The plant covered
an area so great that by the 1950s it had an internal set of roads
nearly 80 miles long and over 100 miles of railroad track for carrying
parts and materials between buildings, enhancing the image of an
industrial city.3
Another metaphor--the fortress or walled city--befits the Rouge.
The plant is almost impenetrable, bounded on two sides by railroad
tracks on the third side by the river. The plant is completely fenced
on all of its landward sides. According to a company memo
191
"all entrances to the main part of the Rouge are guarded when
they are open and traffice is restricted to authorized vehicles
and pedestrians.
There is also a fence between the Fordson yard and the parking
lots and bus terminals no the east side of Miller Road and a
guarded pedestrian overpass to the main part of the Rouge from
the parking lots across Miler Road. There are other fences
within the main part of the Rouge restricting pedestrians and
vehicles to the use of guarded gates.4
The Rouge is located in, an industrial suburb very different from the
Highland Park community. On the streets surrounding the Highland Park
plant one would have found a lively commercial area along with dense
urban residential neighborhoods. The area, in Sam Bass Warner's terms,
was a walking neighborhood. Employees walked to work in Highland Park
and any pedestrian had easy access to the plant whose gates whose gats
opened right onto the sidewalk. This created a closeness between the
residents and the plant that disappeared in later factories. One
notable example of the effect of Highland Park's location involved union
organizing efforts. In 1913, when IWW members began efforts to
organize the plant, Ford workers listened to union speeches outside
during their lunch break. When police dispersed the unionists from
Ford's gates they merely relocated down the block in an empty lot. This
kind of contact was nearly impossible at the Rouge. 5
The vast differences between the two plants is also apparent in
comparisons of the power houses--a symbol of progress and strength.
Highland Park's power house had been built as a showplace. Not only did
the stacks hold up the FORD logo but the building's location beside a
sidewalk on a busy street invited passersby to admire the sparkling
generators and beautiful tiles and fittings of the powerhouse. The
Rouge's power house with far greater capacity than its predecessor, was
just another one of the plant's buildings. The eight stacks must have
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symbolized the plant's importance to visitors but it did not support the
company name. In fact the Rouge could be identified by the uninitiated
only by a sign at the gate that prevented visitors from freely entering
the grounds. Perhaps Ford presumed that everyone would know the
identity of the huge plant along the Rouge River, or perhaps by 1920 he
did not care as much about advertising.
World War I and the B Building
Ford and his engineers decided on the Rouge site as a solution to
several problems facing the growing company--water transportation
through the Great Lakes would reduce high shipping costs and make
delivery of raw materials more efficient, the Rouge River would provide
water necessary for proposed materials processing plants, and the site
was large enough for tremendous expansion.
The River Rouge plant became the largest factory in the world and
one of the most expensive industrial experiments of all times. The
location and design decisions were clearly motivated by technological
and economic concerns and the size of the plant reveals the
administrative decision to increase centralization efforts. Henry Ford
also looked at Dearborn as a community where he could exercise more
influence than he had in Highland Park. Ford and the company bought huge
tracts of land in Dearborn, land that eventually became sites for
additional company facilities, the Edison Institute, Henry Ford
hospital, and Dearborn Inn. The company also made plans for worker
housing in Dearborn but the plans were never carried out. Dearborn
essentially became a Ford town.(see David Lewis)
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The Rouge land was cheap, according to Charles Sorensen, Henry Ford
paid $700,000 for the whole site6 ; I have not been able to verify this
through archival records] because the land was swampy and the river at
that point was too shallow to be very useful to major transportation.
All accounts of the beginnings of the Rouge plant date the land
purchase at 1915. However, the Company's corporate papers contain no
mention of the purchase until November 2, 1916.7 Two reports dated
November 13, 1916 cast doubt on the 1915 date as they compare the
desirability of the Rouge site over one on the Detroit river. The
reports by William B. Mayo, one of the company's main engineers, and
Julian Kennedy, the Pittsburgh engineer who would design the plant's
blast furnaces, both recommended that the company choose the Rouge River
location for the site of the new plant. The reports reveal some of the
thoughts about the company's plans and also more general ideas of good
industrial planning. They suggest that no final decision had yet been
made regarding the land purchase. One wonders, however, how opern the
engineers really were to other sites considering Henry Ford's large
holdings on the Rouge River.
Mayo wrote that "strictly from an engineering point of view" the
Detroit River location would have slight advantages for a blast furnace
but that taken as a whole the River Rouge site had many more advantages.
He stated the reasons for seeking a new site. In order to construct a
blast furnace, with connecting foundry, steel plant, and motor
manufacturing plant that would be different and better than any
existing plant of a similar kind and to be of such highly
specialized construction to be more economical than anything yet
devised, and to this end it was necessary to pick out a location
that would embrace all the necessary essentials from both the
civic and the engineering viewpoint and, in addition, be so
located as to have easy connection with the existing plant at
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Highland Park. "8
Kennedy's report supported Mayo's. He also believed the Rouge
location to be the largest convenient site near Detroit. Speaking as an
expert he explained that "it has been the universal experience of
successful iron and steel works that sites which are thought to be
extremely ample at the outset are found in a few years, to be entirely
inadequate and more land has to be acquired...so that the only safe way
is to start with an acreage which seems absurdly large." 9
Mayo wrote with enthusiasm about the Rouge site. In addition to its
suitability for blast furnaces, he believed that the site would allow
easy access for the delivery of raw materials. He also pointed out the
convenience of the location for workers, and the site's proximity to
"the largest labor sections in the City of Detroit." One of the most
interesting of Mayo's arguments in favor of the site discusses the image
of the new plant. Because of the "very large number of visitors" it was
important to pay attention to "how well everything is done and as to its
cleanliness and sanitary standards... that of all other things the
location should be such that as near as possible a spotless town
appearance could be attained both in regards to the plant and to its
surroundings, with a country-like atmosphere and yet close to the city."
In his report Mayo seemed able to capture the plant's future greatness.
Even though the Ford Motor Company was one of the fastest growing
companies in America, Mayo's enthusiasm for the new industrial village
undoubtedly stemmed in part from the very favorable business climate in
the years before the U.S entry into World War I. The mid 1910s were
profitable years and brought significant growth to American industry.
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The decline in European manufacturing improved the commercial markets in
the U.S. and abroad. Not only did American goods enjoy the absence of
European competition, but many American industries produced directly for
the war effort. As David Kennedy has written, "in war and in peace
[businessmen] pressed their oportunities." 10 In addition to the
built-in advantages of a war overseas, business prosperred from the
pro-business policies of the Wilson administration. The prospects of
the booming war economy must have had some influence on Ford's decision
to buy a piece of land as large as the River Rouge site.
The Rouge site had one expensive problem--the river at that point
was too shallow for freight ships. In December 1916, presumably at the
behest of the Ford Motor Company, the Army Corps of Engineers wrote the
first of several reports on "improving" the Rouge River. Major H.
Burgess of the Corps reported that inquiries to owners of Rouge River
property had been made and a public hearing held to obtain the views of
all interested parties. "The result of the inquires," wrote Burgess,
"has been to develop the fact that the demand for further improvement of
the River Rouge is due primarily to the location of a large industrial
plant by the Ford Motor Company." Burgess repeatedly acknowledged that
the real beneficiary of the Corps' work on the river would be the Ford
Motor Company but based on older precedents he argued that the improved
river would provide a public good. The public benefits would grow from
increased employment (the new plant promised to employ at least 15,000),
harbor frontage would be increased, the improved river would encourage
other industries to locate on the river bank which would, in turn, bring
greater commercial activity to the Great Lakes (an estimated increase of
30,000,000 tons), the increase of freight traffic would be of general
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benefit to the city, and the turning (to be constructed by private
concerns) would be open to the public. Burgess clearly supported the
Corps' involvement with Rouge improvements. At one point in his report
he writes what sounds like a justification to anticipated criticism of
his recommendation.
It has not been the practice of the Government to assist in the
construction of private slips, but it is believed that the
conversion of the Rouge River into a slip will be of sufficient
general benefit to cause it to be considered differently from
other dock improvements. It is understood that in the past it
has been considered proper to add to the harbor frontage o limportant cities at the expense of the General Government.
The division engineer opposed the improvement, arguing that the
proposal work would be "in the interests of one company and not worthy
of being undertaken by the United States."12 Nevertheless, an agreement
was reached in which the Corps of Engineers would widen the channel from
an irregular width ranging from 300 feet to 175 feet to an even width of
200 feet and dredge it to a depth of 21 feet, as well as assuming
responsibility for yearly maintenance. The estimated cost was $495,000
plus $5,000 yearly for maintanance. In turn, the Rouge River property
owners, namely Ford, would donate land needed for widening and build the
turning basin that would allow the large ships to turn around for their
return trip to the Great Lakes.
Work began at the Rouge in 1917 with installation of cranes, digging
of a well for the blast furnace, and the beginning of the blast furnace
construction. In 1918 plant construction experienced a surge when the
United States Navy contracted with the Ford Motor Company to build Eagle
boats for the World War. The boats were needed after President Wilson
declared the end of American neutrality in the war. Henry Ford promised
to build 112 submarine chasers within a year and he believed that he
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could build them as fast as he did Model Ts. Ford's proposal was unique
in the ship building world for no one had ever tried to build ships
using mass production. Ultimately, the attempt failed.13
In December 1917 Henry Ford wrote to Josephus Daniels, Secretary of
the Navy making an unsolicited bid to build the Eagle boats. Ford's
letter contained three promises that would later cause him trouble.
First, he stated confidently that his workers could easily be trained to
build boats; second, that he would build the boats at an almost
completed plant in Newark, New Jersey; and third, that he would accept
no profits from the work.1 4
Instead of using the New Jersey plant, Ford ordered the construction
of a new building on the Rouge River site and billed the government
$3,500,000 for it. Six months after the signing of the original
contract a second contract was drawn up allowing the company to build a
second plant at Kearny, New Jersey at a cost of $2,500,000, to be paid
by the government. In addition to the buildings, many other plant
improvements were charged to the Navy account, such as roads, railroad
tracks, and sewage systems. The total bill came to about $10,000,000.15
The timing of the Eagle contract proved suspiciously convenient to
Ford in light of the events of the previous year. In 1916 John and
Horace Dodge filed suit against the Ford Motor Company and Henry Ford
accusing Ford of using stockholders' dividends to expand the plant and
to lower the price of the Model T. The suit asked that "the defendants
distribute as dividends 75 percent of the company's cash surplus, or
about $39,000,000."16 In October 1917, the minority stockholders
obtained a restraining order to keep the company from continuing
expansion at the Rouge site and thereby spending the contested money.
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The Dodge Brothers accused Henry Ford of deliberately witholding
dividends and of using the money to create a monopoly on cheap cars.
Though they did not explicitly argue that he wanted to hurt the Dodge
Brothers Company commercially, the implication was clear. 7
Less than two months after the issuance of the restraining order
Henry Ford wrote to Daniels with his offer to build Eagle boats. Ford
surely hoped that a government contract would help him to win the case,
and at the very least, to nullify the restraining order. Ford and
Daniels reached an informal agreement before the official contract was
signed in March 1918. The government contract gave Ford the wherewithal
he needed to begin plans for the new plant. The Navy would pay for the
new plant, but moreover, Ford could argue that the war effort needed the
new plant, thereby circumventing the restraining order. Though the
order was lifted several months later, the Navy contract allowed Ford to
metaphorically snub his nose at the Dodge brothers and the courts and
proceed as planned with the new factory. Even without the Eagle
contract the company would have built the plant but the timing gave Ford
a symbolic victory plus the advantage of beginning construction while
under the restraining order.
The government contract also helped the company's financial
situation. The court ruled in favor of the Dodge brothers, in February
1919 the Michigan Supreme Court handed down a decision that the company
owed its stockholders $19,000,000 plus interest. 1 8  Only$1,900,000 went
to outside owners since Henry Ford owned most of the stock. But the
situation angered Ford enough that he decided to buy out all of the
other stockholders to ensure that they could never again keep him from
reinvesting the company's profits. The buyout cost him $105,000,000.
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Not even Henry Ford had that amount of cash on hand. He borrowed
$60,000,000 and the company liquidated as much of its inventory as
possible.19 Without the buyout the Rouge might never have become what
it was, for undoubtedly the stockholders would have continued to object
to the reinvestment of profits into the plant.
In the end the United States had paid for the beginnings of the River
Rouge plant and had allowed Ford to accumulate a work force that was
then in place to begin work in the new auto factory.
Construction on the plant's first factory building, the "B Building"
(presumably short for Boat Building) reached completion in 1919. One of
the largest factory buildings built by that time, it measured 1700 by
300 feet, almost the size of twelve football fields. Constantly
improving construction technologies enabled industrial engineers to
design larger and larger building. New management skills along with the
rapid advancements in materials handling made efficient operations
possible in such a large building. Like the Highland Park plant, the
building's walls had large window areas, a feature that continued in
plant design through the 1920s (illust). Unlike any of Ford's earlier
factories, the building was designed to stand separate from all
subsequent buildings at the Rouge plant.
Construction of the B building signaled the break from the
traditional mill design. Though in planning the new shop, Ford
engineers had abandoned traditional layout patterns and introduced
revolutionary materials handling devices, in the end the actual
buildings only thinly disguised the classic dimensions and appearance of
the mill building.
Though the B building retained the basic, rectangular shape of the
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textile mill, its dimensions make any such comparison superficial. With
the old technological constraints gone, industrial engineers took
advantage of new freedoms to build factories to fit production processes
rather than building technologies. The creation of a new model factory
proved a slow process, however, and one sees the gradual transition from
mill building to modern factory at the Rouge plant. The B building is
clearly represented the beginning of that process where the mill
building was stretched out far beyond the imagination of the early mill
builders while maintaining its multiple stories.
Because the B building's original function was ship fabrication, the
three story interior was open with no floors, to allow the ship to pass
through the building. An Engineering News-Record article20 explained
that the original building design created problems. "The buildings were
designed before the manufacturing method fully evolved, and subsequently
it was found that some different set-ups might have been employed to a
greater advantage. Initially the company took the view that continuous
conveyor-assembly production could be applied to ship building. Further
study showed that this was not practicable... Step by step movement was
installed instead." Charles Sorensen explained in his autobiography
that the building was really designed for the ultimate plan of auto
manufacturing and assembly.2 1
Post-War Activities
The last Eagle boat left the B Building on September 3, 1919.22 As
the final boat moved through the building in the process of completion,
workmen rebuilt the building behind it. The Ford Man reported that "as
201
[the boats] are moved down the line from operation to operation, the
installation of equipment for the building of Ford [Model T] bodies is
taking place. Already the first three operations in the north end of
the building are being transformed from a boat to a body building
institution.2 3 According to William Pioch, the chief tool designer,
"the first, second, and third floors were added after the Eagle boats
went out. There were three lines going down through there for the boats.
We kept the middle line open as a crane bay and the two slides were
filled up with floors." 2 4 The company predicted that over 4,000 bodies
would be produced daily to supply to the Highland Park plant. Body
manufacturing, previously done by Fisher Body and 0.1. Beaudetter of
Detroit, was the first step toward the company's goal of integrated
self-contained production.2 5 A few years later the B Building also
housed production of Fordson tractors.
The company wasted no time in moving from war-time to peace-time
production. In 1919, several operations began--Model T body production,
the coke ovens were started, the saw mills cut their first wood.
At first, the company planned to make iron for the castings used in
the Model T. The blast furnaces were one of the original reasons given
for the decision to expand to another site. Ford's engineers explained
that the Highland Park plant was not only too small for two furnaces,
but that a large amount of water would be needed, which was not
available at the Highland Park plant.
Blast furnaces were especially important to the company for
production of the T's single-cast engine block. In writing about the T,
Michael Mahoney pointed out the irony of Ford's method of engine
fabrication. Casting rather than forging the engine resulted in a
202
product less refined, though more serviceable than those of other cars.
Mahoney argues that one might expect the cruder cast engine to be less
expensive when compared to the more sophisticated, high performance
engines. But, to the contrary, the cast engine required a more expensive
set-up. Casting required a foundry rather than a machine shop and a
stamping press and annealing furnace rather than a blacksmith and
forge.2 6  Thus, in this case at least, the cheaper the car, the more
expensive the factory. The new blast furnaces would make the production
of iron and the cast engine blocks faster and cheaper.
The first blast furnace began making iron in 1920 and it did not
take long before management realized that a steel mill would be an
important addition to the company's works. Charles Sorensen, who became
Henry Ford's right hand man, wrote that the company sold scrap iron for
$8 a ton and spent more than that in handling it. The scrap iron could
feasibly go right into a steel mill saving money in several ways. But
to Ford, the ability to control his own supply of steel was even more
important than saving a few dollars on scrap iron. 2 7 The ability to
produce steel became especially important after the war when steel was
scarce and auto companies competed for the available stock. As usual
Ford did not play exactly the same game as everybody else. Instead of
trying to outmanuever other companies for the available steel, he simply
built his own steel mill.
The blast furnaces and steel mill represented only the beginnings of
the vast Rouge processing facilities. Over the next five years, from
1917 to 1922, the company built several more processing plants. These
included a glass plant, a paper mill, a cement plant, a rubber plant, a
leather plant, and a textile mill. Ford took a radical step when he
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decided to incorporate materials processing into the production
operations. But the next decision was even more unconventional--the
acquisition of coal fields, forests, and rubber plantations to provide
every raw material that went into the Model T.
In the early 1920s the company acquired close to one million acres
of forest in northern Michigan, ore mines in Michigan, coal mines in
Kentucky and West Virginia, and a rubber plantation in Brazil. 28 Wood
from the forests was turned into Model T bodies. The blast furnace made
ore into iron, and coal went into the steel mill. Most exotic of all,
Brazilian rubber became tires. The company also experimented with
making artificial rubber from soybeans for use in steering wheels.
Behind the decision to invest in materials processing lay Henry
Ford's frustration and distrust of suppliers. Undependable suppliers
and their costly materials had angered him in the past, and he believed
that he could supply and process materials cheaper than he could buy
them. Furthermore, by controlling sources, important materials would
never be withheld due to shortages or their prices raised.
Control over raw materials added a new dimension to the company. By
building processing facilities, and acquiring the sources of the
materials, the Ford Motor Company entered its phase as, what David Lewis
has called, an industrial empire. With his empire, Ford was fulfilling
his dream of the totally self-sufficient plant by adding control over
all raw materials and their processing, creating the first integrated
automobile company.
Henry Ford's obsession with eliminating unnecessary costs led to
campaigns to rid the company of all possible waste. The results showed
up in additional materials processing. In order to use the by-products
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of one process, another was installed. Already mentioned was the slag
from the blast furnaces being turned into steel. The scrap from the saw
mill and textile mill was turned into cardboard and paper for plant use.
And blast furnace slag ended up as cement that the company used for all
plant building construction.2 9
Not until 1927, with the introduction of the Model A and the
transfer of final assembly to the Rouge, did the plant become the
absolute center of Ford Motor Company production. Before 1927 the Rouge
was considered primarily as a feeder plant to Highland Park. A 1924
company publication described the Rouge as the plant that "deals
primarily in raw materials." (Ford Industries, 1924, p.9)
Corporate Centralization
By building the Rouge plant the company expanded its centralization
efforts and added processing facilities that eventually completed the
company's vertical integration. The large site attests to Ford's long
range plans for centralizing the growing company.
At first glance the company's earlier decisions to establish branch
assembly plants might seem to imply an interest in decentralization.
The company publication even supports such an idea when, in 1924, an
article appeared stating "the Ford policy in general is for the
decentralization of industry but River Rouge is an exception."30
Highland Park produced Model T components and shipped the unassembled
pieces to assembly plants around the country. More unassembled cars fit
into a railroad car than assembled ones, resulting in dramatic
transportation savings. This, however was not real decentralization.
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Another experiment that many scholars have mistaken as an attempt at
decentralization was the Ford Village Industries. In seventeen villages
around Michigan, Henry Ford experimented with small scale manufacturing
operations operated by local farmers during the seasons when they could
not work their fields. The village industries ranged in size from
twelve workers at Nankin Mills to 738 at Ypsilanti.32 They met varying
degrees of success but after Henry Ford died the company discontinued
the program, implying that serious cost accounting left the small plants
in the red. During Henry Ford's life he refused to discuss the
profitability of his experiment.3 3
Though physically decentralized, Ford's supervision made the
village industries just another piece of the larger centralized system.
Furthermore, the experiment apparently was not part of the company's
commercial planning. All evidence suggests that the company considered
it a pet project of Ford's and that his death ended the experiment.
With the exception of these examples of physical decentralization,
the Ford Motor Company must be considered a highly centralized company.
To see how centralized it was, one can compare the company to its main
competitor, General Motors. GM and Ford are almost ideal types of
opposite business schemes. GM retained the divisions that arose
naturally from the purchase of many small companies. For several years
the adminstration did not follow the activities of the separate
divisions; each set its own price and production policies.34 Even when
the company reorganized in the early 1920s each division remained
semi-autonomous, with only decisions like price and model being made by
the executive committee.
The differences between the two types of management strategies are
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apparent in other examples. Ford produced one model aimed at a
particular market for eighteen years. When the market forced the
company to develop a new model, it produced only one different model. At
the same time, GM had several models aimed at a range of markets and the
models changed almost yearly.
The men who ran the two companies also differed. Obviously Henry
Ford ran the Ford Motor Company with the assistance of a few faithful
engineers. Ford insisted that he, himself, be consulted on all
decisions of any significance. Whether or not one should actually
consult him varied, but more stories are told about erring on the side
of not asking him. He knew the industry as well as anyone in the
business and he knew his company better than most presidents could know
an enterprise of such magnitude. Lastly, after the 1920 buyout, Ford
owned virtually all of the stock. Ford's profile provides an almost
humorous contrast to the presidents and executive committee of General
Motors. After "Willy" Durant left GM in 1920 the successive presidents
knew little or nothing about automobile production as Sloan admitted in
his memoirs.3 5 Instead they were men who knew about business.
To those who view the branch plants and the village industries as
decentralizing efforts, the Rouge and the vast investment in
centralization are confusing. The Rouge, especially when completed, was
the antithesis of decentralization. It would have, in one location, the
facilities to process every material and manufacture every component
used in an automobile. At the Rouge Henry Ford's dream literally came
true--that raw material went in one side of the plant and a complete
automobile came out the other.
Though in the end Ford's centralized company would prove the loser
207
and GM the winner, centralization served the Ford Motor Company well in
the beginning. Henry Ford quickly discovered that larger is cheaper,
and if done right, it is also faster. A master of cost accounting he
knew how to use economies of scale. He knew that by shaving a few
minutes from an operation he could save a few pennies; the pennies,
multiplied by the thousands of cars produced, eventually resulted in
great savings. As John Van Deventer, the industrial journalist, wrote,
"in an organizaion tuned up to the production pitch of the Ford Motor
Company, minutes are measured in terms of thousands of dollars." 3 6
Plant Layout and Materials Handling
Contrasted with the company's administration, the physical layout of
the Rouge was less centralized than other plants. The multiple story
buildings of earlier plants, including Highland Park, had been arranged
with adjoining walls, or grouped around a central yard. The layout at
the Rouge resembled neither of those models. To the outsider the Rouge
must have looked like an almost random placement of huge buildings. The
buildings at Highland Park had been placed contiguously to save time and
expense of materials handling, a strategy that proved successful in
speeding transportation. The arrangement created another problem
though, and one not easily solved by technological innovation. The
problem was expansion. With buildings so tightly arranged, each
department had to be carefully planned and if more machines or
operations were added many departments had to be shifted. This became a
very time consuming and expensive operation. When planning the Rouge,
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ease of expansion became a major concern for the engineers in charge of
layout. By organizing the plant into distinctly separate buildings they
assured the economy and potential of future growth. An editor of Iron
Age wrote in 1918 that "[at the Rouge] practically all construction is
being laid out with a view of 100% expansion when necessary."37
Engineers of the Ford Motor Company, more than their counterparts in any
other auto company, had reason to believe that the almost absurd amount
of space allowed for future expansion was necessary. The enormous size
of the Rouge site reflects the fact that the company had grown so much,
so fast, that the engineers must have anticipated unlimited growth. One
can imagine the thrill felt by Ford's engineers in planning the Rouge.
They had the opportunity to expand their success at Highland Park as
they developed new ideas on an unprecedented scale. Here was a company
with seemingly unlimited capital resources headed by a man willing to
try almost any new idea.
Decentralization of the plant layout is also apparent in considering
the administration building. The first administrative offices at the
Rouge were located in the Wash and Locker Building. Originally planned
as a facility for workers to clean-up, Sorensen converted it into office
space shortly after the building was completed. From these offices, on
the plant site, Sorensen ran the Rouge. In 1928, the year after the
introduction of the Model A, when the Rouge became the primary
production facility of the company, a new administration building was
completed. The new building was located a couple of miles away from the
plant. Though not far from the plant "as the crow flies" several sets
of railroad tracks and a large parcel of land separated the plant and
the administrative building. Of course each manufacturing building
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continued to have a supervisors office, but the company was run from
the new, detached building.
The separation represented several things. Henry Ford increasingly
delegated the running of the company to his son, Edsel, and to Charles
Sorensen. More importantly, the company's continued expansion required
an ever larger administrative and clerical staff for which physically
proximaty to the plant was unnecessary. Yet, what was the advantage of
placing the administrative offices completely away from the site? The
absence of the plant engineering department's records makes it difficult
to explain the separation with certainty, but informed conjecture can
help. The administrative offices at Highland Park were in a separate
building but next to the rest of the plant. Though physically close,
the offices and the plant received very different treatment. The
administration building, for example, housed the only dining room at
Highland Park in addition to the building's beautiful features. And of
course, office workers wore white collars rather than blue ones. The
buildings reflected the differences between office work and
manufacturing. Furthermore, increased labor conflicts by 1926, the year
construction began on the adminstration building, increased the inherent
tensions. Consequently, Ford probably believed it better to have the
offices at a safe distance from the plant. General industrial advice
also suggested the separation of the two functions. 3 9
Other companies preceded Ford in the separation of administration
from manufacturing. The split represented the increasing
professionalization of management, the new high leve managers had less
to do with the day to day operations of manufacturing. It also reflects
the incrasing managerial and clerical staff and the distinction between
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shop floor managers and business managers. By the 1920s companies like
Ford could not survive by simply making a good product. The marketing
and financial decisions determined success as often as the manufacturing
oerations, and many companies seemed to feel proximity to the rest of
the business community more important than closeness to the factory.
Consequently, many companies moved their offices even farther from
production than Ford. General Motors and Fisher Body both hired Albert
Kahn to design elaborate office buildings in Detroit's New Center.40
The Ford Motor Company subsequently built a new skyscraper to house
administrative offices even farther away from the plant than the
original building, it does, however, remain in Dearborn.
Like Highland Park, the Rouge had its chroniclers. In 1922 and 1923
the Industrial Management ran a ten part series written by John Van
Deventer, entitles "Ford Principles and Practice at River Rouge." He
documented nearly every process and building existing at the time. A
decade later the editor of Mill and Factory wrote an equally extensive
but more superficial series on the plant. Much of the following
discussion is taken from those articles.4 1
Construction at the Rouge began with the huge bins for raw materials
storage and the travelling bridge cranes that loaded and unloaded the
bins.(illust) Work on the first blast furnace also began in 1917.
Construction on the materials processing facilities stopped in 1918 when
the B Building was started and boat production consumed time and energy
allotted to the Rouge for the next year. (The company was involved in
more than boat building on behalf of the war effort. The Highland Park
plant produced trucks, tanks, and helmets for American and Allied
troops.) After the war a building campaign began that did not stop
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until the mid 1940s, with a brief break in construction during the
Depression years. Except for the B Building, all of the buildings
during the first few years were constructed for processing raw
materials--blast furnace, foundry, cement plant, power house, and
by-products building. Many small buildings were constructed as support
for the processing plants--breakers building, screening station,
pulverizing building, and others.
The huge processing facilities added to the need for a plant layout
different from Highland park. They had different requirements, most
notably for water and space. Because the processing facilities were the
first constructed they helped to establish the pattern for future
layout.
When construction finally stopped in the 1940s the Rouge contained
almost one hundred separate buildings. These included all of the
buildings one would expect to find--press shop, motor building, tool and
die shop, steel mill, tire plant, etc.--as well as many that would be
surprising to even the experienced engineer--box factory, paper mill,
waste heat power plant, benzol lab, and the soy bean extractor building.
The shift to single-story buildings constituted another change in
plant planning policy that added to the new layout configuration. By
1922 single-story plants had become at least an unofficial company
policy of plant construction. In responding to an inquiry about plant
design E.G. Liebold, Henry Ford's secretary, wrote "we find that a
one-story building for factory purposes with saw-tooth construction is
about the most efficient and obviates elevator service and transferring
materials up and down." 4 2
The Rouge was by no means the first plant to contain single-story
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buildings. Many engineers had argued for years for the efficiency and
economy of one-story plants. Single-story buildings, they argued cost
less to build and provided more flexible manufacturing space. The
problem with single-story plants, however, had been the difficulty in
finding efficient methods by which to move materials. In the Highland
Park plant Ford's engineers had discovered that vertical transportation
was easier than horizontal, given the state of mechanical handling
knowledge.
The diffuse plant layout and single-story buildings were acceptable
to the efficiency minded company only because of the constantly improved
system of materials handling. Materials handling developed to new
heights at the Rouge. Every department was equipped with mechanical
handling devices and every shop and building connected by a network of
overhead monorails and conveyors.43 According to Van Deventer, the
development of the Rouge's "integrated manufacturing" depended largely
on transportation. Integrated manufacturing, he wrote, "ushers in a new
era of mechanical handling, announcing] the beginning of the exit from
industry of manual lifting and shop pedestrianism, and sounds the death
knoll of the wheelbarrow and shovel."44 The continuous flow that
characterized the system eliminated "any possibility of loafing or
soldiering on the job when each operator is faced with the necessity of
keeping up with the procession or else seeing his stock piled up to a
point where it become distinctly noticeable by the immediate
management...45
The idea of process and transportation provided the key to
operations at the Rouge. In preceding decades engineers had improved
individual production machines so much that the cost of fabrication
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became a small part of the total cost of production. "The center of
thought in the modern plant is therefore no longer the individual
machine but the process," wrote Van Deventer. "The biggest cost savings
of today and tomorrow are likely to come from moving rather from making.
This is the decade of mechanical transportation."46
Engineers at the Rouge designed many different types of materials
handling technologies, consisting primarily of expansions on ideas first
developed at Highland Park. The moving conveyors, cranes, monorails,
railroads of earlier days persisted and were joined by overhead
conveyors, the high line and others. The moving conveyor continued to
be a prominent feature of the company's operation. (illust) As it was
improved and extended to more departments it continued to speed
production and eliminate workers just as it had at Highland Park. An
unsigned letter to Sorensen in 1929 described the most recent cuts:
I cabled you today, stating that we had eliminated over 400 men
in the B Building, with the installation of various conveyor
systems thoughout the different departments. In the torque tube
department, the conveyor from the department to the shipping
dock, has been completed and is in operation, eliminating 20 men
for handling stock. The brake plate conveyor from this
department to the loading dock completed, eliminating 80 men.
The differential gear case forging balcony and conveyor for same
from this department to the dock, has been completed and in
operation, eliminating 20 men.... In the steel Mill, the front
radius rod conveyor has been completed and in operation,
eliminating 20 men. The cold heading conveyor for handling cold
heading wire and finished rts will be put in operation Monday,
40 men will be eliminated.
At the Rouge, engineers succeeded in almost eliminating hand
trucking. Although Barclay lists it as one of many methods still in use
in 1936, hand trucking played a small role by then.4 8 The transportation
around the shop floor, previously done by the hand trucks, was
transferred to standard full-size, gas-powered trucks. On the "upper
floors of the B building one sees "a truck loaded with tools, jigs,
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fixtures, or supplies, running along the broad aisles, stopping at
certain points to unload goods and at others to pick up materials."
Furthermore, the aisles are compared to streets in a "small but busy
town."49
Overhead conveyors, made possible in the Rouge after the elimination
of belting, played the greatest role in eliminating hand trucking. As
indicated in chapter four, shop floor layout and movement around the
floor was hampered by the belting needed to power the machines. At the
Rouge, individual motors provided the power to most machines and group
drive powered a few of the smaller machines. By eliminating belting,
pulleys, and overhead shafting, plant engineers opened the space above
the machines, making the installation of the new conveyors possible.
Overhead conveyors became an important part of the Rouge production
system. They maintained a constant supply of parts for the worker,
eliminating the necessity of storing parts at each work station and more
importantly, eliminated the trucking of parts. The overhead conveyors,
thus, improved reliability and speed of production.
Machine placement in the Rouge shops resembled the layout schemes
originated at Highland Pak. Machines were placed closer than in more
conventional shops, so close that "a man who is accustomed to the space
usually allowed between machines.. .would say that the River Rouge
departments were crowded and congested."50 Van Deventer explained the
company's rationale--
Under the usual operating conditions in the average plant a
machine operator is required to take many steps that have been
eliminated at the River Rouge where 'the work moves and the men
stand still.' An old time machinist might feel himself decidedly
cramped if confined to the space alltted him in this machine
shop. Inasmuch as the majority of operators at River Rouge,
however, are specialists who perhaps have never even seen a
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machine tool before their employment by the Ford Company, they
have no precedents or ingrained hapits with respect to tool
operation and they soon become accustomed to carrying on their
operations in the space provided.51
The tight machine arrangement did not escape criticism, however. He
may not have expressed this view while working for Ford, but years later
William Pioch criticized the layout practice.
It was a good idea but it didn't work out too good...because the
machines were in so tight that sometimes if we had to move a
machine, we'd have to move four or five different machines to get
that one out.5 2
Engineers at the Rouge designed a vast network of railroad tracks
and roads to carry materials and the "unusual High Line" that served as
a major transport system throughout the plant. The High Line was a
forty foot high concrete structure resembling a viaduct, wide enough to
carry five railroad tracks, John Van Deventer called it the "backbone of
the plant." "The two principle functions of the High Line," wrote the
journalist, "are active storage and distribution."5 3
The High Line was a unique materials handling method. Similar to
the craneways of the Highland Park plant, it provided semi-automatic
delivery of parts and materials to several buildings. Like the
craneways, it handled the heavy materials and transported raw materials
to and from the huge storage bins. To that end, the line was equipped
with hoppers and gravity unloading devices which were moved by a remote
control system.5 4 In keeping with its anti-waste philosophy, the
company turned the area under the High Line into a one-story building
housing service shops, storage, and repair stations.
In addition to the High Line, the Detroit, Toledo, and Ironton
railroad as well as the internal system of railroads and roads moved
heavy materials. Like the arrangement at Highland Park, railroad cars
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could be brought right into many of the buildings, thus facilitating
deliveries. According to Hartley W. Barclay, editor of Mill and
Factory, "the new River Rouge plant includes the largest completely
mechanized installation of handling equipment ever installed in any
industrial enterprise."5 5
Much of the work at the Rouge consisted of processing and other
heavy work like that in the foundry and press shop. Consequently,
handling facilities had greater demands than at Highland Park. The
handling of coal through the plant provides a good example. A
travelling bridge crane lifted the coal from storage bins at the ore
docks and dumped it in the railroad cars on the High Line. The High
Line carried the coal from the ore docks and dumped it on an enclosed
conveyor. The conveyor carried the coal in to the Pulverizer Building
where it was crushed to be fed into the coke ovens or oilers of the
Power House by another conveyor.56
Operations at the Rouge gradually began to include manufacturing in
addition to the processing, heavy work, and partial assembly. In 1924
completion of three buildings significantly changed things at the Rouge.
The buildings--the Motor Plant, Press Building, and Spring and Upset
Building--marked the beginnings of the company's total move from
Highland Park to the Rouge. Ford Industries published the official
explanation for the move:
Whenever production warrants it the practice of bringing the
machine to the part rather than the part to the machine is
followed. Eighteen Highland Park departments are being moved to
the Rouge in order that all operations from the melting of ore to
the final assembly of the motor may be made continuous. It is
easier to move the machine to the Rouge plant than to bring
castings to Highland Park in constantly increasing numbers.57
The company's big move to the Rouge finalized the policy of
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corporate centralization. The expense and technological sophistication
of the plant speaks to more than centralization, however; it reflects
Henry Ford's emphasis on production methods and quality of product.
Though Henry Ford himself, proved a masterful publicity manager,
throughout his life he encouraged technological innovation over
marketing. His thinking, as embodied in the Ford Motor Company, lies
behind the construction of a complex like the Rouge.
The Ford Motor Company tradition becomes clearer when contrasted
with General Motors. The GM approach, in contrast to the Ford Motor
Company, concentrated energies on financial and legal skills rather than
production and mechanical skills. GM, instead of building a company by
virtue of mechanical know-how, collected together small companies along
with their engineers and mechanics.
The Ford Motor Company's emergence as a successful company came
relatively early in auto history. Ford "made it" largely because he
produced a cheap, good q'uality car. This "first stage" of auto history,
as Alfred Chandler has called it, depended on mechanical invention and
innovation. The Ford Motor Company continued to operate as though it
remained in that first stage for several decades. The construction of
the Rouge reflects that thinking. The organization of General Motors,
on the other hand, occurred during the "second stage" of auto history,
best characterized by competition through marketing.
The Model T, Ford's foremost success, stood at the center of plans
for the Rouge plant. Model T sales, however, began to fall in the mid
1920s. But plant expansion continued as though the company would only
the single model forever. The entire complex was designed around
building only the Model T.
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Finally, in 1926, Henry Ford realized the necessity of a model
change. Once design engineers prepared the new model, it took the
company six months to retool for Model A production. This period of
retooling exposed all of the problems with the Ford system. First, the
single model production meant that the entire plant closed down during
the changeover. Second, because the Rouge had been built solely for
Model T production, it had built into it an inflexibility that
substantially slowed the retooling process.
During the changeover the company moved many operations, including
final assembly, from Highland Park to the Rouge. At the same time
several innovations were added. The October 1927 Ford News proudly
announced that "radical advances have been made in the body department.
Not a single body truck will be employed either in building a body or in
transferring it to the assembly line. From first to last the body will
be handled by conveyors, hoists, elevators, and transfer tables."5 8
Further improvements included some rearrangement of departments to
facilitate delivery of stock. The motor assembly line was joined with
the main assembly line and assembly line practice was improved to allow
assembling of several different body types on the same line. 5 9 The
changeover proved to be very costly to the company. Not only was the
actual expense greater than it would have been in a company organized
differently, but Ford business stopped completely during the changeover
and GM took over'the market lead and succeeded in keeping it. Ford
continued to believe his single model strategy was best but the market
forced him diversify--even innovators become wedded to their own
traditions.
In 1932 the company introduced the V-8 engine and, in 1939, the
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Mercury, but the Ford Motor Company found diversification difficult.
The organization that Ford built around the Model T tacitly excluding
the innovative, creative elements required for new product development.
This is in contrast to GM, a company as diversified as Ford was
unified." Chandler accurately characterizes the Rouge as a brilliant
technological success but unsuccessful as a business venture.60
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Aerial view of the River Rouge plant. FMC Archives.
Storage bins and loading crane at River Rouge plant.
FMIC Archives.
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Conclusion
In 1927 the Ford Motor Company commissioned Charles Sheeler to
produce a series of documentary photographs of the River Rouge plant.
Sheeler had already earned recognition for his urban and rural
landscapes, but his industrial landscapes would become his most famous
artistic achievement. The Rouge photos though, were hardly documentary.
Instead they reflected Sheeler's almost romantic vision of industry.
Sheeler's photos of the Rouge depict a clean and orderly plant, void of
heavy industry's smoke and grime. To achieve that mood Sheeler chose
isolated views, views that created an abstract and almost beautiful
image of the plant. His photographs, like his later paintings, belied
the reality of the factory; they make the viewer forget the noise, the
heat, and most of all the smells that emanated from the plant.
Around 1930 Sheeler began to use his photographs as the basis for a
series of paintings. In the paintings he presents the plant in a cold
romanticism; "it is the industrial landscape pastoralized," removed of
"the frenzied movement and clamor we associate with the industrial
scene," as Leo Marx has written about "American Landscape."1  Clean,
efficient buildings, commanding of order and respect fill Sheeler's
canvases. He achieved that impression by simplifying the scenes, by
stripping the factory of its complexity. Sheeler painted only major
forms, and to enhance the pastoral impression he painted them in
pastels. He left out the clutter of the real factory and, perhaps most
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revealing, he left out the workers--his fascination was for the machine,
not the workers. By visually removing the workers, Sheeler produced his
own version of the rational factory, the factory that operated just like
a machine, a factory in which workers were important only as hidden
pieces of the machine.
Sheeler's quiet landscapes provide concrete images for John Van
Deventer's description of the plant:
I have said that the first impression of the River Rouge is of
vastness and complexity. The second impression is that of
motionless quiet. Unless one enters a building, there does not
seem to be much going on. One does not see many people in the
yards, perhaps the reasons being that space is so vast that men
are less noticeable. As a matter of fact comparatively few men
are required outside the buildings because of the extent to which
mechanical transportation has been developed.2
Sheeler, like many Americans of his day, seemed to revere "the
machine." His art glorifies the factory much like earlier artists paid
homage to the church. In fact, the caption beneath one photograph of
the Rouge, published in Vanity Fair in 1928, referred to the plant in
religious terms -- "an American altar of the God-objective of Mass
Production," and a "Mecca toward which the pious journey for prayer." A
few years earlier Van Deventer, similarly praised the plant and Henry
Ford. He wrote:
Steam and power from the water, glass from the sand, ore and coal
from the cliffs, limestone from the gray rocks and lumber from
the trees.--and thus the motor car and tractor.
Henry Ford has brought the hand of God and the hand of Man closer
together at River Rouge than they have ever been brought in any
other industrial undertaking.3
Sheeler personally believed that "industry, with its emphasis on
utility, efficiency, and progress best expressed American life." 4 He
wrote that "every age manifests the nature of its content by some
external form of evidence." He believed that, with the decline of
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religious beliefs, industry had become the focus for the major belief
system. Consequently, the factory took on new symbolic importance.5
In addition to the actual images he created, Sheeler's titles
further disclosed his ideas about the factory. "American Landscape,"
"Classic Landscape," "Ballet Mechanique," and "City Interior," suggest
that Sheeler believed industrial environments to be more than places for
production. His titles imbue the images with a significance beyond
manufacturing, the factory became a major cultural symbol. Sheeler's
landscapes, as an expression of an American attitude, speak volumes
about changes in thinking about the factory. Compared to the negative
literary images of the eighteenth and nineteenth century factories,
Sheeler's visual depictions of the River Rouge plant embody an
enthusiasm for industry, reflecting the impact of an industrial society
on American attitudes. He captured the growing belief in industry as
the Messiah for modern society and in the factory its physical
representation.
In 1931 Edsel Ford contracted with the Mexican artist, Diego Rivera,
to paint murals with an industrial theme in the courtyard of the Detroit
Institute of Art. Like Sheeler, Rivera was fascinated with the River
Rouge plant and chose it as the subject for his murals. Also like
Sheeler, Rivera considered modern factories important as architecture
and as a cultural symbol. He wrote that "in all the constructions of
man's past--pyramids, Roman roads and aqueducts, cathedrals and palaces,
there is nothing to equal these [factories]." 6
The resemblance between the two men stops with their common respect
for industry and technology. Rivera's murals, in contrast to Sheeler's
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landscapes, step inside the buildings of the Rouge plant to the teeming
world of auto production and workers. The murals depict a voluptuous
Rouge, in contrast to the cool detached crispness of Sheeler's
paintings. Rivera painted the machines with sensuous, soft, curved
edges. His panels are filled with people, in contrast to Sheelers
humanless exterior images. Rivera portrayed workers and machines,
though for him workers remained the most vital force in the factory.
Rivera believed in the importance of the factory in modern life,
placing industrial buildings, machine-design, and engineering in
positions loftier than any other accomplishments in all of history. But
unlike Sheeler, Rivera saw the worker as the center of, and the power
behind, the great machine.7 In focusing on people in the factory, his
murals suggest a negative side of factory life. He depicts the machines
as larger than life, as dominating the men around them and dictating the
pace of work. The activity in the mural is almost too much for the
viewer to comprehend. In stark contrast to Sheeler's serene landscape,
Rivera's Rouge is frenetic, reminding the observer of the Forditis
suffered by workers in the early days of the assembly line.
The two artists depicted different realities of the modern rational
factory. Both images have their own truths. To Sheeler, the Rouge
represented the rational factory, one with little need for workers. He
perceived the ideal toward which industrial engineers worked. Rivera,
on the other hand, recognized some of the consequences of that ideal.
He saw the relationship of the modern factory to history, to the
environment, and to workers.
It was fitting that both artists portrayed Ford's River Rouge plant,
at the time the most modern of factories. The Rouge was the culmination
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of three decades of experimentation with factory planning and design.
It represented the direction in which modern industry would move, both
in building style and production methods; it was a harbinger of things
to come. Above all, it reflected the growing recognition of the
importance of factory organization. The Ford Motor Company, and other
companies, looked to the redesign and reorganization of the factory as a
way to facilitate the perfection of assembly line production and as a
way to better manage workers. The new factory layout, the assembly
line, and the division of labor allowed managers to maintain closer
watch over workers.
Improvements in production technology in the early twentieth century
had increased the potential for faster production and larger volume.
That potential could be realized, however, only with major
reorganization of the factory. The Ford Motor Company, more than most
companies, addressed the problems of organization by designing new
factories at each stage in the development of mass production. At Ford,
one sees a group of engineers trying to figure out how to organize mass
production and to find the best factory for it. Each of the company's
factories should be viewed as more than additional space, it should be
seen as a critical point in the development of Ford's production system.
The Piquette Avenue plant represented the company's first expansion.
Its builders clearly copied the nineteenth century mill building style
and the company's production process at that time, differed little from
nineteenth century production. Highland Park's old and new shops were
transitional buildings--they embodied characteristics of both nineteenth
and twentieth century factories. The old shop represented the
introduction of the Model T and the first attempts to improve materials
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handling. The new shop represented the beginning of the rational
factory, a factory planned to fit the production process rather than the
constraints of building technology or power transmission. The River
Rouge plant undoubtedly introduced the modern factory to world; the
modern factory combined rational factory planning with modern production
and construction technology. It demonstrated to American industry that
technology and know-how had reached the level needed to organize a
large, totally integrated manufacturing enterprise.
At a level of analysis more general than the individual company, we
can see the impact of factory reorganization on the entire auto
industry. Ford's success resulted, in large part, from the
systematization that paralleled improvements in factory design. Ford's
success marked the beginning of the centralization of the entire auto
industry. By the time the Rouge was built the dozens of small companies
had begun to feel the squeeze of the large companies. Mechanization and
centralization made it impossible for companies with small capital to
compete, they could not install the systems that had allowed the large
companies to reduce their prices so much.
The rational factory had a profound impact on the worker. It
heralded the stage in industrialization in which the factory was removed
another step from non-work life. The rational factory--the moving
assembly line, combined with the mechanization of nearly all materials
handling and other work--turned the factory into a mechanical wonder
that left the worker with few authorized freedoms. Managers and
engineers used factory planning and design to confront the increasingly
complicated task of organizing and controlling growing numbers of
workers, machines, and materials in one place.
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By 1930 industrial engineers made significant progress in factory
planning and design. Mechanized materials handling systems and
automated machinery, plus the elimination of belting for transmission of
power had freed engineers to layout the shop floor in the most efficient
manner. That freedom, coupled with reinforced concrete and steel
construction, opened vast possibilities for the design of factories.
Mechanized materials handling, more than the other innovations, allowed
production engineers to chart every necessary movement in the factory.
With such control over details, industrial engineers succeeded in making
everything in the factory merely a cog in the master machine.
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Charles Sheeler, photograph of Cement Plant and boat slip.
233
-W-W-
234
235
Notes: Conclusion
1. Leo Marx, Machine in the Garden (NY: Oxford University Press,
1964), 355-56.
2. John Van Deventer,"Links in a Complete Industrial Chain,"
Industrial Management, Sept. 1922, 137.
3. Van Deventer, 131.
4. J.J. Jacobs, "The Rouge in 1927," The Rouge (Detroit: Detroit
Institute of Arts, 1978), 11.
5. Pgpers of Charles Sheeler, NSh 1, frame 101, Archives of American
Art, Smithsonian.
6. Bertram Wolfe, Diego Rivera, His Life and Times (NY, 1939), 313.
7. Linda Downs, "The Rouge in 1932," The Rouge.
236
